About

Colin Marshall is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Washington. He received his B.A. in Philosophy from Reed College in 2003 and his Ph.D. from New York University in 2010. Before joining the University of Washington, he was the Gerry Higgins Lecturer in the History of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. Born and raised in northern New Mexico, he is also an Adjunct Associate Professor of German Studies. His work primarily focuses on the history of philosophy, especially Kant and Schopenhauer, and issues in ethics. Marshall is engaged in finishing two books: 'Just Hear Me Out: How to Change Minds without Lies, Bullshit, or Moral Compromise,' scheduled for publication in Fall 2026 with the University of Chicago Press, and 'Schopenhauer's Guide to a Tolerable Life,' under contract with Princeton University Press. His research includes exploring normative ethics, the content of compassion, and applying Kantian categories to philosophical questions. He has authored numerous articles and edited volumes, contributing significantly to contemporary discussions in moral philosophy, metaethics, and the history of philosophy.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Psychology
• Philosophy
• Epistemology
• Social psychology
• Physics
• Mathematics
• Applied psychology
• Cognitive psychology
• Theology
• Linguistics

Selected publications

• Kant’s Derivation of the Moral “Ought” from a Metaphysical “Is”

  Oxford University Press eBooks · 2022 · 13 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Epistemology
  • Philosophy
  • Physics

  Abstract This chapter argues that Kant can be read as holding that “ought” judgments follow from certain “is” judgments by mere analysis. More specifically, an interpretation is defended according to which (1) Kant holds that “S ought to F” is analytically equivalent to “If, as it can and would were there no other influences on the will, S’s faculty of reason determined S’s willing, S would F” and (2) Kant’s notions of reason, the will, and freedom are all fundamentally non-normative. Not only does this reading have significant textual support, but it also sheds light on why Kant takes freedom and morality to mutually imply one another. Moreover, while Kant does take there to be a gap between moral judgments and empirical descriptive statements, that gap is consistent with the analysis in question. The author concludes by arguing that this rejection of the is-ought gap is not as philosophically implausible as it might seem, with a focus on G. E. Moore and Hume’s arguments for certain “gaps” between the normative and the non-normative.

  DOI

• Evidence that implementation intentions reduce drivers’ use of mobile phones while driving

  Transportation Research Part F Traffic Psychology and Behaviour · 2021 · 24 citations

  • Computer Science
  • Applied psychology
  • Psychology
  DOI

• Schopenhauer on the content of compassion

  Noûs · 2020 · 6 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Psychology
  • Philosophy

  Abstract On the traditional reading, Schopenhauer claims that compassion is the recognition of deep metaphysical unity. In this paper, I defend and develop the traditional reading. I begin by addressing three recent criticisms of that reading from Sandra Shapshay: that it fails to accommodate Schopenhauer's restriction to sentient beings, that it cannot explain his moral ranking of egoism over malice, and that Schopenhauer requires some level of distinction to remain in compassion. Against Shapshay, I argue that Schopenhauer does not restrict compassion to sentient beings and that a more metaphysically refined version of the traditional reading can accommodate both Schopenhauer's moral ranking of characters and allow for some level of distinction in compassion. I then turn to four further questions for the traditional reading: what the relation is between the feeling of compassionate pain and the recognition of metaphysical unity, how cognitions mediate compassion, whether compassion is limited to the present, and how the feeling of compassion relates to Schopenhauer's fundamental moral principle. I conclude by explaining how, in a reductive vein, the traditional reading can also allow for compassion to have normative content.

  DOI

Frequent coauthors

• Aaron Barker

  University of Washington

  2 shared

• Jonathan Simon

  Université de Montréal

  2 shared

• Carla Corbin

  1 shared

• Chris Baas

  1 shared

• Kimberly Kreuzman

  1 shared

• Lohren Deeg

  1 shared

• Alicia Haydon

  1 shared

• Margaret-Alice Tree

  1 shared

Awards & honors

• Mellon Summer Fellowship for New Graduate Seminars in the Hu…

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