Pablo Casas Arce

About

Pablo Casas Arce is an associate professor at the W.P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University, where he has been a faculty member since 2012. His research focuses on areas including compensation, control systems, the use of accounting information, organizational economics, and corporate governance. His work has been published in top journals such as the Journal of Political Economy, Management Science, Journal of Accounting Research, and The Accounting Review. Prior to his current position, he held faculty appointments at Universitat Pompeu Fabra from 2006 to 2012 and at the University of Oxford from 2003 to 2006. Casas Arce earned his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2003 and his B.A. from Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain in 1998.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Business
• Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public relations
• Computer Science
• Accounting
• Psychology
• Management science
• Finance

Selected publications

• Women and Power: Unpopular, Unwilling, or Held Back?

  Journal of Political Economy · 2015-05-19 · 133 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  We use Spain’s Equality Law to test for the existence of agency problems between party leaders and their constituents. The law mandates a 40 percent female quota on electoral lists in towns with populations above 5,000. Using pre- and postquota data by party and municipality, we implement a triple-difference design. We find that female quotas resulted in slightly better electoral results for the parties that were most affected by the quota. Our evidence shows that party leaders were not maximizi…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

  Journal of Accounting Research · 2017-08-10 · 78 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  ABSTRACT This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve pe…

  PublisherDOI

• Relative Performance Evaluation and the Ratchet Effect

  Contemporary Accounting Research · 2017-12-12 · 44 citations

  article1st author

  ABSTRACT When targets depend on past performance, incentives are adversely affected by the ratchet effect. We provide theory and evidence that incorporating past peer performance into targets can alleviate this adverse incentive effect. In particular, we present an analytical model that characterizes optimal target revisions as a function of past own and past peer performance. We then test the predictions of our model using data on 2008–2010 performance targets from 354 units of a governmental a…

  PublisherDOI

• The Impact of Forward-Looking Metrics on Employee Decision-Making: The Case of Customer Lifetime Value

  The Accounting Review · 2016-08-01 · 36 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the effects of forward-looking metrics on employee decision-making. We use data from a bank that started providing branch managers with the customer lifetime value (CLV)—an estimate of the future value of the customer relationship—of mortgage applicants. The data allow us to gauge the effects of enriching the employees' information set in an environment where explicit incentives and decision rights remained unchanged. On average, customer value increased 5 percent af…

  PublisherDOI

• Contracting with Opportunistic Partners: Theory and Application to Technology Development and Innovation

  Management Science · 2018-04-30 · 23 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  After a contract is signed, contracting partners may engage in opportunistic behavior aimed at circumventing the original intention of the agreement governing their business relationship, complying with the letter but not the spirit of the contract. We use an incomplete contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of such behavior are typically not enough to prevent it when parties can renegotiate contractual outcomes. This is because contractually specified incentives inev…

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• F. Asís Martínez-Jerez

  Cornell University

  12 shared

• Francisco de Asís Martínez-Jerez

  Cornell University

  9 shared

• Albert Sáiz

  6 shared

• V.G. Narayanan

  6 shared

• Michal Matějka

  4 shared

• Francisco de Asis Martinez Jerez

  4 shared

• Sven Modell

  3 shared

• Raffi Indjejikian

  University of Michigan–Ann Arbor

  3 shared

Education

• Ph.D.

  Harvard University

  2003

• B.A.

  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain

  1998

Similar researchers at Arizona State University

• Gregory Dawsonh-12
• Jenny Brownh-12
• Lucile Faurelh-12