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Nova · Professor Researcher · re-ranking top 20…

Valerie Tiberius

· Professor

University of Minnesota · Philosophy

Active 1997–2026

h-index21
Citations1.7k
Papers12430 last 5y
Funding
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About

Valerie Tiberius is a professor in the Philosophy department at the University of Minnesota, affiliated with the College of Liberal Arts. Her work explores the ways in which philosophy and psychology can both contribute to the study of well-being and virtue. She has authored several books, including The Reflective Life: Living Wisely With Our Limits, Well-Being as Value Fulfillment: How We Can Help Others to Live Well, Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, and What Do You Want out of Life?: A Philosophical Guide to Figuring Out What Matters. Her research interests include well-being, ethics, and moral psychology. Tiberius has contributed to philosophical discussions on value commitments, practical deliberation, prudential virtues, cultural differences in well-being, and the stability of practical reason. She has also been actively involved in organizing professional activities, such as the Minnesota Workshop on Well-Being, which brings together philosophers and psychologists to discuss the relationship between their fields. She served as President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association from July 2016 to June 2017. Her academic background includes numerous awards and fellowships, such as the McKnight Land-Grant, the National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, and the Defining Wisdom grant from the University of Chicago/Templeton Foundation. Tiberius teaches courses on topics including happiness, moral theories, contemporary moral theories, and well-being, and she maintains a personal website with additional information about her work.

Research topics

  • Computer Science
  • Psychology
  • Sociology
  • Social psychology
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Statistics
  • Developmental psychology
  • Epistemology
  • Engineering
  • Engineering ethics
  • Mathematics

Selected publications

  • 2 Friends and “Friends”: What Is Friendship?

    Princeton University Press eBooks · 2026-02-25

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • 7 Risky Business

    Princeton University Press eBooks · 2026-02-25

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • 5 I Am Nothing without My Friends: Friendship Makes Us Who We Are

    Princeton University Press eBooks · 2026-02-25

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • 4 What’s in It for Me? What Friendship Gets Us

    Princeton University Press eBooks · 2026-02-25

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • Value Fulfillment and the Prudential Good

    2026-02-04

    book-chapterSenior author

    Abstract Theories of well-being aim to characterize the prudential good, or what is good for someone. One prominent view, inspired by the Ancients, is that a prudentially good life just is a morally good life. Another prominent position, inspired by utilitarian philosophers, is that a good life for a person is a life with more pleasures than pains. A third perspective, with roots in Hobbes, holds that a good life is one in which a person achieves their aims. This chapter describes and explores a view about prudential good that fits most naturally in this third camp. According to the value fulfillment theory, one’s well-being consists in realizing or fulfilling one’s values, which integrate one’s affective, conative, and cognitive attitudes. This makes well-being relative to individuals in the sense that what is good for a person depends on their own valuing attitudes and capacities, not on moral or intrinsic values that transcend the individual.

  • 3 What’s So Great about Friendship?

    Princeton University Press eBooks · 2026-02-25

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • James Lenman, The Possibility of Moral Community: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024. Hardback, ISBN: 9780198885085. 188 pages

    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · 2026-03-20

    article1st authorCorresponding
  • Philosophical Concepts in Organization and Leadership

    2025-04-08

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

    Abstract This chapter explores the intersections of organization theory, economics, and philosophy, with a particular focus on critiques of the homo economicus model. Battilana’s discussion challenges neoclassical economic assumptions, resonating with political philosophy critiques. Walsh provides contrasting perspectives, suggesting a nuanced debate on rational agency within organizational theory. Themes of power dynamics, motivational factors, and ethical leadership are examined, emphasizing the complex interplay between individual agency and social forces. Mendiola introduces the concept of “true leaders” as ethically thick, action-guiding notions. The chapter underscores the fragility of shared values and concepts, urging reflection on their preservation and adaptation in contemporary business discourse.

  • Adaptive Values and Subjective Ill-Being

    2025-04-16

    book-chapterSenior author

    Abstract This chapter addresses a key challenge for subjective theories of well-being: to explain how the satisfaction of certain adaptive preferences may be prudentially bad. Critics argue, for example, that subjective theories have the unfortunate implication that if a person wants to remain enslaved, then the fulfilment of this desire is good for them. This chapter contends that a subjective theory centred on values, rather than mere preferences or desires, can provide an explanation for why some adaptive values are prudentially harmful. In particular, it argues that the Value Fulfillment Theory (VFT) can account for how certain adaptive values negatively affect well-being by appealing to psychological integration and the long-term fulfilment of values.

  • Introduction: What Is Moral Psychology?

    2023-07-03

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

Frequent coauthors

Awards & honors

  • McKnight Land-Grant (2002)
  • Consortium Fellow, Consortium on Law and Values in Health, E…
  • Young Scholar at Cornell (Spring 2002)
  • Defining Wisdom grant, University of Chicago/Templeton Found…
  • National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship (Jan. 2013…
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