Tom Ristenpart

About

Thomas Ristenpart is a professor at Cornell Tech and a member of the computer science department at Cornell University. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of California, San Diego, in 2010, and his M.S. at the University of California, Davis, in 2005. Before joining Cornell Tech in May 2015, he spent four and a half years as an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ristenpart’s research spans a wide range of computer security topics, with recent focuses including digital privacy and safety in interpersonal abuse; anti-abuse mitigations for encrypted messaging systems; improvements to authentication mechanisms, including passwords; and topics in applied and theoretical cryptography. His work is routinely featured in the media and has been recognized by numerous distinguished paper awards, two ACM CCS test-of-time awards, a USENIX Security test-of-time award, an Advocate of New York City award, an NSF CAREER Award, and a Sloan Research Fellowship.

Research topics

• Computer Security
• Computer Science
• Political Science
• Internet privacy
• Law
• Sociology
• Public relations
• Psychology
• Criminology
• Programming language

Selected publications

• Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020

  Lecture notes in computer science · 2020 · 629 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  DOI

• Trauma-Informed Computing: Towards Safer Technology Experiences for All

  CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · 2022 · 142 citations

  Trauma is the physical, emotional, or psychological harm caused by deeply distressing experiences. Research with communities that may experience high rates of trauma has shown that digital technologies can create or exacerbate traumatic experiences. Via three vignettes, we discuss how considering the possible effects of trauma and traumatic stress reactions provides an explanatory lens with new insights into people’s technology experiences. Then, we present a framework—trauma-informed computing—…

  PublisherDOI

• SoK: Hate, Harassment, and the Changing Landscape of Online Abuse

  2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · 2021 · 133 citations

  We argue that existing security, privacy, and antiabuse protections fail to address the growing threat of online hate and harassment. In order for our community to understand and address this gap, we propose a taxonomy for reasoning about online hate and harassment. Our taxonomy draws on over 150 interdisciplinary research papers that cover disparate threats ranging from intimate partner violence to coordinated mobs. In the process, we identify seven classes of attacks—such as toxic content and…

  DOI

• Care Infrastructures for Digital Security in Intimate Partner Violence

  CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · 2022-04-27 · 70 citations

  articleOpen access

  Survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV) face complex threats to their digital privacy and security. Prior work has established protocols for directly helping them mitigate these harms; however, there remains a need for flexible and pluralistic systems that can support survivors’ long-term needs. This paper describes the design and development of sociotechnical infrastructure that incorporates feminist notions of care to connect IPV survivors experiencing technology abuse with volunteer comp…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• A Digital Safety Dilemma: Analysis of Computer-Mediated Computer Security Interventions for Intimate Partner Violence During COVID-19

  2021 · 45 citations

  The shutdown measures necessary to stop the spread of COVID-19 have amplified the role of technology in intimate partner violence (IPV). Survivors may be forced to endure lockdowns with their abusers, intensifying the dangers of technology-enabled abuse (e.g. stalking, harassment, monitoring, surveillance). They may also be forced to rely on potentially compromised devices to reach support networks: a dangerous dilemma for digital safety. This qualitative study examines how technologists with co…

  PublisherDOI

Recent grants

• CAREER: Infrastructure for Secure Cloud Computing

  NSF · $385k · 2015–2019

• CAREER: Infrastructure for Secure Cloud Computing

  NSF · $280k · 2013–2015

Frequent coauthors

• Nicola Dell

  Cornell University

  32 shared

• Ari Juels

  24 shared

• Paul Grubbs

  University of Michigan–Ann Arbor

  23 shared

• Thomas Shrimpton

  University of Florida

  20 shared

• Mihir Bellare

  18 shared

• Emily Tseng

  Cornell University

  13 shared

• Rahul Chatterjee

  University of Wisconsin–Madison

  12 shared

• Michael M. Swift

  University of Wisconsin–Madison

  12 shared

Labs

• Tom Ristenpart's LabPI

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Education

• Ph.D.

  University of California, San Diego

  2010

• M.S.

  University of California, Davis

  2005

Awards & honors

• ACM CCS test-of-time award
• USENIX Security test-of-time award
• Advocate of New York City award
• NSF CAREER Award
• Sloan Research Fellowship

Similar researchers at Cornell University

• Jon Kleinbergh-122
• Deborah Estrinh-120
• Wen Sunh-102