Tim Baldenius
· Paul M. Montrone Professor of Private Enterprise in the Faculty of BusinessVerifiedColumbia University · Accounting
Active 1998–2025
Research topics
- Computer Science
- Business
- Economics
- Political Science
- Finance
- Accounting
- Econometrics
- Microeconomics
- Financial system
- Process management
- Public relations
- Knowledge management
Selected publications
Innovation in firms: Experimentation and strategic communication
Journal of Accounting and Economics · 2025-08-23
articleSenior authorCorrespondingAccounting information and risk shifting with asymmetrically informed creditors
Journal of Accounting and Economics · 2023 · 5 citations
1st authorCorresponding- Business
- Finance
- Economics
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01
articleOpen access1st authorCorrespondingSSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01
articleOpen access1st authorCorrespondingInnovation and Strategic Communication
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022 · 6 citations
1st authorCorresponding- Computer Science
- Political Science
- Business
Review of Accounting Studies · 2021 · 13 citations
1st authorCorresponding- Computer Science
- Business
- Accounting
Special Interest Forum on the Interface between Managerial Accounting and Tax
Journal of Management Accounting Research · 2021-04-01 · 4 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingViews Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Tim Baldenius, Scott D. Dyreng; Special Interest Forum on the Interface between Managerial Accounting and Tax. Journal of Management Accounting Research 1 April 2021; 33 (1): 1–5. doi: https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-10760 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search nav search search input Search input auto suggest Search
Accounting Information and Risk Shifting with Asymmetrically Informed Creditors
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2020-01-01
articleOpen access1st authorCorrespondingResponsibility Centers, Decision Rights, and Synergies
The Accounting Review · 2019-07-01 · 8 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingABSTRACT We consider the optimal allocation of decision rights over noncontractible specific investments. Risk-averse business unit managers each engage in general (stand-alone) operations and invest in joint projects that benefit their own and other divisions. Which of the managers should have the authority to choose these investments? With scalable investments, we show that decision rights should be bundled in the hands of the manager facing the more volatile environment. With discrete (lumpy) investments, on the other hand, decision rights should be split between the managers, provided they face comparable levels of uncertainty in their general operations. Splitting decision rights better leverages the inherent investment complementarity, counter to conventional wisdom. Our model generates empirical predictions for the equilibrium association of organizational structure and managers' incentive contracts: bundling of decision rights results in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) divergence across divisions; splitting them results in PPS convergence. JEL Classifications: M41; D23; D86.
Integrated ownership and managerial incentives with endogenous project risk
Review of Accounting Studies · 2019-11-20 · 8 citations
article1st author
Frequent coauthors
- 25 shared
Stefan Reichelstein
- 6 shared
Nahum D. Melumad
Columbia University
- 6 shared
Xiaojing Meng
Xuzhou Medical College
- 6 shared
Beatrice Michaeli
University of California, Los Angeles
- 4 shared
Ziv Amir
Superior University
- 3 shared
Aaron S. Edlin
National Bureau of Economic Research
- 3 shared
Lin Qiu
- 2 shared
Hao Xue
Duke University
- Resume-aware match score
- Save to shortlist
- AI-drafted outreach
See your match with Tim Baldenius
PhdFit ranks faculty by your research interests, methods, and publications — grounded in their actual work, not templates.
- Free to start
- No credit card
- 30-second signup