About

Thomas Christiano is a Professor and the Department Head in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He is part of the core faculty in the Social Sciences and is based in Room 215, with office hours on Mondays from 2-4pm or by appointment. His contact information includes a phone number, 520-621-5046, and an email address. His research focuses on political philosophy, and he is involved in departmental activities related to philosophy and social sciences. Further details about his background, research contributions, or specific areas of expertise are not provided in the page text.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Computer Science
• Law
• Sociology
• Social Science
• Computer Security
• Geometry
• Economics
• Law and economics
• Mathematics

Selected publications

• Self-Government

  Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2025-03-31

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
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• Symposium on Tommie Shelby's <i>The Idea of Prison Abolition</i>

  Politics Philosophy & Economics · 2025-07-20

  article1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Normative Conventionalism about Contracts

  2025-04-10

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Normative conventionalism asserts that the nature of contracts and their normative force are primarily explained by reference to the normative force of conventions or institutions that create relations of contract. The normative force of the conventions derives from the system of such conventions satisfying several values such as freedom, justice, and efficiency. And the obligations of persons derive from the requirements that persons do their share to uphold the justice and efficiency of the convention by, in the first instance, treating each other in accordance with the norms of the practice as they have been laid down. This chapter attempts to defend normative conventionalism with a new argument and against some powerful critiques. It argues, first, that normatively desirable conventions can be the source of the special obligations of contracts, so that neither the fidelity view nor the normative powers view expresses a necessary condition on contractual obligations. Second, it argues that considerations of equilibrium in the system of contracts overall provide good reason for thinking that normatively desirable conventions are the grounds of a large swath of the contracts we see. Third, it argues that normatively desirable conventions either are the sole source of obligations or that such conventions gradually replace naturally produced obligations in an increasingly complex society. Finally, it argues that the fact that contracts create directed obligations, which is normally taken to be a consideration in favor of non-conventionalist approaches, actually provides support for conventionalism because such directedness is actually quite uneven among contracts.

  PublisherDOI

• War, Legitimacy, and Democracy

  Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · 2025-09-04

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  This discussion article examines Massimo Renzo’s highly illuminating critique of the revisionist view of the moral obligations of soldiers in war and his effort to defend an intermediate position between the classical (or “traditional”) approach and the revisionist approach. The classical approach argues that soldiers have a duty to fight if commanded to do so by a legitimate state. This supports the idea that soldiers on all sides are moral equals. The revisionist approach argues that soldiers are obligated to fight only if they have a justified belief that the war is just. The legitimacy of the state and the need for legitimate political authority are not essential to the assessment of the moral obligation of soldiers, say revisionists. Many soldiers are permitted to fight, others are just criminals. Renzo defends the view that a soldier is permitted to fight if she is commanded to do so by a legitimate state and she has no justification for the idea that the war is unjust, thus reversing the revisionist presumption against fighting. This discussion article examines Renzo’s argument for a modified account of moral equality. It probes and questions the main argument for the presumptive approach to the duty to fight. And it critiques Renzo’s thesis that a citizen’s possession of a justification for the idea that a war is unjust is sufficient to defeat the presumption in favor of the obligation to fight. The problem arises particularly in democratic societies where it is expected, or at least hoped, that citizens engage in reasoned debate about war, yet the debate is often unresolved.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• The Egalitarian Theory of the Duty to Vote

  2025-04-02 · 2 citations

  book-chapterSenior author

  Abstract Critics often argue that there cannot be a moral duty to vote because whatever reason there is to vote can be satisfied in other ways. This chapter develops a novel theory of the duty to vote—which the authors call the egalitarian theory—that responds to this challenge. The egalitarian theory grounds the duty to vote in the unfolding demands of treating others as equals in the pursuit of justice. Whatever private actions individuals perform to help some subset of individuals in need, they have a duty to recognize the equal importance of all individuals in need. And the only way for most individuals to do so is by voting in elections. This is because elections present a unique opportunity to advance justice in a holistic way that takes account of the full range and scope of human need, and in a way that treats each person’s need as equally important. Furthermore, voting uniquely pursues justice in a way that is not unilateral and treats people as equals in the process. In the course of developing the egalitarian theory, the authors defend the idea that voting is not a merely symbolic act, but can partially contribute to the moral improvement of institutions.

  PublisherDOI

• Markets, Fairness, and the All-Affected Principle

  Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2024-11-14

  book-chapterOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Equality

  2024-10-10

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  The idea that persons are equals is at the foundation of modern political thought and practice. Much of the impetus behind the abolition of slavery and colonialism, the rejection of the practice of the master race, of sexism, and of racism, as well as ethnic or national chauvinism, is grounded in the thought that all persons are equal. The fundamental ideas underpinning democracy and the practices of liberal rights, as well as the contemporary practice of international human rights, are explicitly based on the idea of the equality of persons. A dominant idea in contemporary moral and political philosophy is that all persons should be treated as equals.

  PublisherDOI

• Equal Moral Status and the Collective Nature of Rationality

  2024-05-23 · 2 citations

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract This chapter defends the idea that imperfectly rational beings have equal moral status. It develops a concept of moral status and the relation of moral status to autonomy. It articulates a conception of imperfect rational nature and the collective character of rational nature. It first articulates some intuitive arguments for the truth of equal moral status despite the inequality of rational capacities. It enables us to see persons as having equal moral status on the basis of rational capacities even though they have unequal capacities. Beyond this, the chapter develops a positive argument for the thesis that reflective rational natures are equal in moral status based on the collective nature of rationality and the importance of autonomy as a marker of moral status. The chapter explores some objections to the argument and some limits to the strategy and what the next steps are to overcoming those limits.

  PublisherDOI

• Human Right to Democracy

  2023-01-01

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Enabling Informed and Equal Participation

  2022-02-28 · 1 citations

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Democracy is a system of collective decision-making in which adults have the right to participate as equals in some essential stage of the decision-making. In a modern representative democracy, people participate as equals in voting for representatives in the legislature and the executive and sometimes in the judiciary. The most basic framework of rights under which people participate as equals in a democracy consists of the right to vote, the right to run for office, the rights to associate with others in political parties and other political associations, the rights to express one's opinions freely in support of candidates, parties, policies, or the basic aims of policy. The right to vote is subject to an egalitarian principle; the principle is one person one vote. This implies that persons have equal votes in each election they may participate in, it requires that the decision rule is majoritarian, and in many circumstances, it requires that legislative districts are of equal size so that each person's vote counts for the same in terms of its effect on the legislature.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Andrew Williams

  Baidu (China)

  6 shared

• John Parkinson

  6 shared

• James Bohman

  5 shared

• Wolfgang Merkel

  WZB Berlin Social Science Center

  5 shared

• Jeremy Moss

  4 shared

• Daniele Archibugi

  4 shared

• Colin Hay

  3 shared

• Cindy Holder

  University of Victoria

  3 shared