About

Stephanie Grant is an Associate Professor of Accounting at the University of Washington's Foster School of Business, holding the Deloitte & Touche Endowed Professorship in Accounting Education. She earned her PhD from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2016, and her MAcc and BS degrees from the University of Northern Iowa in 2008 and 2007, respectively. Her research focuses on financial accounting, particularly investor behavior, disclosure practices, and the impact of technology such as mobile devices and social media on investor judgments. Grant has contributed to understanding how disclosure features, interactivity, and digital engagement influence investor decision-making and trust. She has published extensively in leading journals, exploring topics like the effects of fake news, payment transparency, and the role of social media in financial information processing. Since joining the University of Washington in 2016, she has established herself as a prominent researcher in her field, with a focus on the intersection of accounting, technology, and investor psychology.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Business
• Accounting
• Psychology
• Political Science
• Epistemology
• Finance
• Advertising
• Public relations
• Cognitive psychology
• Law
• World Wide Web
• Multimedia

Selected publications

• A Survey of Financial Experimental Research through a Regulatory Lens

  Accounting Horizons · 2026-04-01

  articleSenior author

  SYNOPSIS Academic research can inform policy, enforcement, and rulemaking at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). We argue that experimental accounting research is particularly well-suited to provide rigorous, causal evidence on issues central to these regulators’ missions. We review existing financial experimental studies relevant to securities regulation and classify them according to the SEC’s divisions and offices and FINRA’s oversight functions. This framework highlights where financial experimental evidence is relevant to regulatory activities and can help the SEC and FINRA identify research aligned with specific mandates. We also identify opportunities for future research and offer practical guidance to academics on communicating the relevance of their work, with the goal of strengthening the connection between research and securities regulation. JEL Classifications: D83; G11; G41; G53; M41.

  PublisherDOI

• How Index Fund Ownership and Earnings Guidance Frequency Influence Managerial Myopia

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Disclosure Presentation Attributes, Generative AI Output, and Investor Judgments

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 1 citations

  preprintOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Generative AI and Investor Processing of Financial Information

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 8 citations

  preprintOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• How Index Fund Ownership and Earnings Guidance Frequency Influence Managerial Myopia

  Behavioral Research in Accounting · 2024-12-12

  article

  ABSTRACT Managerial myopia imposes significant costs on firms, stakeholders, and the overall economy. Research suggests that both a firm’s shareholder base and the frequency of its earnings guidance influence myopia. Shareholder bases have undergone significant changes in recent years as index fund ownership supplants long-term shareholder ownership, yet it is unclear how the growth of index funds affects managerial myopia. We experimentally examine how index fund ownership influences managers’ myopia, and how these effects vary based on firms’ earnings guidance frequency. Consistent with prior research, results show that the likelihood of myopic decision-making increases as earnings guidance frequency increases. Results also show that the likelihood of myopic decision-making increases as index funds replace long-term shareholders, but only for managers who provide frequent earnings guidance. Our results suggest that eliminating frequent earnings guidance to help curtail myopia may become even more important as index fund ownership grows and supplants long-term shareholder ownership. JEL Classifications: M41; G11; G31; C91; D83.

  PublisherDOI

• The Value of Investors Being in a Deliberative Mindset When Reading News Later Revealed to Be Fake

  Journal of Financial Reporting · 2023 · 7 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Political Science
  • Computer Science
  • Psychology

  ABSTRACT Investors face a difficult challenge in determining whether news they read is true or fake and, according to psychology theory, an additional challenge of ceasing to rely on news subsequently revealed to be fake. To help address this latter challenge, we examine whether prompting investors to be in a deliberative mindset reduces their reliance on news after they learn that it is fake without affecting their reliance on news later revealed to be true. Consistent with theory, investors adjust their valuation assessments when news is later revealed to be fake, and this adjustment is magnified for investors in a deliberative mindset. Importantly, our results reveal that a deliberative mindset does not cause investors to discount news later revealed to be true. Data Availability: Please contact the authors. JEL Classifications: M41; G11; G4; C91; D83.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Digital Engagement Practices in Mobile Trading: The Impact of Color and Swiping to Trade on Investor Decisions

  Management Science · 2023-11-08 · 7 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  As coined by the SEC, Digital Engagement Practices (DEPs) are visual cues and design features to engage investors on mobile trading platforms. With the rise of mobile stock trading, regulators and other capital market participants are concerned that these DEPs may cause retail investors to trade in ways they otherwise would not. Using an experiment, we examine the impact of two common DEPs in mobile trading platforms—color (i.e., the use of green or red to indicate performance) and allowing investors to swipe versus click and confirm to execute trades. Drawing from prior research, we predict that the color associated with firm information will interact with how investors execute their trades to affect investment decisions. Consistent with expectations, results show that investors make the largest investment in a firm when they swipe to trade and firm information is colored green, relative to when they click and confirm to trade or firm information is colored red, holding firm economics constant. Swiping to trade causes investors to focus relatively more on the upside of investing, but only when firm information is colored green and not when it is colored red. The color red leads to a muted effect of swiping to trade as investors experience more negative affect and focus relatively more on the downside of investing. Our study answers calls from regulators and academics to examine the effects of technology on information evaluation in investment decisions, and has important practical implications for investors. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00379 .

  PublisherDOI

• Q&A Interactions: Managers’ Withholding of Information and the Effect of Giving Investors a Voice

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01 · 1 citations

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• How Do Disclosure Repetition and Interactivity Influence Investors’ Judgments?

  Journal of Accounting Research · 2021 · 12 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Business
  • Psychology

  ABSTRACT Recent regulatory amendments aimed at modernizing disclosures and enhancing their usefulness focus on repetition and interactivity within firms’ disclosure filings. We use two experiments to provide evidence on the effects of disclosure repetition (repeating of information in the filing) and disclosure interactivity (user involvement in directing the form or content of the information displayed) on investors’ information processing and investment judgments. Results show that repetition increases investors’ processing of repeated information, consistent with the informational role of repetition documented in prior research. In contrast, repetition reduces investors’ processing of other, nonrepeated information when the filing is less interactive. This evidence corroborates concerns that repetition can obscure value‐relevant information from investors. However, we find that more interactive disclosures mitigate this harmful effect of repetition on investors’ processing of nonrepeated information. Further, more interactive disclosures lead to deeper overall processing of both repeated and nonrepeated information, rather than more interactive disclosures redirecting investors’ attention and processing away from repeated information. Thus, our evidence suggests that disclosure interactivity is an important disclosure attribute that counteracts the potentially harmful effects of repetition on investors' processing of nonrepeated information, while preserving repetition's informational role.

  PublisherDOI

• How Does Using a Mobile Device Change Investors’ Reactions to Firm Disclosures?

  Journal of Accounting Research · 2020 · 35 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Business
  • Accounting

  ABSTRACT I examine how characteristics of investors’ information access tools change investors’ reactions to firm disclosures. I examine my research question in the context of information choice (i.e., allowing investors to choose the order of information and sections to read within a disclosure) and spatial layout (i.e., how information is displayed when viewing the disclosure). Results of an experiment are consistent with information choice improving investors’ judgments if the disclosure is viewed on a computer screen. Conversely, and consistent with cognitive overload, information choice harms investors’ judgments if the disclosure is viewed on a smaller screen, such as that of a mobile device. Follow‐up experiments show that changing the disclosure presentation to reduce the need to scroll is one way to improve investors’ judgments on a smaller (or mobile) screen. My findings caution firms and regulators about expanding information choice within disclosures without considering the screen size used to access the disclosure.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Frank D. Hodge

  University of Washington

  11 shared

• William Elliott

  10 shared

• Roshan K. Sinha

  6 shared

• Brian Gale

  6 shared

• Samantha C. Seto

  Simon Fraser University

  4 shared

• Jessen L. Hobson

  3 shared

• Kristina M. Rennekamp

  Cornell University

  3 shared

• Nerissa C. Brown

  3 shared