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SC
Dr. Sarah Chen
Stanford · NLP & interpretability
91
fit
Fairness + NLP projects overlap with her recent work.
Strong methods fit: model evaluation and interpretability.
Clear outreach angle for current trustworthy AI research.
Outreach angle
Ask how her lab is extending interpretability methods into fairness audits for real-world AI systems.
Sharon Goldberg is an associate professor in the Computer Science Department at Boston University. Her research uses tools from theory, including cryptography, game theory, and algorithms, as well as networking, such as measurement, modeling, and simulation, to solve practical problems in network security. She received her Ph.D. from Princeton University in 2009 and her B.A.Sc. from the University of Toronto in 2003. Goldberg has worked as a researcher at IBM, Cisco, and Microsoft, and as an engineer at Bell Canada and Hydro One Networks. She has also served on working groups of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). In 2014, she received two IETF/IRTF Applied Networking Research Prizes, an NSF CAREER Award, and a Sloan Research Fellowship.
A Verifiable Random Function (VRF) is the public-key version of a \n keyed cryptographic hash. Only the holder of the private key can \n compute the hash, but anyone with public key can verify the \n correctness of the hash. VRFs are useful for preventing enumeration \n of hash-based data structures. This document specifies several VRF \n constructions that are secure in the cryptographic random oracle \n model. One VRF uses RSA and the other VRF uses Eliptic Curves (EC).
We present eclipse attacks on Ethereum nodes that exploit the peer-to-peer network used for neighbor discovery. Our attacks can be launched using only two hosts, each with a single IP address. Our eclipse attacker monopolizes all of the victim’s incoming and outgoing connections, thus isolating the victim from the rest of its peers in the network. The attacker can then filter the victim’s view of the blockchain, or co-opt the victim’s computing power as part of more sophisticated attacks. We argue that these eclipse-attack vulnerabilities result from Ethereum’s adoption of the Kademlia peer-to-peer protocol, and present countermeasures that both harden the network against eclipse attacks and cause it to behave differently from the traditional Kademlia protocol. Several of our countermeasures have been incorporated in the Ethereum geth 1.8 client released on February 14, 2018.
RFC 5905 [RFC5905], section 7.3, Packet Header Variables, defines
the value of the REFID, the system peer for the responding host. In
the past, for IPv4 associations the IPv4 address is used, and for IPv6
associations the first four octets of the MD5 hash of the IPv6 are
used. There are two recognized shortcomings to this approach, and this
proposal addresses them. One is that knowledge of the system peer is
abusable information and should not be generally available. The
second is that the four octet hash of the IPv6 address looks very much
like an IPv4 address, and this is confusing. RFC EDITOR: PLEASE
REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING: The source code and
issues list for this draft can be found in https://github.com/hstenn
/ietf-ntp-refid-updates
When does Internet traffic cross international borders? This question has major geopolitical, legal and social implications and is surprisingly difficult to answer. A critical stumbling block is a dearth of tools that accurately map routers traversed by Internet traffic to the countries in which they are located. This paper presents Passport: a new approach for efficient, accurate country-level router geolocation and a system that implements it. Passport provides location predictions with limited active measurements, using machine learning to combine information from IP geolocation databases, router hostnames, whois records, and ping measurements. We show that Passport substantially outperforms existing techniques, and identify cases where paths traverse countries with implications for security, privacy, and performance.
When does Internet traffic cross international borders? This question has\nmajor geopolitical, legal and social implications and is surprisingly difficult\nto answer. A critical stumbling block is a dearth of tools that accurately map\nrouters traversed by Internet traffic to the countries in which they are\nlocated. This paper presents Passport: a new approach for efficient, accurate\ncountry-level router geolocation and a system that implements it. Passport\nprovides location predictions with limited active measurements, using machine\nlearning to combine information from IP geolocation databases, router\nhostnames, whois records, and ping measurements. We show that Passport\nsubstantially outperforms existing techniques, and identify cases where paths\ntraverse countries with implications for security, privacy, and performance.\n
RFC 5905 states that Network Time Protocol (NTP) packets should be
authenticated by appending the NTP data to a 128-bit key, and hashing
the result with MD5 to obtain a 128-bit tag. This document deprecates
MD5-based authentication, which is considered to be too weak, and
recommends the use of AES-CMAC as in RFC 4493 as a replacement.
