About

Scott Wolford is a professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin and serves as Co-Director of the Correlates of War Project. He earned his Ph.D. in political science from Emory University in 2008, after studying at the University of Kentucky, and holds a B.A. in political science from Transylvania University, obtained in 2002. Prior to joining the University of Texas, he was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Colorado from 2008 to 2011. His research interests encompass war and peace, military coalitions, international law and institutions, national leaders and international conflict, and game theory. Wolford authored a game theory and international security textbook titled The Politics of the First World War, published by Cambridge University Press in 2019, which originated from his "World War I in Real Time" course. Additional information on his published work and current projects can be found on his Publications and Research pages, and students have access to course information and past syllabi in the Teaching section.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Economics
• Law
• Political economy
• Computer Security
• Psychology
• International trade
• Biology
• International economics
• Market economy
• Development economics
• Macroeconomics
• Law and economics
• Social psychology
• Business

Selected publications

• The Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905

  Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2025-11-20

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics

  American Journal of Political Science · 2025-04-23

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract We analyze a model in which shifting power undermines foreign states’ commitments to the status quo, yet domestic leaders cannot credibly communicate the true scale of averted power shifts after preventive war. Publics prefer war only for large prospective power shifts, but preventive war renders the true size of averted shifts unobservable, incentivizing leaders to lie ex post to avoid political punishment. When publics are ex ante skeptical over shift size and war outcomes are middling, the probabilities of war and political punishment, as well as public skepticism over averted shifts and the chances of erroneous punishment, all increase in war outcomes. Public strategies of punishing military failures are particularly unsuccessful at discouraging undesirable preventive wars, yet the same conditions that encourage preventive war undermine its political benefits. We use our model to explain why Japan's leaders failed to convince the public of preventive success against Russia in 1905.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Conclusion: A Newly Dynamic East Asian International Order

  Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2025-11-20

  book-chapterSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Author response for "Experimental evidence supports the ability of spotted lanternfly to hitchhike on vehicle exteriors as a mechanism for anthropogenic dispersal"

  2024-06-11

  peer-review
  PublisherDOI

• The bargaining framework and Russia's invasion of Ukraine

  Conflict Management and Peace Science · 2024-04-22 · 4 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  I introduce this issue's symposium on the Russo-Ukrainian War by giving a brief overview of the bargaining framework, which asks why states sometimes use war to resolve disputes despite common knowledge that fighting is wasteful. I describe two types of mechanism—costly war and costly peace—and briefly discuss each symposium contribution in relation to its proposed mechanism(s). I also discuss the advantages of the bargaining framework for identifying and ruling out potential causal mechanisms in historical cases and close with some suggestions for continued work in the modeling dialogue between theory and evidence in the study of war.

  PublisherDOI

• Weak sovereignty and interstate war

  International Theory · 2024-05-16

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract International agreements save the costs of war, but complying with their terms can be costly. We analyse a model of interstate crisis bargaining in which one state may be unwilling or unable to make a costly investment that guarantees its subjects’ compliance. In equilibrium, peace is assured when the domestic government is militarily strong enough to demand terms that its subjects tolerate. When the domestic government is militarily weaker, peace requires that the foreign state compensate it for either the costs of enforcement or its subjects’ violations, and these prospective costs of peace may also lead the foreign state to solve the enforcement problem with war because peace is relatively costly. We also show that war due to enforcement problems is more common in militarily weak states and that equilibria at which the foreign state subsidizes enforcement are more common when the costs of violation fall disproportionately on the domestic state. The American invasion of Mexico in 1916 and the Red Army's peaceful withdrawal from East Germany in 1989 demonstrate the model's usefulness.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Experimental evidence supports the ability of spotted lanternfly to hitchhike on vehicle exteriors as a mechanism for anthropogenic dispersal

  Royal Society Open Science · 2024-07-01 · 9 citations

  articleOpen access

  Historically, anecdotal observations support the likelihood of human-assisted invasive insect dispersal to new environments. No previous studies have investigated the ability of insects to remain attached to moving vehicles; however, such information is critical for prioritizing research, mitigation activities and understanding anthropogenic effects on biotic communities. Lycorma delicatula (White), spotted lanternfly (SLF), an invasive insect whose range is currently expanding throughout the United States, is commonly observed in urban settings and near transportation hubs. We developed a novel method to test SLF’s ability to remain on vehicle surfaces including bonnet, nose wing, windscreen, wipers and scuttle panel using laminar wind flow from 0 to 100 ± 5 km h −1 . We found all mobile life stages (nymphs and adults) could remain on the vehicle up to 100 km h −1 . First instar nymphs and early season adults remained attached at significantly higher wind speeds than other stages. A brief acclimatization period prior to wind delivery increased attachment duration for all life stages except later season adults. The importance of outliers in the success of invasive species is well established. Given these results, any hitchhiking SLF could potentially establish incipient populations. This methodology will be beneficial for exploring human-assisted dispersal of other invasive arthropods.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Coalition Politics and War Termination

  The Journal of Politics · 2022-11-03 · 1 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  I analyze a model of coalition war termination in which continued fighting prevents power from shifting in an enemy’s favor but causes power to shift between partners. War ends in equilibrium when both across- and within-side distributions of power are sufficiently stable, but coalition politics can shorten or lengthen the war. When within-side power is shifting but the rising partner’s stakes in the war are low, the war ends “early,” before fighting can solve the underlying bargaining problem. When continued fighting strengthens the rising partner sufficiently, its declining partner acquiesces in continued fighting when intramural discord is costly or coalition exit is unattractive, causing the war to end “late,” well after the enemy’s power has been stabilized. I use the model to account for the early end of World War I and the late end of the Paraguayan War and then discuss implications for research design, war outbreak, and balancing coalitions.

  PublisherDOI

• Oil discovery, oil production, and coups d’état

  International Interactions · 2022-04-21 · 2 citations

  articleSenior authorCorresponding

  We analyze a model of bargaining in the shadow of coups d’état in which oil rents increase the value of capturing the state but also allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth has already been realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government’s capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before the government can use oil wealth to shift the distribution of power decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are also likely to fail. We uncover these relationships in an empirical analysis of oil production, oil discovery, coup attempts, and coup outcomes in a global sample of states from 1980 to 2010.

  PublisherDOI

• Oil discoveries, civil war, and preventive state repression

  Journal of Peace Research · 2022 · 15 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Political Science
  • Computer Security
  • Political economy

  Abstract Anticipated shifts in power favoring one side can lead to preventive war today. When power is poised to shift towards the state, potential rebels may launch a civil war while they retain a relative advantage, consistent with the commitment problem. We argue that a government expecting a group to rebel has an incentive to prevent that challenge by repressing the population. Repression is a government attempt to undermine and prevent dissent that would turn into rebellion—dissent and rebellion that is more likely in expectation of power shifting in the government’s favor. Empirical models using data on newly proved oil reserves show that states expecting an increase in oil wealth demonstrably increase repression in the years between discovery and access. The findings imply a new connection between natural resources and political violence: Oil wealth can encourage repression not only by reducing its costs, but also by creating windows of opportunity that rebels hope to exploit and governments hope to close. Not only civil war but also rising expectations of rebellion are associated with a marked increase in state-directed violence against civilians.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Emily Hencken Ritter

  Millersville University

  7 shared

• Cathy Xuanxuan Wu

  Old Dominion University

  5 shared

• Curtis Bell

  4 shared

• Terrence L. Chapman

  The University of Texas at Austin

  3 shared

• Jakana Thomas

  Princeton University

  3 shared

• Dan Reiter

  Emory University

  2 shared

• William L. Reed

  2 shared

• Moonhawk Kim

  San Francisco Unified School District

  2 shared

Education

• Ph.D., Political Science

  Emory University

  2008