About

Sandy Goldberg is the Chester D. Tripp Professor in the Humanities at Northwestern University. He earned his PhD from Columbia University in 1995. His research areas include Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, and Philosophy of Mind. Goldberg's interests in Epistemology encompass social epistemology, reliabilism, the epistemology of testimony, the theory of epistemic justification, epistemic normativity, self-knowledge, and skepticism. In the Philosophy of Language and Mind, his work focuses on speech act theory, the semantics of speech and attitude reports, the individuation of propositional attitudes, and externalist theories of mental content and linguistic meaning. His notable publications include books such as 'Anti-Individualism' (2007), 'Relying on Others' (2010), 'Assertion' (2015), 'To the Best of Our Knowledge' (2018), 'Conversational Pressure' (2020), and 'Foundations and Applications of Social Epistemology' (2021). Goldberg's scholarship contributes significantly to understanding the intersections of social epistemology, language, and mind, and he has authored and edited numerous influential works in these fields.

Research topics

• Epistemology
• Philosophy
• Psychology
• Sociology
• Computer science

Selected publications

• On the doxastic constraint on group evidence

  Inquiry · 2025-03-30

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• On Being Entitled to Expect Enlightenment by Expertise

  2025-08-28

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  In this chapter, I argue that the existence of expertise in a community of epistemic subjects can entitle us to expect others to be apprized of relevant expertise when forming beliefs that fall within the domain of that expertise. This chapter has two further aims: to discern when we are entitled to such an expectation (= the expectation of enlightenment by expertise) and to identify the nature and sources of this entitlement. I argue that there are (at least) two types of consideration that can underwrite an enlightenment demand. One type arises in connection with our efforts at coordination and cooperation with one another; the other is sourced in the expectations of morality. Considerations of either sort can entitle us to expect others to be enlightened by relevant expertise. When the existence of the expertise in question is manifest and its contents are widely available at negligible cost, this entitlement to expect enlightenment results in an obligation to be enlightened by the relevant expertise. In the course of this discussion, I will have occasion to discuss the political dimensions of this expectation as well.

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• Introduction

  2025-05-15

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  Abstract This volume brings together work in the philosophy of language on internet communication. For philosophers interested in language, the spread of social media and the possibilities it creates have generated new phenomena to examine, given fresh perspectives on familiar aspects of communication, and provided us with a variety of novel ways to evaluate existing theories and conceptualize language. The scope of topics covered within this volume shows the potential for work in the philosophy of language that can be used to help us with a broader understanding of conversations online. The book itself is structured around four main themes: how online contexts differ from face-to-face contexts; how online conversational environments provide new ways of understanding the role of community, commitments, and cooperation; how the fact that we are communicating online affects the nature and scope of the speech acts that can be performed; and ways to improve online communication.

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• Do scientific communities understand? A fictionalist account

  Philosophical Studies · 2025-06-24 · 2 citations

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• Engineering a Concept of Epistemic Justification

  Synthese Library/Synthese library · 2025-01-01

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
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• Editor’s Preface

  2025-05-15

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• Simpson on Trust

  Analysis · 2025-03-31

  article1st authorCorresponding
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• Copyright Page

  2025-05-15

  otherOpen access
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• Reliabilism in/as Social Epistemology

  Oxford University Press eBooks · 2025-04-22

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Formulated and defended by Alvin Goldman, Process Reliabilism (PR) is a well-developed reliabilist account of epistemic justification and knowledge according to which the core epistemic good-making features are the reliability of the processes-types of belief-formation and belief-sustainment. This chapter explores what role(s) PR itself can play in a more social epistemology. The chapter does so by focusing on the PR account of justification (PRJ) and exploring what modifications might render PRJ more social in orientation and why such a revised version might be of interest. Three versions will be discussed: Cognitively Extended PRJ, PRJ regarding group belief, and PRJ regarding socio-epistemic practices. While the first of these can be motivated in the very terms that Goldman himself used to motivate PRJ, the latter two are more thoroughgoing in their repudiation of some of these terms. The chapter concludes, briefly, by noting why we might want to pursue them nevertheless.

  PublisherDOI

• What's the Point?

  2024-11-13

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  In this chapter, I aim to characterize the point of the practice of philosophy, on the two-fold assumption that (a) this practice aims at truth and (b) our knowledge of that truth is always in doubt (at least whenever there is widespread disagreement). I will focus in particular on what point there can be to “having and defending a view” under these conditions. My thesis is that even assuming (a) and (b), there is a clear rationale for philosophers to engage in an activity I designate as championing a view. After developing what is involved in championing a view in philosophy, I suggest that proper championing in philosophy is governed by both epistemic and non-epistemic standards.

  PublisherDOI

Recent grants

• NIH Grant R01MH034490

  NIH · $70k · 1986

Frequent coauthors

• Duncan Pritchard

  University of California, Irvine

  12 shared

• Jonathan Matheson

  University of North Florida

  10 shared

• Christina Dietz

  The Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center

  9 shared

• Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio

  University of Helsinki

  9 shared

• Heather Logue

  University of Leeds

  9 shared

• John Hawthorne

  University of Southern California

  9 shared

• Susanna Siegel

  Harvard University Press

  9 shared

• Aidan McGlynn

  University of Edinburgh

  9 shared