About

Ronald Endicott is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Program Director for Cognitive Science at North Carolina State University. He was educated at Indiana University, Indianapolis, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, and at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, where he completed both his Master of Arts and Ph.D. in Philosophy. His research primarily focuses on the philosophy of mind, foundations of cognitive science, and the philosophy of science. Endicott has contributed to highly regarded academic journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, Synthese, Philosophy of Science, American Philosophical Quarterly, and Philosophical Studies. Additionally, he has provided entries for notable philosophical reference works including The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Cognitive psychology
• Linguistics
• Speech recognition
• Epistemology
• Mathematics
• Philosophy
• Psychology
• Mathematical economics
• Communication

Selected publications

• Inner speech and the body error theory

  Frontiers in Psychology · 2024 · 3 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Psychology

  , which thus explains the "voice within the mind." I also show how BET's cross-modal system fits with standard information processing accounts for speech monitoring and how it accommodates the central insights of leading theories of inner speech. In addition, I show how BET is supported by data from experience-sampling surveys and how it can be empirically tested against its rivals.

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• Functional Reduction with a Third Step:a Larger and Less Reductive Picture

  ProtoSociology · 2022

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  • Computer Science
  • Computer Science
  • Mathematical economics

  Functional reduction follows two familiar steps: a definition of a higher-level or special science property in terms of a functional role, then a statement describing a physical property that plays or occupies that role. But Kim (2005) adds a third step, namely, an explanation regarding how the physical property occupies the functional role. I think Kim is correct. But how is the third step satisfied? An examination of the pertinent scientific explanations reveals that the third step is best satisfied by a multiple-subject, part-whole explanation, which is to say, a decomposition of the occupier’s causal capacities or relations. This is true even in cases wherein role and occupant properties are identical, for an occupier’s causal capacities are always underwritten by a part-whole explanation. As a consequence, functional reduction is transformed into a larger picture that at bottom always contains multiple layers of distinct, nonidentical properties that divide between parts and their whole systems. I call it “Part-Based Functional Reduction.” My aim is to develop this larger picture of reduction.

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• The counter-revolution over multiple realization

  Metascience · 2017-05-10 · 2 citations

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• MANY-MANY MAPPINGS AND WORLD STRUCTURE

  American Philosophical Quarterly · 2016-01-01 · 5 citations

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  Examinant le phenomene des relations multi-multiples tant dans le domaine de la genetique moleculaire que du point de vue de la realisation physique des types computationnels, l'A. propose une analyse de ce probleme architectural qui, dans le cadre des relations inter-theoriques entre les proprietes de niveau eleve et les proprietes de niveau bas, met en jeu une image comprehensive de la structure metaphysique du monde. Definissant les notions de structure formelle, mecanisme, realisation, degre de plasticite, identite, reduction et survenance, l'A. montre que la relation multi-multiple et ses extensions offre une nouvelle conception non-reductrice de la determination contextuelle des proprietes de niveau superieur

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• Developing the explanatory dimensions of part–whole realization

  Philosophical Studies · 2016-03-30 · 14 citations

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• Functionalism, superduperfunctionalism, and physicalism: lessons from supervenience

  Synthese · 2015-08-05 · 5 citations

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• Flat Versus Dimensioned

  Journal of Philosophical Research · 2011-01-01 · 22 citations

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• Resolving arguments by different conceptual traditions of realization

  Philosophical Studies · 2010-12-23 · 20 citations

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• Realization Reductios, and Category Inclusion

  The Journal of Philosophy · 2010-01-01 · 11 citations

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  Thomas Polger and Laurence Shapiro argue that Carl Gillett's much publicized dimensioned theory of realization is incoherent, being subject to a reductio. Their argument turns on the fact that Gillett's definition of realization makes property instances the exclusive relata of the realization relation, while his belief in multiple realization implies its denial, namely, that properties are the relata of the realization relation on occasions of multiple realization. Others like Sydney Shoemaker have also expressed their view of realization in terms of property instances, yet they too have accepted the multiple realizability of properties. Thus I am interested in the more general issue raised by Polger and Shapiro's argument. Specifically, I show how to supplement a theory of realization with a category-inclusive auxiliary assumption, which avoids the stated reductio. I then offer a few reasons to justify the proposed category-inclusive view of realization, making some comparisons to supervenience and causation along the way.

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• Nomic-Role Nonreductionism

  Philosophical Topics · 2007-01-01 · 3 citations

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  I introduce “nomic-role nonreductionism” as an alternative to causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. It is inspired by recent trends in cognitive science that emphasize embodied cognition and multi-level methods of explanation in the special sciences. While causal-role functionalists identify mental properties by an intra-level transition theory that describes relations between inputs, internal mental states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that includes inter-level facts about realization from the appropriate implementation sciences. Thus mental properties are understood by a broad network that includes a horizontal dimension of intra-level causal relations as well as a vertical dimension of inter-level realization relations. To set the stage, in section 1 I describe the popular second-order version of causal-role functionalism. In section 2 I present the alternative nomic-role nonreductionism. In section 3 I support this view by an argument that generalizes upon an imputed rationale for scientific versions of causal-role functionalism. In section 4 I consider some possible problems. Then in section 5 I describe a general account of property identity that utilizes the same picture of causal and realization relations.

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