Robert Gibbons

About

Robert Gibbons is the Sloan Distinguished Professor of Management and a Professor of Applied Economics at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He also holds the position of Professor of Economics in MIT’s Department of Economics. His research focuses on the design and performance of organizations and organized activities, with particular emphasis on relational contracts—agreements rooted in the parties’ specific circumstances that cannot be adjudicated by outsiders such as courts. Gibbons studies how relational contracts influence performance differences among firms, plants, and work groups, both within and between organizations. He is the co-principal investigator for the Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations at MIT Sloan and has authored influential works including the book 'Game Theory for Applied Economists' and co-edited the 'Handbook of Organizational Economics.' Gibbons has served on the boards of the Citicorp Behavioral Sciences Research Council and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and he founded and directed the working group in organizational economics at the National Bureau of Economic Research for two decades. He holds an AB in applied mathematics from Harvard University, an MPhil in economics from Cambridge University, and a PhD in decision sciences from Stanford University. Recognized for his contributions to the field, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2009.

Research topics

• Sociology
• Political Science
• Computer Science
• Economics
• Management
• Engineering
• Cognitive psychology
• Library science
• Knowledge management
• Public relations

Selected publications

• Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority

  Management Science · 2019-11-15 · 25 citations

  articleCorresponding

  We study relationships between parties who have different preferences about how to tailor decisions to changing circumstances. Our model suggests that relational contracts supported by formal contracts may achieve relational adaptation that improves on adaptation decisions achieved by formal or relational contracts alone. Our empirics consider revenue-sharing contracts between movie distributors and an exhibitor. The exhibitor has discretion about whether and when to show a movie, and the partie…

  PublisherDOI

• What Situation Is This? Shared Frames and Collective Performance

  Strategy Science · 2021 · 24 citations

  1st authorCorresponding

  We study agents who distill the complex world around them using cognitive frames. We assume that agents share the same frame and analyze how the frame affects their collective performance. In one-shot and repeated interactions, the frame causes agents to be either better or worse off than if they could perceive the environment in full detail: it creates a fog of cooperation or a fog of conflict. In repeated interactions, the frame is as important as agents’ patience in determining the outcome: f…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Strategy Meets Culture (for Breakfast): Understanding the Relationship and Highlighting Its Potential

  Strategy Science · 2021 · 21 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Visible Hands: Governance of Value Creation—Within Firms and Beyond

  AEA Papers and Proceedings · 2020-05-01 · 12 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Economic transactions can be divided into (1) those that are priced versus (2) those that are governed by visible hands, and within the latter (2a) those within a single organization versus (2b) those in nonintegrated settings. Nonintegration is not always “the market” [i.e., (1)]. The conventional distinction between markets versus firms, (1) versus (2a), is misleading. The fundamental distinction is between transactions that are priced versus those that are governed, (1) versus (2). Unifying (…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Deals that start when you sign them

  Journal of Institutional Economics · 2021-08-31 · 8 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract This essay explores six sentences from Oliver Williamson – five providing context and the sixth the central topic. Decades ago, Williamson asserted that: (a) ‘substantially the same factors’ (1973: 316) create governance issues not only within organizations but also in interactions between organizations; and (b) relational contracting might be useful in addressing these issues in both domains (1979, Figure II). More recently – in an informal conversation in 2002 – he suggested a perspec…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Kevin J. Murphy

  18 shared

• George P. Baker

  11 shared

• Peter Cramton

  8 shared

• Michael Waldman

  8 shared

• Paul Klemperer

  University of Oxford

  8 shared

• Joseph Farrell

  7 shared

• K. J. Murphy

  5 shared

• Rebecca Henderson

  5 shared

Awards & honors

• Elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2009)

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