About

Rebecca Dizon-Ross is an Associate Professor of Economics and a Charles E. Merrill Faculty Scholar at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Her professional contact information includes an office located at 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, with a phone number of 773-702-3265 and an email address of rdizonross@gmail.com. The page does not provide additional details about her research focus, background, or key contributions.

Research topics

• Psychology
• Microeconomics
• Social psychology
• Political Science
• Economics
• Advertising
• Economic growth
• Labour economics
• Cognitive psychology
• Demographic economics
• Business

Selected publications

• Replication package for: "Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise".

  Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2026-03-11

  otherOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  "Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise" by Rebecca Dizon-Ross and Ariel Zucker.

  PublisherDOI

• Using a Discounted Hour at Clinics to Extend Healthcare Access to the Underserved

  AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · 2026-02-14

  dataset
  PublisherDOI

• Using a Discounted Hour at Clinics to Extend Healthcare Access to the Underserved

  AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · 2026-02-14

  dataset
  PublisherDOI

• The Non-Working Wife as a Status Symbol: A Field Experiment in India

  AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · 2026-01-28

  dataset
  PublisherDOI

• The Non-Working Wife as a Status Symbol: A Field Experiment in India

  AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · 2026-01-28

  dataset
  PublisherDOI

• Using a Discounted Hour at Clinics to Extend Healthcare Access to the Underserved

  AEA Randomized Controlled Trials · 2026-02-14

  dataset
  PublisherDOI

• Replication package for: "Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise".

  Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2026-03-11

  otherOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  "Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise" by Rebecca Dizon-Ross and Ariel Zucker.

  PublisherDOI

• Not Playing Favorites: Parents and the Value of Equal Opportunity^†

  American Economic Journal Applied Economics · 2025-06-26

  article

  We conduct two experiments to identify the value parents place on equality of opportunity when investing in children. The experiments exogenously vary short-run returns to educational investments to identify the weight placed on equalizing “opportunity” (child-level investment) relative to maximizing “returns” (total household earnings) or to equalizing “outcomes” (child-level expected earnings). While parents in both experiments place some weight on maximizing returns, they also display a strong preference for equalizing opportunities and are willing to forgo 15–45 percent of their earnings to do so. Parents in higher-income countries also care about equalizing outcomes, while parents in lower-income countries do not. (JEL D63, J12, J13, O15)

  PublisherDOI

• Mechanism Design for Personalized Policy: A Field Experiment Incentivizing Exercise

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2025-03-01 · 1 citations

  reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Personalizing policies can theoretically increase their effectiveness.However, personalization is difficult when individual types are unobservable and the preferences of policymakers and individuals are not aligned, which could cause individuals to misreport their type.Mechanism design offers a strategy to overcome this issue: offer an "incentive-compatible" menu of policy choices designed to induce participants to select the variant intended for their type.Using a field experiment that personalized incentives for exercise among 6,800 adults with diabetes and hypertension in urban India, we show that personalizing with an incentive-compatible choice menu substantially improves program performance, increasing the treatment effect of incentives on exercise by 80% without increasing program costs relative to a one-size-fits-all benchmark.Mechanism design achieves similar performance to personalizing with an extensive set of observable variables, but without the high data requirements or the risk that participants might manipulate their observables.

  PublisherDOI

• Detecting Mother-Father Differences in Spending on Children: A New Approach Using Willingness-to-Pay Elicitation

  American Economic Review Insights · 2023 · 10 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Economics
  • Demographic economics
  • Labour economics

  This paper tests whether mothers and fathers differ in their spending on daughters relative to sons by comparing their willingness to pay (WTP) for specific goods for their children. This method, which we apply in Uganda, offers more precision than the standard method of examining expenditure effects of mothers’ versus fathers’ income. We find that fathers have a lower WTP for their daughters’ than their sons’ human capital but mothers do not. Altruism plays a role: fathers’ but not mothers’ WTP for goods that simply bring joy to their daughters is lower than their WTP for such goods for sons. (JEL D64, G51, J12, J13, J16, O12)

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Ariel Zucker

  City University of New York

  25 shared

• Pascaline Dupas

  Center for Economic and Policy Research

  24 shared

• Jonathan Robinson

  19 shared

• Seema Jayachandran

  Princeton University

  10 shared

• Keesler Welch

  7 shared

• Shilpa Aggarwal

  6 shared

• Danielle Charpentier

  Centre Hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal

  4 shared

• Abigail Sellman

  Ideas42

  4 shared

Education

• B.A.

  Harvard University

• Ph.D.

  Stanford University

Awards & honors

• Distinguished Alumni Award Honorees