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Rakesh Vohra

Rakesh Vohra

· Visiting Professor Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences; J. L. Kellogg School of Management

Northwestern University · Chemical Engineering

Active 1984–2026

h-index43
Citations9.7k
Papers30548 last 5y
Funding—

Academic metrics are sourced from OpenAlex and public funding records; values may differ from Google Scholar.

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About

Rakesh Vohra is a faculty member at Northwestern Engineering, serving as a Visiting Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering. He is associated with the Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the J. L. Kellogg School of Management. His contact information includes an office located at 2169 Campus Dr., Room 548, Evanston, IL 60208-3109, and a phone number of 215-898-7701. The page indicates his involvement in engineering and management disciplines, contributing to the interdisciplinary environment of Northwestern University.

Research topics

  • Economics
  • Business
  • Medicine
  • Econometrics
  • Sociology
  • Microeconomics
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Science
  • Political Science
  • Psychology

Selected publications

  • Best vs. All: Equity and Accuracy of Standardized Test Score Reporting

    arXiv (Cornell University) · 2021 · 2 citations

    Senior authorCorresponding

    We study a game theoretic model of standardized testing for college admissions. Students are of two types; High and Low. There is a college that would like to admit the High type students. Students take a potentially costly standardized exam which provides a noisy signal of their type. The students come from two populations, which are identical in talent (i.e. the type distribution is the same), but differ in their access to resources: the higher resourced population can at their option take the…

    PublisherOA PDF

  • Optimal Bailouts in Diversified Financial Networks

    arXiv (Cornell University) · 2024-06-18 · 1 citations

    preprintOpen accessSenior author

    Widespread default involves substantial deadweight costs which could be countered by injecting capital into failing firms. Injections have positive spillovers that can trigger a repayment cascade. But which firms should a regulator bailout so as to minimize the total injection of capital while ensuring solvency of all firms? While the problem is, in general, NP-hard, for a wide range of networks that arise from a stochastic block model, we show that the optimal bailout can be implemented by a si…

    PublisherOA PDFDOI

  • Prophet Inequalities via Linear Programming

    Open MIND · 2026-02-07

    preprintSenior author

    Prophet inequalities bound the expected reward that can be obtained in a stopping problem by the optimal reward of its corresponding off-line version. We propose a systematic technique for deriving prophet inequalities for stopping problems associated with selecting a point in a polyhedron. It utilizes a reduced-form linear programming representation of the stopping problem. We illustrate the technique to derive a number of known results as well as some new ones. For instance, we prove a $\frac{…

    DOI

  • Prophet Inequalities via Linear Programming

    arXiv (Cornell University) · 2026-02-07

    articleOpen accessSenior author

    Prophet inequalities bound the expected reward that can be obtained in a stopping problem by the optimal reward of its corresponding off-line version. We propose a systematic technique for deriving prophet inequalities for stopping problems associated with selecting a point in a polyhedron. It utilizes a reduced-form linear programming representation of the stopping problem. We illustrate the technique to derive a number of known results as well as some new ones. For instance, we prove a $\frac{…

    PublisherOA PDF

  • Signaling Design

    ArXiv.org · 2025-02-04

    preprintOpen accessSenior author

    We revisit the classic job-market signaling model of \cite{spence1973job}, introducing profit-seeking schools as intermediaries that design the mapping from candidates' efforts to job-market signals. Each school commits to an attendance fee and a monitoring policy. We show that, in equilibrium, a monopolist school captures the entire social surplus by committing to low information signals and charging fees that extract students' surplus from being hired. In contrast, competition shifts surplus t…

    PublisherOA PDFDOI

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