Peter D. Feaver
· Professor of Political ScienceDuke University · Political Science
Active 1989–2026
Academic metrics are sourced from OpenAlex and public funding records; values may differ from Google Scholar.
About
Peter D. Feaver (Ph.D., Harvard, 1990) is a Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University. He is the Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy and Co-PI of the America in the World Consortium. Feaver has authored several books, including 'Thanks For Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the US Military' (Oxford University Press, 2023), 'Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations' (Harvard Press, 2003), and 'Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States' (Cornell University Press, 1992). He has also co-authored and co-edited multiple works on civil-military relations, American foreign policy, and national security issues. His research interests include grand strategy, civil-military relations, nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, and public opinion. Feaver has served in key government roles, including as Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform on the National Security Council Staff at the White House from June 2005 to July 2007, and as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council in 1993-94. He is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group and contributes to policy discussions through various platforms.
Research topics
- Political Science
- Law
- Sociology
- Social psychology
- Psychology
- Medicine
- Public relations
- History
- Demography
Selected publications
Oxford University Press eBooks · 2023 · 23 citations
1st authorCorrespondingAbstract What explains the high levels of public confidence in the US military, and does high confidence matter? Proprietary survey data show that confidence is partly based on public beliefs about the military’s high competence, adherence to high professional ethics, and a determination to stand apart from the bitter divisions of partisan politics. However, confidence is also propped up by other factors that do not fit neatly within this comfortable story of complete deservedness. It is shaped…
Politics, Politicization, and Public Confidence
2023-06-07 · 15 citations
book-chapter1st authorCorrespondingAbstract The public does not yet see the military as a hyperpartisan organization, but there are indications that many partisans would be willing to encourage the military to assume a more partisan role—as long as it remains on their side. A majority of the public believes that members of the military affiliate with a party, and the plurality view is that those affiliations are evenly divided between Republican and Democrats. Respondents are slightly more likely to believe the military aligns wi…
Right or Wrong? The Civil–Military Problematique and <i>Armed Forces & Society</i> ’s 50th
Armed Forces & Society · 2024-05-30 · 5 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingThe central concern of civil–military relations theory is how to have a military institution simultaneously strong enough to protect society and the state from enemies while also properly sized and obedient enough not to pose a threat itself to that society and state. When scholars wrestle with this question, they must engage the seminal contributions from Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, as I did in “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Cont…
Oxford University Press eBooks · 2023 · 4 citations
1st authorCorrespondingAbstract Public support for the military is partly due to social desirability bias. When respondents are primed to reflect on the high levels of confidence other Americans express, confidence in the military increases; when informed that confidence in the military among other Americans has dropped in recent years, however, confidence falls. Americans in the aggregate inflate their support for the military because they feel social pressure to do so. This bias shows up in most subgroups in the pop…
Oxford University Press eBooks · 2021 · 3 citations
Senior authorCorrespondingAbstract Grand strategy is essential to effective foreign policy. Yet even as the study of grand strategy has flourished within the academy, many academics have remained skeptical of grand strategy as a concept or been harshly critical of grand strategy as practiced by the United States. This essay defines the concept of grand strategy, emphasizing that it is best understood as the logic undergirding state action. The essay also explains why common academic critiques are mistaken; they set fire…
Frequent coauthors
- 29 shared
Christopher Gelpi
The Ohio State University
- 14 shared
Jason Reifler
University of Exeter
- 9 shared
Hal Brands
- 9 shared
Peter R. Lavoy
- 5 shared
Richard H. Kohn
- 4 shared
Stephen Biddle
- 3 shared
John H. Aldrich
- 3 shared
Kristin Thompson Sharp
Duke University
Awards & honors
- Civil Discourse Project - Institutional Support (2026-2027)
- Executive in Residence Fellowship (2026-2027)
- Civil Discourse Project - Fellowship Support (2026-2027)
Similar researchers at Duke University
- Resume-aware match score
- Save to shortlist
- AI-drafted outreach
See your match with Peter D. Feaver
PhdFit ranks faculty by your research interests, methods, and publications — grounded in their actual work, not templates.
- Free to start
- No credit card
- 30-second signup