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Michael Tye

Michael Tye

University of Texas at Austin · Philosophy

Active 1975–2024

h-index44
Citations9.5k
Papers20515 last 5y
Funding

Academic metrics are sourced from OpenAlex and public funding records; values may differ from Google Scholar.

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About

Michael Tye is a philosopher and professor whose special interests include consciousness, animal minds, perception, concepts, mental imagery, and vagueness. His work focuses on exploring these areas within philosophy, contributing to the understanding of how minds operate and how mental phenomena are conceptualized. He is accessible via email at mtye@austin.utexas.edu.

Research topics

  • Computer Science
  • Psychology
  • Political Science
  • Epistemology
  • Philosophy
  • Linguistics
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Fishery
  • Aesthetics
  • Social psychology

Selected publications

  • Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness

    Oxford University Press eBooks · 2021 · 60 citations

    1st authorCorresponding

    Abstract Either consciousness appeared suddenly in living beings so that its appearance is like that of a light switch being turned on or it arose through intermediate stages. On the former view, consciousness is an on/off matter, but once it arose, it became richer and richer through time rather as a beam of light may become brighter and broader in its sweep. On the latter view, consciousness is not an on/off matter. There are shades of gray. Consciousness arose gradually just as life did, beco…

  • Homunculi Heads and Silicon Chips: The Importance of History to Phenomenology

    The MIT Press eBooks · 2019-02-12 · 51 citations

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience

    2019-07-22 · 29 citations

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

    A number of different theses concerning the representational content of visual experience are canvassed and a new proposal is made. It is shown that the new proposal accounts satisfactorily both for hallucinatory experiences and for the justificatory role visual experiences play.

  • Crustacean Pain

    Animal Sentience · 2022 · 24 citations

    1st authorCorresponding

    This commentary discusses the target article’s methodology, the relevance of the claim that crustaceans lack a neocortex to the thesis that they feel pain, and the evaluation of the results of some trade-off experiments done with hermit crabs.

  • What Acquaintance Teaches

    2019-11-27 · 23 citations

    book-chapterOpen accessSenior author

    Abstract In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it, one must also know an appropriate answer to the question ‘what is it like to see red?’. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object knowledge rather…

Frequent coauthors

  • R. M. Sainsbury

    11 shared
  • Terence Horgan

    4 shared
  • Tim Crane

    Central European University

    3 shared
  • Sam Coleman

    University of Hertfordshire

    3 shared
  • Anthony O’Hear

    2 shared
  • Brian P. McLaughlin

    2 shared
  • Kim Sterelny

    Australian National University

    2 shared
  • Brian Cutter

    University of Notre Dame

    2 shared

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