About

I am formerly a solid-state physicist, who now specializes in American political economy, international relations, and comparative politics. In my research, I seek to 1) explain why some countries are better than others at science, technology, and innovation; 2) investigate the relationship between the presidency and US economic performance.

Research topics

• Political science
• Political economy
• Economics
• Economic history
• Business

Selected publications

• The Isolated Presidency. By Jordan T.Cash, New York: Oxford University Press, 2024. 272 pp. $45. ISBN: 978‐0‐19‐766977‐8

  Presidential Studies Quarterly · 2025-08-19

  article1st authorCorresponding

  The author has nothing to report.

  PublisherDOI

• The Presidency of Bill Clinton after Thirty Years: A Review Article

  Political Science Quarterly · 2024-10-14 · 1 citations

  review1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Did Bill Clinton destroy the U.S. economy? In a recent book, Nelson Lichtenstein and Judith Stein offer a scathing new critique. In this account, Clinton not only ravaged the United States in his own time but is largely to blame for America's subsequent economic inequality, monopolistic corporations, the Great Financial Crisis, the rise of China, and the advent of Trumpism. And yet, the economic data speak well of the Clinton presidency. He fares poorly on the trade deficit and economic inequality but otherwise delivered a balanced economic boom, far better than most administrations of the past fifty years. How do we square the withering criticisms of Lichtenstein and Stein with Clinton's economic achievements? It is correct that globalization and technological change tend to hurt blue-collar workers. And because Clinton embraced these forces and sought to place the United States at their headwaters, he may, indeed, be a “fabulous failure” from Lichtenstein and Stein's perspective. But the authors, each a labor historian and advocate, willfully dismiss the benefits that the nation as a whole, including workers and their children, enjoyed under Clinton. They also ignore the financial and military crises that Clinton averted. Overall, the Clinton administration created a wealthier and more competitive economy, albeit at the expense of those workers most vulnerable and least able to change. That is, Clinton helped transform the U.S. economy, just not along the lines that Lichtenstein and Stein prefer.

  PublisherDOI

• Notes

  2023-10-19

  other1st authorCorresponding

  Subject US Politics Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

  PublisherDOI

• Benjamin Harrison, Patriot and Partisan

  2023-10-19

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Benjamin Harrison was, by most measures, supremely equipped to deliver a booming economy. He was college educated and, for his time, exceedingly well-versed in political economy. He was also a devoted public servant, with decades of leadership experience and considerable background in public policy and legislative affairs. In fact, Harrison was one of the most competent administrators ever to enter the White House. He mastered every major aspect of domestic and foreign policy, even running several federal departments himself. In politics, he was a formidable campaigner and a paragon of decency in an indecent era. He was also a keen strategist who understood issue framing, campaigning, and political messaging. He was reportedly an amazing public speaker. And, unlike most executives of the Gilded Age, he had a positive vision for the presidency, the federal government, and what both could do for the American economy. Working with Harrison, Congress passed more major legislation than it had in twenty years. However, instead of prosperity, Harrison created the conditions for a devastating financial crisis and a deep recession. For Harrison had few consistent policy preferences; rather, he tended to support whatever policies were necessary to unify the Republican Party or to reward Union army veterans. The result was a haphazard mixture of fiscal, trade, and monetary policies that spiked deficits and scared investors. Conditions then gradually snowballed into a financial panic and the Great Depression of 1893–1897 that commenced soon after he left office.

  PublisherDOI

• Preface

  2023-10-19

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Extract I am an unusual author for a book on the Gilded Age presidency, so some explanation is appropriate. My primary subfield of expertise is the economic competitiveness of nations. Within it, I have paid particular attention to the political economy of science, technology, and innovation. But I also deal with trade, industrial policy, defense spending, fiscal policy, even monetary policy. My previous scholarship, which is best summarized in The Politics of Innovation (2016), led me to suspect that political leadership plays an important, but poorly explained, role in the economic performance of nations. Public debate over President Obama’s economic leadership then prompted me to perform a rough statistical analysis of all US presidents and national economic performance over the short run, published in the journal PS: Politics & Political Science.1Close The economic data suggested that individual presidents mattered little. But statistics miss a lot. They do not capture important factors that are difficult to quantify, like leadership, ideology, political skill, or historical contingencies. And of course, a fundamental principle of statistics warns us that correlation does not guarantee causality.

  PublisherDOI

• Introduction

  2023-10-19

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Presidents are often dismissed as mere rhetoricians with little real influence on the nation’s economy, especially during the Gilded Age. This book contradicts such descriptions. In doing so, it also delivers valuable insights into leadership in the 21st century. In fact, the Gilded Age is important to us today precisely because its presidents seem so powerless. This book shows that, even in this unlikely period, presidents did affect national economic performance and that their success came from surprising sources. They could not control the economy directly, but decisive leadership could shape the environment in which the economy thrived or languished. Thus, this book also makes a larger argument about presidential leadership. It is an examination not of economic governance alone but of leadership quality overall. Its point is that we can learn a lot about the evolution of the modern presidency and the exercise of presidential power from the Gilded Age.

  PublisherDOI

• Grover Cleveland

  2023-10-19

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract As a whole, the 1880s were rocky years and, during his first term, the strictly constitutional Grover Cleveland oversaw a merely average economy. It prospered during some months and years, but not in others. Cleveland was a sternly ethical but inexperienced and poorly educated politician who entered the White House during the apex of the corrupt spoils system and on the tail of the smoldering depression of 1881–1885. He saw little role for presidents, or governments, in managing the economy. Before entering office, he took extraordinary action to ward off a brewing dollar panic. Thereafter he preferred to mostly just cheer or harangue from the sidelines. Many Americans, including Cleveland himself, blamed government corruption for the nation’s economic problems, which by now included recurring financial crises, economic recessions, labor strikes, monopoly abuses, and unnecessary trade protectionism. Each of these evils seemed to flow from the spoils system. Cleveland’s solution was to hark back to pre–Civil War democratic ideals: an honest and limited federal government, run with business efficiency and strictly according to the Constitution. And if government must act, the intervention should be objective, nonpartisan, and minimal. Cleveland’s numerous vetoes were perhaps his most assertive use of executive power. He used them to strike down hundreds of spending bills that benefited individuals or special interests. But his inflexible attachment to minimal government and a restrained presidency rendered him incapable of actions that might have better grown the economy and prevented the crises that would ruin his second term.

  PublisherDOI

• Conclusions

  2023-10-19

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract How does the evidence presented in this book square with existing debates over presidential performance? And what new hypotheses, if any, are generated by the preceding case studies? This chapter attempts to tackle these questions. It begins with some important caveats and a brief review of the conventional wisdom. It then argues that presidents do matter for the nation’s economic performance. Most clearly, presidential (in)action during economic crises appears to matter most. Otherwise, a president’s effectiveness as an economic leader flows from three less obvious sources. First, the president’s vision for the country, for the federal government, and for the presidency itself are far more important than other factors, even his policy agenda. Second, political skill and enthusiasm matter, for leadership success is partly a function of a president’s willingness and ability to forge and leverage coalitions with other important political-economic actors, including the American people. Thus, the president’s role as an educator is a significant component of his leadership ability. Finally, trust is all-important. As economic actors, we value the predictability and reliability of others in the economy as well as that of the major political-economic institutions upon which our economic activities rely. Hence a president’s ability to build or maintain trust in institutions such as the financial system, the American currency, the federal government, even the presidency itself is crucial. In sum, not only do presidents matter for the nation’s economic performance, but they matter in subtle and unexpected ways.

  PublisherDOI

• Chester Arthur and the Smoldering Depression of 1881–1885

  2023-10-19

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Chester A. Arthur (1881–1885) oversaw one of the most dismal economies of any American president. After he entered office, the country gradually sank into a now forgotten “smoldering” depression that dragged on for years. The federal government had the means by which to avoid the 1881–1885 depression and the financial panic it produced. The US Treasury was flush with cash at the time. And although countercyclical fiscal policy and the welfare state were considered eccentric concepts during the Gilded Age, other government solutions were available. The federal surplus could have been distributed to the state governments, used on infrastructure projects, spent to pay down state debts, offered as pensions to veterans, or ladled out as pork. Tariffs could have been cut. Even more potent would have been a decisive move on monetary policy. Each of these actions was well within the historical experience and political acceptability of the 1880s. In fact, Arthur himself suggested many of these ideas to Congress. But he did so only rarely. And he never followed up with any sort of action. Instead, he stood by as the economy toppled. As unemployment and business failures mounted, Arthur spent lavishly on himself and on transforming the White House into a fabulous social hub. At times he appeared to fall back into unseemly meddling in state and party machine politics. Where possible, he mostly just ignored the presidency. Hence, Arthur reveals that presidential inactivity during crisis can have dire consequences.

  PublisherDOI

• Prelude

  2023-10-19

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract What sort of economy, and political system, did US presidents inherit at the start of the Gilded Age? Technological change and globalization were the primary driving forces throughout the period. Over the years, they generated battles over tariffs, monopolies, labor, immigration, industrialization, and inequality, which dominated American politics and created pivotal moments for its presidents. But as the US economy headed into the Gilded Age, it was developments left over from the Civil War (1861–1865) that challenged Americans and their leaders most. This chapter describes the human destruction and economic costs of the war. It also explains the myriad federal policy responses and the transformation of American life that resulted, including changes in the presidency itself.

  PublisherDOI

Recent grants

• MOD: A Political-Economic Model of Opposition/Support for Science and Innovation Policies

  NSF · $58k · 2008–2010

• Testing the Effects of Culture on Institutional Effectiveness and National Innovation Rates

  NSF · $95k · 2011–2012

Frequent coauthors

• Sue V. Rosser

  California State University, Fresno

  1 shared

• Sean Wilson

  1 shared

• Mikhail I. Melnik

  1 shared

• James Mitchell Watkins

  1 shared

• Jon Schmid

  1 shared

• Dave O’Brien

  1 shared

• Carter Doyle

  1 shared

• Harvey M. Sapolsky

  1 shared

Education

• PhD, Political Science

  Massachusetts Institute of Technology

  2006

• MA, International Affairs

  Yale University

  1995

• Certificate, International Affairs

  Kansai Gaikokugo Daigaku

  1992

• BA, Physics

  University of California Berkeley

  1990

Awards & honors

• Distinguished Teaching Award
• Innovation in Co-Curricular Education Award