Trying and Deliberative Agency

Southwest Philosophy Review · 2024-01-01

Types of Tropes

Routledge eBooks · 2023

• History
• Geography
• Art

The general concept of a trope – that of a non-shareable character-grounder – admits of a distinction between modifier tropes and module tropes. Roughly, a module trope is self-exemplifying whereas a modifier trope is not. This distinction has wide-ranging implications. Modifier tropes are uniquely eligible to be powers and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes are uniquely eligible to play a direct role in perception and causation. Moreover, each type of trope theory faces unique challenges concerning character-grounding. Modifier trope theory faces challenges concerning the inscrutability of predication and the incompatibility with bundle theory, whereas module trope theory faces challenges concerning character overdetermination and a collapse into austere nominalism. These differences indicate that the modifier/module distinction divides the advantages of general trope theory and thus presents the trope theorist with a pivotal choice.

Nominalist Constituent Ontologies: A Development and Critique

PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 2022-09-15 · 4 citations

In this dissertation I consider the merits of certain nominalist accounts of phenomena related to the character of ordinary objects. What these accounts have in common is the fact that none of them is an error theory about standard cases of predication and none of them deploys God or uniquely theistic resources in its explanatory framework. The aim of the dissertation is to answer the following questions: Ì¢‰âÂå¢What is the best nominalist account on offer? Ì¢‰âÂå¢How might it be improved?Ì¢‰âÂå¢Does it ultimately succeed?I will argue that while so-called trope theory is the best account on offer, it can be significantly improvedÌ¢‰âÂ'or replacedÌ¢‰âÂ'by a novel version of nominalism that is modeled after trope theory. Ultimately, however, I will argue that even the novel version fails.The dissertation unfolds as follows. In Chapter 1, I introduce Austere Nominalism (AN), which is perhaps the most extreme version of nominalism that falls within the scope of the dissertation. AN is often described as the view that there exist only concrete particulars. According to AN, it is unnecessary to posit any entities other than ordinary objectsÌ¢‰âÂ'turkeys, tables, and the likeÌ¢‰âÂ'in order to account for explananda related to the character of those objects. (Such explananda include the phenomenon of attribute agreement, of attribute possession, of true subject-predicate sentences, etc.) In this chapter I argue that AN fails to provide an adequate account of these explananda. In addition, introducing and criticizing AN serves an important heuristic role for the rest of the dissertation. To understand this role, we must distinguish between the basic explanatory strategy deployed by the austere nominalist and the type of explananda for which she deploys that strategy. The austere nominalist deploys the strategy to account for the character of ordinary objects. As I argue in Chapter 1, this deployment is a failure. As I go on to show in Chapter 2, the widespread rejection AN has led to a variety of rival accounts of the character of ordinary objects. In rejecting AN, however, these accounts also tacitly reject its basic explanatory strategy. Thus goes the baby with the bathwater, since, arguably, there are some attractive features of AN's basic explanatory strategy. Indeed, those who defend the most prominent version of nominalismÌ¢‰âÂ'trope theoryÌ¢‰âÂ'seem to overlook the advantages of AN's basic strategy, and by so doing, make an unnecessary concession to the realist. Or so I argue in Chapter 3. And, as I will argue in Chapter 4, the strongest version of nominalism is a novel account, modeled after trope theory, that deploys AN's basic strategy at a more fundamental level than that of ordinary objects. This novel accountÌ¢‰âÂ'troper theoryÌ¢‰âÂ'is closer in spirit to AN than is traditional trope theory. (Thus, AN serves as a foil for the discussion of other nominalist views.) Finally, in the Afterword I show how troper theory is subject to some of the traditional objections to which trope theory is subject. Thus, while troper theory is the best nominalist account on offer, it is ultimately inadequate as an account of the character of ordinary objects. Finally, in the Afterword I indicate how troper theory is equally vulnerable to some of the traditional objections that plague trope theory. Thus, if you are not convinced that traditional objections to trope theory are conclusive and you want to be a nominalist, then you should abandon trope theory and adopt troper theory. If you take traditional objections against trope theory to have significant force, then you should reject both theories.

Hidden Mickeys and the Hiddenness of God

2022-03-04

This chapter explores how a little-known feature of Disney attractions illuminates a traditional challenge concerning God's existence. Professional Hidden Mickey hunter Steven Barrett says that a Hidden Mickey is “a partial or complete image of Mickey Mouse that has been hidden by Disney's Imagineers and artists in the designs of Disney attractions, hotels, restaurants, and other areas”. Although atheists have appealed to divine hiddenness to argue against theism, the observation that God is hidden would not catch many theists by surprise. The hiddenness of God is the fact that, even if God exists, sometimes God seems distant, absent, or even nonexistent. The hiddenness problem leaves us doubting the very existence of God, not just whether some situation in the world is the result of God's intentional activity. Hidden Mickeys, therefore, don't take us all the way to a solution to the problem of divine hiddenness.

La Bundle Theory y el desafío del carácter denso

Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso · 2021

• Computer Science
• Epistemology
• Philosophy

The challenge of thick character consists in explaining the apparent fact that one object can be charactered in many ways. If we assume a trope bundle theory, we ought to answer in turn the two following questions: (P1) What are the requirements on a trope bundle theory if it is to adequately account for thick-character?; (P2) Is a trope bundle theory that meets those requirements preferable to rival theories? In order to address the above questions, the paper proceeds as follows. In the first section I cover two preliminary matters: I introduce the concept of thick-character and distinguish it from other related concepts. Then, I sketch several leading accounts of character and situate bundle theory among them. Also, I pick up (Q1) and argue that there are three requirements on a trope bundle theory if it is to adequately account for thick-character. Lastly, in the third section I pick up (Q2) and argue that the requirements spell trouble for trope bundle theory. This trouble, I argue, indicates that trope bundle theory—and hence bundle theory simpliciter—fails to better its chief rival, substance-attribute theory.

Theistic Conferralism

Routledge eBooks · 2021

• Philosophy
• Epistemology

In Chapter 13, Robert K. Garcia develops a theory that synthesizes two metaphysical issues whose relationship is rarely made clear. The first concerns the way in which God continually sustains creatures in existence, or divine sustenance. The second issue concerns the metaphysics of creaturely properties and, more specifically, the status and nature of non-shareable properties, or tropes. The position he defends is that the best trope theory will involve non-shareable and non-self-exemplifying properties, called modifier tropes. The synthesis is achieved by way of an identification: theistic conferralism is the thesis that creaturely properties, understood as modifier tropes, are identical with divine acts of sustenance, understood as acts of property-conferral. Garcia argues that this theory has a number of attractive features. First, it offers an especially parsimonious theory about the metaphysics of properties. The category of trope is consolidated into the category of divine action. Thus, properties are real but not sui generis. Second, it offers an attractive solution to a perennial problem for an account of providence, namely the challenge of avoiding deism, occasionalism, and panentheism. Third, this theory offers a way to situate the doctrine of sustenance within a so-called relational ontology.

Hidden Mickeys and the Hiddenness of God

2019-10-03

C.S. Lewis on Love and Personhood: A Philosophical Exploration

2018-01-01

Resting on Your Laurels

Oxford University Press eBooks · 2017-03-23

Abstract This chapter analyzes an apparent incompatibility between a traditional theistic view of heaven and theodicies that centrally appeal to libertarian free will in responding to the problem of evil. Toward resolving this incompatibility, leading strategies (i) deploy a tracing (historical or externalist) account of freedom and moral responsibility along with the related distinction between occurrent (or direct) freedom and derivative (or indirect) freedom, (ii) hold that freedom makes possible the realization of “freedom goods,” goods uniquely actualized by freedom and of such outweighing value that they (at least partly) justify God’s permission of evil, and (iii) hold that heavenly acts manifest freedom goods by being derivatively free. It argues that these strategies for reconciling the alleged incompatibility founder on ambiguities in how they employ the notion of derivative freedom, and that available disambiguations both fail to show the requisite compatibility, and face significant and unnoticed objections to their possible success.

Is it Possible to Care for Ecosystems? Policy Paralysis and Ecosystem Management

Ethics Policy & Environment · 2016-05-03 · 6 citations

Conservationists have two (non-mutually exclusive) types of arguments for why we should conserve ecosystems: instrumental and intrinsic value arguments. Instrumental arguments contend that we ought to conserve ecosystems because of the benefits that humans, or other morally relevant individuals, derive from ecosystems. Conservationists are often loath to rely too heavily on the instrumental argument because it could potentially force them to admit that some ecosystems are not at all useful to humans, or that if they are, they are not more useful than alternative configurations of those ecosystems. Consequently, conservationists often resort to an intrinsic value argument, contending that ecosystems are objectively valuable as ends in themselves, rather than merely as means to an end. If ecosystems have intrinsic value, then they have moral standing, which means that we must consider their needs and interests in any decisions we make about them. This paper concerns the significance of this move for individual and collective action on behalf of ecosystems. We show that even if there were ecosystems that had moral standing, we would lack adequate practical reasons to act on their behalf.