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Kyle Bagwell

Kyle Bagwell

· Donald L. Lucas Endowed Professor in Economics

Stanford University · Economics

Active 1984–2023

h-index58
Citations15.9k
Papers28010 last 5y
Funding—

Academic metrics are sourced from OpenAlex and public funding records; values may differ from Google Scholar.

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About

Kyle Bagwell is the Donald L. Lucas Professor in Economics at Stanford University. His research focuses on International Trade, Industrial Organization, and Game Theory. He examines theoretical and empirical questions related to the purpose and design of GATT/WTO trade agreements, as well as theories of competition and cooperation in settings where asymmetric information is present. His work explores the purpose and design of trade agreements, competition and cooperation under private information, and collusion and advertising.

Research topics

  • International trade
  • Sociology
  • Political Science
  • Economics
  • International economics
  • Law
  • Keynesian economics
  • Microeconomics

Selected publications

  • Is the WTO Passé?

    Journal of Economic Literature · 2016-12-01 · 116 citations

    articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    The WTO has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand-off, where the WTO has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage, and is now passing the baton to PTAs to finish the job? We survey a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argue on this basis that the WTO is not passé. Rather, and subject to so…

    PublisherOA PDFDOI

  • Trade policy under monopolistic competition with firm selection

    Journal of International Economics · 2020 · 58 citations

    1st authorCorresponding
    PublisherDOI

  • Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records

    American Economic Journal Applied Economics · 2020 · 37 citations

    1st authorCorresponding

    This paper empirically examines recently declassified tariff bargaining data from the GATT/WTO. Focusing on the Torquay Round (1950–1951), we document stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations that suggest a lack of strategic behavior among the participating governments and an important multilateral element to the bilateral bargains. We suggest that these features can be understood as emerging from a tariff bargaining forum that emphasizes the GATT pillars…

    PublisherDOI

  • Quantitative Analysis of Multi-Party Tariff Negotiations

    National Bureau of Economic Research · 2018-02-01 · 28 citations

    reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    This paper develops a model of international tariff negotiations to study the design of the institutional rules of the GATT/WTO. We embed a multi-sector model of trade between multiple countries into a model of inter-connected bilateral negotiations over tariffs. Using 1990 trade flows and tariff outcomes from the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO negotiations, we estimate country-sector productivity levels, sector-level productivity dispersion, iceberg trade costs, and country-pair bargaining parameter…

    PublisherDOI

  • The Design of Trade Agreements

    National Bureau of Economic Research · 2016-03-01 · 23 citations

    reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    What does economics have to say about the design of international trade agreements? We review a literature on this question, providing detailed coverage on three key design features of the GATT/WTO: reciprocity, nondiscrimination as embodied in the MFN principle, and tariff bindings and binding "overhang." Each of these features is central to the design of the GATT/ WTO, and we argue that an economic perspective can go a long way toward revealing a consistent logic to the inclusion of these desi…

    PublisherOA PDFDOI

Frequent coauthors

  • Robert W. Staiger

    283 shared

  • Robert Howse

    New York Law School

    217 shared

  • Joseph H. H. Weiler

    208 shared

  • Bernice Greenberg

    St. Olaf College

    208 shared

  • Jean Chair

    University of Michigan–Ann Arbor

    208 shared

  • Henrik Horn

    159 shared

  • Gene Grossman Is

    Columbia University

    144 shared

  • Robert Staiger Is

    Columbia University

    144 shared

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