About

Kinda Hachem is an Associate Professor of Business Administration at the University of Virginia, Darden School of Business. He is also a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and serves as an Associate Editor for the Journal of Monetary Economics. Additionally, he is a member of the Board of Editors for the Journal of Economic Literature and is involved with the Finance Theory Group. His role as a Financial Research Advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York highlights his engagement with financial research and policy. The information provided indicates his active participation in academic research and editorial activities within the fields of economics and finance.

Research topics

• Economics
• Computer Security
• Monetary economics
• Finance
• Geography
• Macroeconomics
• Financial system
• Psychology
• Market economy
• Business

Selected publications

• The Prudential Toolkit with Shadow Banking

  Staff reports · 2025-03-01 · 2 citations

  reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Several countries now require banks or money market funds to impose state-contingent costs on short-term creditors to absorb financial stress. We study these requirements as part of the broader prudential toolkit in a model with five key ingredients: banks may face an aggregate stress state with high withdrawals; a fire-sale externality motivates a mix of non-contingent and state-contingent regulation; banks may use shadow technologies to circumvent regulation; parameters of the shadow technologies may be private information; and bailouts may occur. We characterize the optimal policy for various combinations of these ingredients and demonstrate that the threat of shadow activities constrains state-contingent regulation more than noncontingent regulation, especially when imperfect information and limited commitment coexist. The planner triggers shadow activities with positive probability under imperfect information, and shadow activities that deplete resources in the stress state elicit larger bailouts under limited commitment, rendering the requirement of state-contingent costs a weak instrument.

  PublisherDOI

• Banking in China

  Oxford University Press eBooks · 2025-04-22

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract The growth of China’s banking system over the past 15 years has outpaced the rapid growth of its economy. This chapter reviews recent banking developments in China. It begins with an overview of the traditional banking sector and the constraints faced by these banks. It then reviews the rise of shadow banking in China in response to regulation and the subsequent expansion of shadow banking activities in response to regulatory attempts to curb the first generation of shadow banks. Emphasis is placed on developments following the deleveraging campaign introduced by the Chinese government in 2016, including the struggles of China’s property sector. A recurring theme in China’s recent financial history is that government efforts to balance liberalization (by expanding the set of permissible financial products) and control (by regulating traditional banks and now their shadow banking activities) have led to unintended growth in various short-term debt instruments and increased correlation within the financial system.

  PublisherDOI

• The Prudential Toolkit with Shadow Banking

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Cryptocurrency and the Washington Nationals: Once Bitten, Twice Shy?

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Markets for financial innovation

  Journal of Economic Theory · 2023-01-27

  articleOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Unconventional Monetary Policy

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021-01-01 · 1 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021-01-01 · 1 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Regulation and security design in concentrated markets

  Journal of Monetary Economics · 2021 · 11 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Computer Security
  • Business
  • Economics
  PublisherDOI

• Reallocating Liquidity to Resolve a Crisis: Evidence from the Panic of 1873

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021-01-01 · 2 citations

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Regulation and Security Design in Concentrated Markets

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2021-05-01 · 3 citations

  reportOpen accessSenior author

  Regulatory debates about centralized trading assume security design is immune to market structure. We consider a regulator who introduces an exchange to increase liquidity, understanding that security design is endogenous. For a given security, investors would like to trade in a larger market and, for a given market structure, they would like to trade a safer security. We show that financial intermediaries design riskier securities after the exchange is introduced, even when the exchange leads to the origination of safer underlying assets. The results reflect a relative dilution of investor market power and motivate coordinated policies to improve investor welfare.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Gary Richardson

  20 shared

• Jon Cohen

  20 shared

• Jing Cynthia Wu

  12 shared

• Zheng Song

  9 shared

• Ana Babus

  Washington University in St. Louis

  8 shared

• Haelim Anderson

  TD Bank

  7 shared

• Simpson Zhang

  Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

  5 shared

• Gordon Anderson

  University of Toronto

  2 shared

Education

• Ph.D.

  University of Virginia, Darden School of Business