About

Dr. Karl V. Lins is the Spencer Fox Eccles Chair in Banking and a Professor of Finance at the David Eccles School of Business at the University of Utah. His research primarily focuses on international corporate governance, capital markets, and corporate sustainability. He presents his research at academic and practitioner conferences worldwide, contributing to the understanding of these areas through his published work in leading finance and accounting journals. His scholarly contributions have been recognized with several awards, including the Best Paper prize at the European Financial Association meeting in 2012, the Best Paper Award by the Review of Asset Pricing Studies in 2014, the Blackrock Prize for Best Paper at the 2015 Australasian Banking and Finance Conference, the Standard Life Investments Finance Prize in 2016, and the FMA Global Finance Conference in Latin America Best Paper Award in 2019. Dr. Lins earned a B.S. in Petroleum Engineering from Texas A&M University, an MBA from UCLA's Anderson School, and a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he was named the Outstanding Doctoral Student. He has extensive experience in executive education, having taught for institutions such as London Business School, INSEAD, Duisenberg School of Finance, and others. His teaching has been honored with multiple awards, including the Brady Superior Teaching Award and the ASUU Student’s Choice Teaching Award at the University of Utah, as well as awards at the Duisenberg School of Finance and the University of North Carolina. Prior to his academic career, Dr. Lins worked as a petroleum engineer for Conoco Inc. and held corporate finance and international marketing positions at Boise Cascade Corporation.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Finance
• Political Science
• Business
• Social psychology
• Aesthetics
• Economics
• Monetary economics
• Law
• Market economy
• Psychology
• Financial system
• Engineering
• Art
• Accounting

Selected publications

• The impact of shifting societal attitudes toward women on capital markets and corporations: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein scandal and the #MeToo movement*

  Journal of applied corporate finance · 2025-03-01

  articleOpen access1st author

  The underrepresentation of women in leadership positions in corporations, and in other organizations and institutions, is ubiquitous. While business leaders, investors and society in general advocate for greater gender equality at all firm levels, the reality differs: the fraction of female executives remains very low, despite the considerable growth in female representation on company boards over the last few decades. Figure 1 illustrates the low levels of female representation in companies that make up the S&P 1500 index, which consists roughly of the 1500 largest firms in the United States by stock market capitalization. Figure 1A shows that the proportion of firms with at least one female executive among the five highest-paid executives has risen from under 10% in 1992 to 65% by the end of 2023—a significant increase, yet still far below what would be expected if gender were represented proportionately among top executives.1 Likewise, the fraction of top five executives who are female has also increased substantially over time, but remains at only 17% at the end of 2023 (Figure 1B). Finally, as illustrated in Figure 1C, only 7% of S&P 1500 companies have a female CEO. Why are there so few women in top leadership positions? One possible explanation is that the supply of qualified women is limited. Another is that conscious or unconscious biases lead to female candidates being overlooked for top roles. Of course, these two explanations could both be true, and work to reinforce one another: if female candidates are systematically passed over for top leadership positions, fewer women will pursue such opportunities, thereby further restricting future supply. We contend that the absence or underrepresentation of women in leadership positions within some firms stems partly from a corporate culture that tolerates (and may even foster) sexism, preventing women from rising to the top—a phenomenon widely known as the “glass ceiling.” The renowned economist Marianne Bertrand (2018) has identified many factors that help explain the glass ceiling, but she highlights that there is an unexplained residual and that “sexism should be high on the list to name that residual” (p. 228).2 This notion is further supported by survey evidence. For example, analysis by the Rockefeller Foundation and Global Strategy Group (2017) indicates that the culture of the corporation itself, and particularly the so-called “boys club” attitude in the workplace, is one of the main hurdles preventing women from achieving top leadership positions.3 Research has also shown that having a woman in the firm's C-suite improves equality in the organization by narrowing the gender pay gap (Tate and Yang (2015), Kunze and Miller (2017), and Dong (2022)).4 Similarly, a World Economic Forum (2017) study on attitudes towards women in the workplace emphasizes the pivotal role of female leadership in building a culture of gender equality.5 In fact, it concludes that the key to closing the gender pay gap is to put more women in charge. In our work, we provide compelling evidence on how shifts in societal attitudes toward women can influence capital markets and corporations, ultimately contributing to shattering the glass ceiling. In particular, we show that in the aftermath of the Harvey Weinstein scandal and the subsequent re-emergence of the #MeToo movement, corporations increased their gender diversity in the top echelons of management, even in traditionally male-dominated industries and in more sexist states. This change was partly driven by changes in investors’ non-monetary preferences leading to heightened investor demand for shares of less sexist firms. Importantly, the rise in executive gender diversity did not come at the expense of future profitability, which is consistent with sexism being a significant barrier preventing women from reaching the top echelons of corporations. Undoubtedly, the public revelation of the numerous sexual harassment allegations against Harvey Weinstein and the resurgence of the #MeToo movement constituted a watershed moment in societal attitudes towards women. These events quickly brought to the forefront the extent to which sexual harassment and gender discrimination were prevalent in the workplace, while making it clear that such egregious behavior would no longer be condoned. Notably, they highlighted the importance of having a corporate culture free of sexism and misogyny, where employees can advance to leadership roles irrespective of their gender or other demographic characteristics. In our work, we exploit these unexpected and salient events to explore the extent to which changes in societal attitudes towards women affect capital markets, investors’ preferences, and the culture of corporations. We argue that investor response could stem from two non-mutually exclusive channels. One explanation is that investors believe that firms with female leaders will perform better after these events due to societal pressure; for example, customers may prefer to buy products from companies with female leaders or employees may prefer to work for such companies. We refer to this as the cash flow channel, whereby today's returns the of future cash The other explanation is non-monetary preferences, in which investors prefer to and the capital market of such preferences, whereby investors while has by and among in particular, argue that if investors these in expected returns (and a of could returns in the which investors’ for a We argue that the events this of we the changes in to investor preferences towards companies with a in In our we the stock of companies with and female leaders the We study these are to changes in non-monetary preferences of the investors in these companies. Finally, we explore how firms to these is that the events to significant with at least one woman among their five highest-paid executives returns of to firms female top executives these This is to a of the of firms with While may it is to in that these returns to all firms in the S&P we provide evidence on the of the we in on investors and study they their of the shares on the of women in leadership investors are of as they are investors that and the of the work has their importance in and We in the of companies with female leaders after the a that at the as as at the investor Notably, the in is more among investors who less of a for to the These are the of investors preferences we would to be the by the shifts in societal attitudes in the of We also a rise in the of the which is driven not only by in the of the firms they but also by of their towards These are consistent with the that the stock response is driven by changes in investors’ non-monetary of course, possible that investors their in of future cash for firms female leaders to firms with female leaders of such cash and ultimately female leaders could be to greater yet we no evidence of in or in of these that markets not heightened the of the is far to be by female leaders could business as customers firms with greater gender to this we no changes in for firms with female leadership to other firms in the two after the with female top executives could have to the Weinstein and #MeToo events due to investors’ female as the stock could be to a of this we study investors’ to a of and no in the to of firms with and female leaders and and of to these investors their demand for firms female leaders, thereby up their of we would firms to to investor preferences by gender can be in Figure after the Weinstein scandal and the of the #MeToo movement by the in the the of growth of female representation in the top echelons of on a of and we in gender diversity in companies female Notably, we in gender diversity even in firms in industries with fewer women in executive positions and in more sexist states. This that the we are driven by in the market for female the of women to work, in industries or states. as a our are of changes in investors’ non-monetary preferences as the main of the This indicates that shifts in societal attitudes towards women are the behavior of both capital markets and corporations. we that it is to the that investors their they that greater diversity would have a on the future of these companies. In of our this could be or the could only in the as we are to We this by the of our in the of the against and particularly in the United companies are to provide on the of the the and the other We these for the to from the which the S&P 1500 firms Weinstein scandal on gender we an that is to one if at least one woman is among the five executives and We these with stock returns from the for Research in for the in which was more one the allegations against Harvey Weinstein were consists of firms after with returns executive illustrated in Figure the of the Weinstein to of S&P 1500 companies no women among the and women up less 10% of the executives in our on the last companies with at least one female executive were to with no female executives in of cash by and companies more their We also from the the to For our 17% of all are women and of all companies have at least one woman on the We that firms with female executives have more women on their boards firms with no female executives The Harvey Weinstein sexual allegations were widely in the on and While further allegations against Weinstein were in the after the notion that harassment in the workplace was and the #MeToo on to to the of sexual harassment in the a for and harassment in the an and further were against other leaders in business and the firms with and female leadership these we study the of to and the returns to returns these for both of firms. We and the Harvey Weinstein allegations were the subsequent which we to in the on after the #MeToo and on While the #MeToo movement did not end there was a significant in the of on of the after that we contend that investors would have the stock if of these within this and the of to the which we to study show that companies with at least one woman among the executives returns of on and and an the on This evidence that investors the of having women among the top executives of the Notably, there is no evidence of in the and subsequent these our that a corporate culture is firms with women in top leadership positions returns the importance of having a culture increased the Weinstein scandal and the of the #MeToo We also study the of a corporate culture are further the is a woman and no only of firms a female at the time, such a female may be to argue that women are in the C-suite as for their which would that our is not the culture of the While may be women are in positions, we contend that it is that firms would women as top with if they did not believe that they were to this and the general that the of women among the executives may not a sexist we also two we female leadership below the C-suite from the which on the of the organization at the below a firm's are to have leadership we for the to and firms that have at least one female to firms that not only but are in we a of sexism on on the an and company from employees for companies For all we the in the and firms with fewer we a of companies. We the of that to a sexist corporate such as sexism, sexual misogyny, We a company to be sexist if at least 10% of all these and We the returns over the events for sexist and companies. are consistent with our companies to have a less sexist corporate culture by Finally, we these events investors to the of corporate culture more the culture and to companies by their employees as by We that companies with culture and other firms of the on female leadership and of the has not on the executive but on women on the and and and and the of and Miller that female are more to female it is possible as by the of having a culture at the and that our from In other female representation on the could be what ultimately a corporate which in to the of female the extent this is the our could be to female explore this we our with of the fraction of female not the that the is the the fraction of female has no on returns the while our main This that the importance of having a corporate culture from having women in executive positions from having female We this to the that female representation on boards is more as female executive is to be a more of a culture female We to the of our we that our after for with or our are we firms from of the industries one at a for industries and may have by the of by the being a public our not affect the we explore the can be by changes in investor preferences, partly by the of and to these changes in investor preferences for can lead to returns for high In our the Weinstein scandal and #MeToo movement increased the of gender an of is that this increased investors’ preferences towards firms with greater gender we the stock to both and changes in investor investor preferences are not we can who of the shares of the firms in our and are the of change their in with their preferences for gender this in we on investor from the over the to these from with the which are for all investors with at least in under We study in our as as the of In to with a more we study the of investors that at least and of a In our we the change in from the to the while for the in over as as for the of the we study we also for the general preferences of at in This to at in time, an or of firms with women in top executive positions to Figure the Figure shows the change in the while Figure on significant in investors’ of firms with a culture to other firms after the the (Figure their by with the rising to with and The to we on the largest institutions, these are also investors with to their at Figure shows the increased in firms with female leaders to by of firm This is more for with their by We also that our are not the of a In particular, if were their in firms with female leaders the Weinstein our up the of this This would the and our this we that there is no in firms with and female leaders at a We that the the in of the two of firms. that gender diversity is an of our is that the of the events on should be for that a for in their the is that these events shifts in investor investors firms with more gender they are to make on the other are expected to their these are the investors preferences are more to have in response to the We investor preferences the of We the of the to the events for on the from the We this over the from to to a for investors are on their we the and study changes in after the events are more for investors with low We this to be the In fact, the change in is driven by These further the investor as the explanation for the We also this analysis but of on the to to and we our on the which is more to gender The Finally, we in even more and to the of the of the firms they we the we that these lead to changes in the of the investors’ we the of the of with low change more of with high that this is the in the their by 10% to the of an could change for two or changes in the of the companies in is that at least of the change is driven by the that this is the we the of but on the of under this changes in the can be to changes in illustrated in Figure more of the in the of investors are due to changes in This is even fact, to the of the and for the the in this that investors their toward with greater female investors an to the and that these changes in lead to in the of their These are consistent with changes in investor preferences the stock that we is that the stock response with the Weinstein and #MeToo events is to shifts in investors preferences, as by the changes in We after a of One explanation is that after Weinstein and increased for firms with a more sexist corporate The stock returns that we would an of by the firm market for our firms of which high to an of expected in and possible the of we only from to in firms with at least one female in firms This that increased is an explanation for the it is possible that market expected more to what We this by by should increased for companies. We for our firms from the for the the events to and the to We for firms female leadership to with female leadership after the after for many factors that affect We no evidence of changes in that not explain the stock we These are also with the that the market expected increased but that the firms leading to no change in the of the of evidence of increased and it could be that the events we study increased the of future of sexual which in could have stock even if by that the response with the revelation of of sexual harassment is for over the to our is this explanation would that the market firm in our women in top leadership (and of the firms with women in top to allegations of sexual harassment we as explanation is that investors cash in firms with female leadership For example, they expected customers to their to firms with greater gender diversity or employees to be to work for less pay work in companies with female this were the we would significant in for companies with women this we to as less of by growth in to the in the and as by the of employees at the end of the We to these for the firms in our over the from to and the changes after the events the of which both the and are and we also for The no in both of that our stock evidence is not due to changes in cash This is an it that the stock is to investors’ of we the that investors may have expected future in cash that did not we as a explanation for our to this firms with female top executives were by markets of investor preferences for This would also explain many firms did not female executives as this would have to The this leading to the stock changes we is it a of what a We an of which is that investors to The is that a firm with a female the market not as as a firm a female the is to be more we study such to and it was We from from to stock at the of the We returns on the the the market We of the stock as a of the and the changes after the events for the stock in the in we that returns are for the is for firms with and women in top and it not change after These provide no to the We the of women in top as evidence of a more sexist is that the of female representation in top has to with the culture of the but supply in general or in In other firms with fewer women executives not a more sexist they to qualified women to on these roles. This would also be consistent with the stock response if the Weinstein and #MeToo events increased from investors or society at on firms to women. with female particularly in some companies female leaders would stock they would be to top executives that are less While this explanation is both and by our it would be and for to companies to more women after if the of women at the top is not an of a sexist would have to be to firms female leaders if the of women at the top has to with the culture of the Of course, it could be that investors are but believe that other are not and will firms female For example, customers could their from such firms This could also explain the stock we if this were the we should also a in firms female executives would be less their or in response to they end up having to female executives that are less as we no evidence of changes in after the as we show in the firms increased their of female executives after the that there was a that was Importantly, we that this was the even in industries with fewer top executives or in that are more These are the in which qualified female executives should be particularly of the supply is that the pay of female executives should due to increased demand for their on and and for firm and we no evidence that or female top executives pay executives after the Finally, we also the stock evidence we firms with more female executives the to firms with fewer female executives the thereby for female supply in the for this as In while are consistent with some of the evidence we the explanation consistent with our is the investor preferences whereby investors their in firms female top and on the response of companies to the demand from investors for more female representation in top We would firms with fewer female leaders to to this demand by gender we illustrated in Figure there has a in the growth of female representation in top this not is the of this it from firms female or from firms with female leaders that to the this we of gender diversity from the for the to the which a firm's and towards a gender and it from to with greater gender which the fraction of women among a firm's and and which is an to one if the firm has a to diversity and and that these are from our which on the fraction of women among the five While our for our as we to on that are widely and from our Figure shows the over of these for firms with women among the executives and for as of we in of the diversity for both of firms after the events in these are more for firms women in top positions as of For example, increased from in to in for firms with female a change of but for firms female this increased from to over the a change of even firms executives are a gap still remains as of the gap the for the This is not a less making changes in the top of the We the of these which show that the changes are more for firms women in top We also these changes for firms in more sexist and for firms in industries with fewer women in executive These also to the supply supply are in industries or in with low female executive companies in these would it particularly to gender diversity at the executive in the We the fraction of women in executive positions in from the from with or more employees or with or more attitude towards women at the is on two The one is sexism from and from the to an is sexist and the survey in a and to a The is the gender which we from the for the and This survey on and many demographic characteristics. For we a of pay on a female while for other that explain The on the female the in pay after for that it as an of the gender pay States and industries are two on the of these We that firms their diversity even in sexist and in industries with few women in executive This with the of a in for female the that the supply of qualified women is in these or that qualified women are to work for firms in sexist or in industries with a sexist In this we show that S&P 1500 companies with women in their top leadership in which a corporate culture that tolerates sexism is less to be returns to other firms the the revelation of the Harvey Weinstein scandal and the resurgence of the #MeToo supported by a of that these events the preferences of investors toward companies to have a corporate investors increased their of these their to the events was less which to in the of their the we also in gender diversity among firms with fewer female executives to the as these firms to investors’ for more gender we that the revelation of prevalent sexism in corporations changes in investors’ attitudes towards sexism that in corporations to gender and investors as a in gender equality in corporations. We that shifts in societal attitudes towards women are capital markets and corporations in a with changes in investors’ non-monetary preferences as an for this the last few have a against and which to the of we our in of this how they to the the against in the of passed restricting from or with companies that or in and from and further after the of as of more have some of the of factors in public The movement, more and the against in This was by in and and after the in a key of our have and their to the For example, and of the largest investors in the have all their diversity and female representation on company this reality or even the increased of women in top that we in our We not While the of growth in female representation at the top may as we come to gender we no for a of the movement is that In our this would that more women to the executive would lead to a in as having identified the qualified to a less female evidence this by investors (and to their after the companies were to more even in traditionally male-dominated industries and in more sexist states. Importantly, we no evidence of a in subsequent This that the female executives were at least as as the that they In other by the and more firms have to women of This is in the and it the that candidates are less least in our our this we no firms should not women in the particularly the high of of women in further and also to the on as the which investors can their preferences and influence corporate in which investors their to while to from companies they work by that may be a more this show that the at gender diversity in by the largest investors and were by by companies that at least as many female in as in these investors have from their in response to the This as the which investors can their with corporate evidence indicates at least in the we can also be in can have the of a firm's of leading to that can in corporate and boards to the that to the in the While less our evidence that can also be an for corporate

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Sexism, Culture, and Firm Value: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein Scandal and the #MeToo Movement

  Journal of Accounting Research · 2024 · 39 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Psychology
  • Social psychology

  ABSTRACT During the revelation of the Harvey Weinstein scandal and the reemergence of the #MeToo movement, firms with a nonsexist corporate culture, proxied by having women among the five highest‐paid executives, earn excess returns of 1.3% relative to firms without female top executives. These returns are driven by changes in investor preferences toward firms with a nonsexist culture. Institutional ownership increases in firms with a nonsexist culture after the Weinstein/#MeToo events, particularly for investors with larger holdings and investors with a lower ESG focus ex ante. Firms without female top executives improve gender diversity after these events, particularly in more sexist states and in industries with few women executives. Our evidence attests to the value of having a nonsexist corporate culture and indicates that changes in societal norms toward women are permeating into capital markets and corporations.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Family-Controlled Firms and Environmental Sustainability: All Bite and No Bark

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 3 citations

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Trust, social capital, and the bond market benefits of ESG performance

  Review of Accounting Studies · 2022 · 201 citations

  • Monetary economics
  • Business
  • Financial system

  Abstract We investigate whether a firm’s social capital and the trust that it engenders are viewed favorably by bondholders. Using firms’ environmental and social (E&S) performance to proxy for social capital, we find no relation between social capital and bond spreads over the period 2006–2019. However, during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, which represents a shock to trust and default risk, high-social-capital firms benefited from lower bond spreads. These effects are stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs of debt and firms whose E&S efforts are more salient. During the crisis, high-social-capital firms were also able to raise more debt, at lower spreads, and for longer maturities. We find no evidence that the governance element of ESG is related to bond spreads. The gap between E&S performance of firms in the bottom and top E&S terciles has narrowed since the financial crisis, especially in the year prior to accessing the bond market.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Renewable Governance: Good for the Environment?

  Journal of Accounting Research · 2022 · 111 citations

  • Political Science
  • Business
  • Accounting

  ABSTRACT We conjecture that board renewal mechanisms—those substantive enough to renew the thinking of the board—are required before investors can address the mismatch between their preferences regarding environmental sustainability and what insiders at firms are actually doing. We identify the adoption of majority voting for directors and the introduction of a female director as two corporate governance mechanisms potentially strong enough to renew a board's thinking on sustainability. Using a sample of 3,293 firms from 41 countries, along with quasi‐exogenous shocks to board renewal mechanisms in Canada and France, we find that both board renewal mechanisms are associated with significantly higher future environmental performance. Further tests provide suggestive evidence that board renewal is more strongly associated with environmental performance in settings with better institutions and more motivated institutional investors. These results suggest the importance of board renewal for alignment of firm policies with investor preferences around the world.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Sexism, Culture, and Firm Value: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein Scandal and the #MeToo Movement

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2019-01-01 · 12 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Social capital, trust, and corporate performance: how CSR helped companies during the financial crisis (and why it can keep helping them)

  London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) · 2019-01-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  The authors summarize the findings of their study, published recently in the Journal of Finance, that shows that CSR investments can help companies when they perhaps need it most—that is, during sharp downturns when overall trust in companies and markets declines. Companies with high‐CSR rankings experienced stock returns that were five to seven percentage points higher than their low‐CSR counterparts during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and even larger excess returns during the Enron crisis of 2001–2003. High‐CSR companies during the crisis also reported better operating performance, higher growth, higher employee productivity, and greater access to debt markets—while continuing to generate higher shareholder returns as late as the end of 2013. Many of these operating improvements continued well into the post‐crisis period, though at more modest levels. As the authors view their findings, the ‘social capital’ built up by corporate CSR programs complements effective financial capital management in increasing shareholder wealth mainly by limiting companies' downside risk. CSR is seen as not only reducing systematic as well as firm‐specific risk, but as also providing protection against overall ‘loss of trust.’ The social capital created by CSR programs is said to provide a kind of insurance policy that pays off when investors and the overall economy face a severe crisis of confidence.

  PublisherOA PDF

• Social Capital, Trust, and Corporate Performance: How CSR Helped Companies During the Financial Crisis (and Why It Can Keep Helping Them)

  Journal of applied corporate finance · 2019-06-01 · 67 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  The authors summarize the findings of their study, published recently in the Journal of Finance , that shows that CSR investments can help companies when they perhaps need it most—that is, during sharp downturns when overall trust in companies and markets declines. Companies with high‐CSR rankings experienced stock returns that were five to seven percentage points higher than their low‐CSR counterparts during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and even larger excess returns during the Enron crisis of 2001–2003. High‐CSR companies during the crisis also reported better operating performance, higher growth, higher employee productivity, and greater access to debt markets—while continuing to generate higher shareholder returns as late as the end of 2013. Many of these operating improvements continued well into the post‐crisis period, though at more modest levels. As the authors view their findings, the ‘social capital’ built up by corporate CSR programs complements effective financial capital management in increasing shareholder wealth mainly by limiting companies' downside risk. CSR is seen as not only reducing systematic as well as firm‐specific risk, but as also providing protection against overall ‘loss of trust.’ The social capital created by CSR programs is said to provide a kind of insurance policy that pays off when investors and the overall economy face a severe crisis of confidence.

  PublisherDOI

• Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence

  Journal of Financial Economics · 2018-09-04 · 498 citations

  preprintOpen access

  This paper assesses whether shareholders drive the environmental and social (E&S) performance of firms worldwide. Across 41 countries, institutional ownership is positively associated with E&S performance with additional tests suggesting this relation is causal. Institutions are motivated by both financial and social returns. Investors increase firms’ E&S performance following shocks that reveal financial benefits to E&S improvements. In cross section, investors increase firms’ E&S performance when they come from countries with a strong community belief in the importance of E&S issues, but not otherwise. As such, these institutional investors transplant their social norms regarding E&S issues around the world.

  PublisherDOI

• Control Rights and Corporate Sustainability Around the World

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2018-01-01 · 6 citations

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Christian Leuz

  106 shared

• Francis E. Warnock

  National Bureau of Economic Research

  104 shared

• Darius P. Miller

  Southern Methodist University

  88 shared

• George Andrew Karolyi

  Cornell University

  74 shared

• René M. Stulz

  74 shared

• Craig Doidge

  73 shared

• Hannes F. Wagner

  65 shared

• Paolo F. Volpin

  53 shared

Education

• Ph.D., Finance

  University of California, Berkeley

  1995

• M.S., Finance

  University of California, Berkeley

  1991

• B.S., Economics

  University of California, Los Angeles

  1988

Awards & honors

• Best Paper prize at the European Financial Association meeti…
• Best Paper Award by the Review of Asset Pricing Studies (201…
• Blackrock Prize for Best Paper at the 2015 Australasian Bank…
• Standard Life Investments Finance Prize by the European Corp…
• FMA Global Finance Conference in Latin America Best Paper Aw…