Imagined Audiences and Common Ground

2025-05-15 · 1 citations

Abstract Many theories of conversational contexts hold that an important element of the context is the common ground, an evolving shared background of information against which communication takes place. Conversations online, particularly public conversations on social media, differ from paradigmatic private, face-to-face conversations in ways that present problems for the roles common ground is supposed to play in an account of conversational dynamics. I argue that despite these challenges, there are good reasons for thinking common ground does play an important role in conversations online, but it is a common ground with an imagined audience rather than an actual audience, and its dynamic evolution over the course of a conversation is one than involves a series of overlapping imagined and actual common grounds. The account of common ground is one important element for understanding both successful and unsuccessful communication in conversations online.

Towards a generalized framework for planetary communication

Space Policy · 2025-07-26

Towards a Generalized Framework for Planetary Communication

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01

Descriptions, pronouns, and uniqueness

Linguistics and Philosophy · 2021 · 19 citations

• Computer Science
• Linguistics
• Computer Science

Metasemantics without semantic intentions

Inquiry · 2020 · 8 citations

• Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Psychology

The most common answers to metasemantic questions regarding context-sensitive expressions appeal primarily to speakers' intentions. Having rejected intentionalism in Lewis [(2020. “The Speaker Authority Problem for Context-Sensitivity (Or: You Can't Always Mean What You Want).” Erkenntnis 85: 1527–1555.], this paper takes a non-intentionalist perspective in answering the metasemantic question: how does a context determine the value of context-sensitive expressions? It focuses on the case of gradable adjectives, i.e. expressions like ‘tall’, ‘expensive’, and ‘rich’, which require a contextually determined standard in the unmarked positive form, as in ‘Pia is tall’. I argue that this standard is determined by a salient comparison class, which, when embedded in the relevant facts, provides input into statistical reasoning which outputs a standard in accordance with conversational domain goals.

Anaphora and negation

Philosophical Studies · 2020-07-23 · 19 citations

Correction to: Anaphora and negation

Philosophical Studies · 2020-10-26

The Speaker Authority Problem for Context-Sensitivity (Or: You Can’t Always Mean What You Want)

Erkenntnis · 2019-01-01 · 21 citations

Counterfactual Discourse in Context

Noûs · 2017-01-30 · 25 citations

Abstract The classic Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals captures that Sobel sequences are consistent sequences, for example: If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro dance. But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro dance. But reverse a sequence like this one and it no longer sounds so good, which is surprising on the classic semantics. This observation motivated Kai von Fintel (2001) and Thony Gillies (2007) to propose dynamic semantic accounts of counterfactual conditionals. Subsequently, Sarah Moss (2012) defended the classic semantics against the charge that it need be abandoned in the face of these order effects, arguing that the infelicity of the reverse sequences is pragmatic. I argue that both accounts are ultimately untenable, but each account has strengths. Seeing what works and what doesn't in each account points the way to the right positive view. With this in mind, I defend a contextualist account of counterfactuals that takes conversational relevance to play a central role.

Counterfactuals and Knowledge

2017-03-16 · 1 citations