Jennifer H. Arlen

About

Jennifer H. Arlen is the Norma Z. Paige Professor of Law at NYU School of Law, where she also serves as the Director of the Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement and the Center for Law, Economics and Organization. Her scholarship focuses on corporate liability, behavioral and experimental law and economics, and medical malpractice. She is the founder and faculty director of the NYU Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement, and teaches courses including Corporations, Business Crime, and a seminar on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing. Arlen has held prominent roles in the legal academic community, including serving as president of the American Law and Economics Association and the Society for Empirical Legal Studies, which she co-founded. She has contributed to the development of legal principles through her work with the American Law Institute and is on the editorial board of the American Law and Economics Review. Her scholarly work has been published in leading journals such as the Yale Law Journal, Chicago Law Review, NYU Law Review, and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. She holds a BA in economics from Harvard College, an JD from NYU School of Law, and a PhD in economics from NYU. Her professional background includes clerkship for Judge Phyllis Kravitch on the US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, and academic appointments at institutions including Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and USC Gould School of Law, prior to her current…

Research topics

• Political Science
• Business
• Law
• Economics
• Law and economics
• Engineering
• Accounting
• History
• Psychology
• Criminology

Selected publications

• Does conviction matter? The reputational and collateral effects of corporate crime

  Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · 2018-04-28 · 17 citations

  book-chapterSenior author

  Critics of deferred prosecution agreements claim they undermine deterrence by lowering the cost to firms from reputational damage or stigma resulting from a criminal settlement. We evaluate the claim that the choice of a DPA, instead of a guilty plea, reduces the cost to corporations of reputational damage from a criminal settlement, holding constant other factors such as the identity of the offender and offense magnitude. Criminal settlements cause firms to sustain costs from reputational damag…

  PublisherDOI

• The Law of Corporate Investigations and the Global Expansion of Corporate Criminal Enforcement

  eYLS (Yale Law School) · 2019-10-30 · 13 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  The United States model of corporate crime control, developed over the last two decades, couples a broad rule of corporate criminal liability with a practice of reducing sanctions, and often withholding conviction, for firms that assist enforcement authorities by detecting, reporting, and helping prove criminal violations. This model, while subject to skepticism and critiques, has attracted interest among reformers in overseas nations that have sought to increase the frequency and size of their…

  Publisher

• Corporate Criminal Enforcement in the United States: Using Negotiated Settlements to Turn Potential Corporate Criminals into Corporate Cops

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2017-01-01 · 13 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Battle for Our Souls: A Psychological Justification for Corporate and Individual Liability for Organizational Misconduct

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022 · 6 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• The potential promise and perils of introducing deferred prosecution agreements outside the U.S.

  Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · 2020 · 6 citations

  1st authorCorresponding

  Countries around the world are reforming their corporate criminal liability regimes to introduce deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs). DPAs can help deter crime when properly structured. But otherwise they can increase the risk of corporate misconduct. This chapter identifies the steps countries need to take in order to use DPAs to deter corporate crime. It then evaluates the recent reforms adopted in the U.K. and France. Both reforms are a significant step forward, yet further reform is neede…

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Eric L. Talley

  European Corporate Governance Institute

  152 shared

• Matthew L. Spitzer

  Northwestern University

  124 shared

• Lewis A. Kornhauser

  New York University

  22 shared

• W. Bentley MacLeod

  National Bureau of Economic Research

  22 shared

• Stephan Tontrup

  New York Law School

  21 shared

• Mark A. Cohen

  17 shared

• Cindy R. Alexander

  12 shared

• Marcel Kahan

  10 shared

Education

• B.A.

  Harvard College

  1982

• Other

  New York University

  1986

• Ph.D.

  New York University

  1992

Awards & honors

• Lifetime Achievement Award, Compliance.Net, 2025
• Honorary Doctorate of Law, University of St. Gallen, Switzer…

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