Ilan Guttman

About

Ilan Guttman is a Professor of Accounting at the Leonard N. Stern School of Business, where he joined in July 2013. He holds the position of The Peter Drucker Faculty Fellow and teaches courses at both the graduate and doctoral levels. He is also the director of the accounting PhD program. Professor Guttman's primary research interest lies in the application of economics of information in capital market settings. His recent research focuses on disclosure decisions by information holders such as managers and financial analysts, and the market reactions to these disclosures. His work explores issues including the manipulation of disclosures when disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, the impact of earnings manipulation on managers' contracts, the relationship between disclosure and real economic decisions like investment and dividend policies, and the implications of dynamic multi-period settings on disclosure and earnings management. His research has been published in leading academic journals including The Accounting Review, The American Economic Review, the Review of Financial Studies, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Accounting Research, and Management Science. Prior to his tenure at NYU Stern, he served on the faculty of Stanford Graduate School of Business, teaching MBA and PhD courses. Professor Guttman earned his B.A. in Economics, B.Sc. in Computer Science, M.A. in Economics and Business Administration, and Ph.D. in Economics, all from the Hebrew…

Research topics

• Business
• Finance
• Economics
• Microeconomics
• Accounting
• Actuarial science
• Monetary economics

Selected publications

• Earnings Management and Earnings Quality: Theory and Evidence

  The Accounting Review · 2018-09-01 · 154 citations

  article

  ABSTRACT We study a model of earnings management and provide predictions about the time-series properties of earnings quality and reporting bias. We estimate the model to empirically separate two components of investor uncertainty: fundamental economic uncertainty, and information asymmetry between the manager and investors due to reporting noise. We find that (1) the null hypothesis of zero reporting bias is rejected; (2) the ratio of the variance of the noise introduced by the reporting proces…

  PublisherDOI

• The effect of exogenous information on voluntary disclosure and market quality

  Journal of Financial Economics · 2020 · 78 citations

  PublisherDOI

• Earnings Management and Earnings Quality: Theory and Evidence

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2014-01-01 · 68 citations

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Optimal Contracts with Performance Manipulation

  Journal of Accounting Research · 2014-06-18 · 67 citations

  article

  ABSTRACT We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures, which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is privately informed about his productivity prior to being hired by a firm. In order to incentivize the manager to exert productive effort, the firm designs a compensation contract that is based on reported earnings, which can be manipulated by…

  PublisherDOI

• Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2012-01-01 · 56 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Eugene Kandel

  Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center

  10 shared

• Iván Marinovic

  9 shared

• Anne Beyer

  9 shared

• Ilan Kremer

  7 shared

• Ohad Kadan

  Arizona State University

  7 shared

• Cyrus Aghamolla

  Rice University

  5 shared

• Andrzej Skrzypacz

  3 shared

• Haim Levy

  Hebrew University of Jerusalem

  3 shared

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