About

Filomena Garcia is an associate professor of economics at NC State University's Poole College of Management, within the Department of Economics. She specializes in industrial organization and game theory, with particular research interests in understanding the links between competition policy, digitization of markets, and environmental policies. She earned her Ph.D. in Economics from Université Catholique de Louvain in 2005, and holds additional degrees including an MS in Philosophy from the University of York, an MS in Economics from Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and a BA in Economics from Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Her academic background and research focus contribute to her role in advancing economic understanding of market dynamics, policy implications, and the impact of technological and environmental factors.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Computer Science
• Business
• Economics
• Accounting
• Microeconomics
• Psychology
• Market economy
• Public economics
• Social psychology
• Industrial organization

Selected publications

• Post-merger strategies of multiplatform monopolies *

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Post-Merger Strategies of Multiplatform Monopolies

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01

  preprintOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Nationalistic bias in collusion prosecution: the case for international antitrust agreements

  Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 2023-12-28 · 4 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract We study the incentives of competition authorities to prosecute collusive practices of domestic and foreign firms in a multimarket contact model between two firms operating in two countries. In equilibrium, the country of origin of the firms might prefer to delay prosecution to protect profits in foreign markets. This strategic delay is valuable because prosecution in the country of origin of the firms activates an information spillover that triggers prosecution in the foreign country. Prosecution delays, however, are suboptimal under global welfare. With multiple industries, both countries can be better off under integration or signing an international antitrust agreement.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• First‐best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities

  Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2023-11-14 · 8 citations

  article

  Abstract This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free‐riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two‐part per‐unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first‐best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first‐best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first‐best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.

  PublisherDOI

• Wealth inequality, systemic financial fragility and government intervention

  Economic Theory · 2022-04-11 · 3 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Does wealth inequality make financial crises more likely? If so, how can a government intervene, and how does this affect the distribution of resources in the economy? To answer these questions, we study a banking model where strategic complementarities among wealth-heterogeneous depositors trigger systemic self-fulfilling runs. In equilibrium, higher wealth inequality increases directly the incentives to run of the poor, and indirectly those of the rich via higher bank liquidity insurance, thus increasing the probability of a systemic self-fulfilling run overall. A government intervention on illiquid but solvent banks redistributes resources towards the poor and makes systemic self-fulfilling runs less likely.

  PublisherDOI

• Digitalization in Two-Sided Platform

  RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2020-01-01

  preprint1st authorCorresponding

  In this paper we study the effects of the introduction of a new two sided platform endowed with artificial intelligence in a market where a firm provides a brick and mortar platform to buyers and sellers. In our theoretical model we show that the decision of whether to introduce the new platform depends on the reduction of the search cost for the consumers. We also show that the introduction of the platform enlarges the market with more consumers using both platforms. Finally we study the welfare effect of the introduction of the platform opening the discussion on whether certain artificial intelligence devices for shopping should be regulated.

  Publisher

• The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance

  Journal of Economic Psychology · 2020 · 29 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Political Science
  • Accounting
  • Business
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• The merger paradox, collusion, and competition policy

  Journal of Public Economic Theory · 2020 · 8 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Economics
  • Microeconomics

  Abstract This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion, and competition policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting collusion could induce a wave of mergers, so firms can sustain collusion again. Indeed, mergers could fully neutralize the procompetitive effect of an improvement in collusion detection and prosecution. From a normative perspective, we show that merger policy is crucial when cost synergies are small (or nonexistent) and the competition authority can only deter collusion by restricting mergers. Finally, we highlight that mergers could be more harmful (less beneficial) than expected if the impact that mergers have on the competition regime is properly considered, which suggests a decomposition of the welfare impact of mergers into unilateral and coordinated effects.

  PublisherDOI

• The Effects of Official and Unofficial Information on Tax Compliance

  RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2018-04-01

  preprint1st authorCorresponding

  The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instru-ments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of ran-domly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham–Sandmo–Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the official past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compli-ant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments, and especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effect depends on the characteristics of the population. In countries with inherently low levels of tax evasion, official information can have beneficial effects by consolidating the behavior of compliant individuals. However, in countries with inherently high levels of tax evasion, official information can have detrimental effects by intensifying the behavior of evaders. In both cases, the impact of official information is magnified in the presence of strong peer effects.

  Publisher

• The Effects of Official and Un-official Information on Tax Compliance

  University of Lisbon Repository (University of Lisbon) · 2018-01-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary
\ninstruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an
\nanalysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax
\nevasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an
\nexperiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have
\nto declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax
\nevasion rate or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax
\nbehavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax
\nevasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham Sandmo Yitzhaki tax evasion
\nmodel to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers.
\nWe _find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher
\nthe offcial past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more
\nlikely to evade again, and compliant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third,
\nwhen all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and
\ncompliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments,
\nand especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our
\nexperiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effect
\ndepends on the characteristics of the population. In countries with inherently low levels of
\ntax evasion, official information can have beneficial effects by consolidating the behavior
\nof compliant individuals. However, in countries with inherently high levels of tax evasion,
\nofficial information can have detrimental effects by intensifying the behavior of evaders.
\nIn both cases, the impact of official information is magnified in the presence of strong
\npeer effects.

  Publisher

Frequent coauthors

• Jean J. Gabszewicz

  UCLouvain

  16 shared

• Luca David Opromolla

  Peterson Institute for International Economics

  14 shared

• Jose Manuel Paz y Miño

  University of Chile

  9 shared

• Gustavo Torrens

  9 shared

• Rafael Marques

  Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

  8 shared

• Andrea Vezzulli

  University of Insubria

  8 shared

• Rabah Amir

  University of Iowa

  7 shared

• Joana Resende

  Universidade do Porto

  5 shared

Labs

• Economics Department of NC State UniversityPI

Education

• Doctorate, Center for Operations Research and Optimization

  Université catholique de Louvain

  2006

• MsC in Economics and Finance, Economics

  Pompeu Fabra University

  2001

• BSc, Economics

  NOVA School of Business and Economics

  2000