About

EMERSON M. S. NIOU (Ph.D., U. of Texas at Austin, 1987) is a Professor of Political Science at Duke University. His academic work includes co-authoring two books: 'The Balance of Power' published by Cambridge University Press in 1989, and 'Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory' published by Rutledge in 2015. His recent publications explore topics such as preferences for divided government, alliance formation under external threats and internal rivalry, and strategic voting in elections. His research also examines the conditions under which states form alliances or ententes, especially in the context of common threats, and the dynamics of international relations and security, with a focus on Taiwan and cross-strait issues. He has been a faculty member at Duke University since 2002 and has received grants for research on Taiwan studies and security stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Political Science
• Economics
• Epistemology
• Law
• Public economics
• Econometrics
• Political economy
• Mathematics
• Law and economics

Selected publications

• Entente versus Alliance: When Should States Be Friends but Not Allies?

  Defence and Peace Economics · 2023 · 2 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Political Science
  • Political Science
  • Political economy

  When faced with a common threat, states have various alignment choices. Formal alliances offer explicit military obligations of support. Others, such as the Triple Entente that preceded World War I, are more ambiguous understandings. These entente-like alignments make no formal pledges of armed support in the event of hostilities. However, they do not entirely rule out military support either. Why might states embrace this form of strategic ambiguity over firm alliance commitments? Our formal explication addresses this question via the prism of collective action. Our modeling efforts, combined with historical precedents, suggest that an entente might be a more effective alignment choice than a formal alliance for states to balance against powerful threats. An entente permits states to strike the middle ground between entrapment and deterrence. The strategic ambiguity inherent in these two seemingly self-contradictory goals of an entente is a key component of its success as an alignment strategy, especially when external threats are large. However, asymmetry in strength between two states can result in divergent preferences between alliance and entente.

  PublisherDOI

• Measuring ‘closeness’ in 3-candidate elections: Methodology and an application to strategic voting

  Electoral Studies · 2020 · 2 citations

  • Political Science
  • Computer Science
  • Political Science
  PublisherDOI

• External Threat, Internal Rivalry, and Alliance Formation

  The Journal of Politics · 2019-02-05 · 17 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  History reveals enemies often ally to confront a common threat. In such competitive coalitions actors must balance the simultaneous risk of distrust of their ally against external danger. We model this interactive relationship and generate several novel outcomes. Intra-alliance rivalry forces allying players to preemptively commit more resources to conflict and to free ride less. Consequently, their likelihood of conflict success increases. However, intra-alliance instability forces weaker players to commit a higher proportion of resources to fighting than do their stronger allies. This outcome runs contrary to Mancur Olson’s classic collective action result that the “small exploit the great.” Furthermore, allies do not demonstrate a uniform preference for bandwagoning or balancing. In general, it is preferable to bandwagon with friends but to balance with enemies. Finally, because rivalry can raise alliance payoffs, actors may rationally seek out risky partnerships with so-called enemies rather than molding more certain alliances with friends.

  PublisherDOI

• Measuring Preferences for Divided Government: Some Americans Want Divided Government and Vote to Create It

  Political Behavior · 2017-12-22 · 15 citations

  article
  PublisherDOI

• Taiwan in 2016

  Asian Survey · 2017-01-01 · 3 citations

  articleSenior author

  The opposition Democratic Progressive Party won decisive victories in the Legislative Yuan and presidential elections. Despite these victories, 2016 proved to be a difficult year for Taiwan’s new ruling party. As 2016 drew to a close, polls showed that most of Taiwan’s population disapproved of Tsai Ing-wen’s performance as president.

  PublisherDOI

• Taiwan in 2015

  Asian Survey · 2016-01-01 · 3 citations

  articleSenior author

  In 2015, Taipei’s relations with Washington moved forward in parallel with the improvements in cross-Strait relations initiated in 2008. Perhaps most notable was President Ma Ying-jeou’s summit meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping. Despite gains in external relations, however, the island was plagued by partisan gridlock, a stagnating economy, and political unrest. Most anticipated a Democratic Progressive Party victory over the ruling Kuomintang in the January 2016 presidential election. But few could predict what kind of fallout the election might generate.

  PublisherDOI

• Strategy and Politics

  2015-05-15 · 3 citations

  book1st authorCorresponding

  Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory is designed to introduce students with no background in formal theory to the application of game theory to modeling political processes. This accessible text covers the essential aspects of game theory while keeping the reader constantly in touch with why political science as a whole would benefit from considering this method. Examining the very phenomena that power political machineries—elections, legislative and committee processes, and international conflict, the book attempts to answer fundamental questions about their nature and function in a clear, accessible manner. Included at the end of each chapter is a set of exercises designed to allow students to practice the construction and analysis of political models. Although the text assumes only an elementary-level training in algebra, students who complete a course around this text will be equipped to read nearly all of the professional literature that makes use of game theoretic analysis.

  PublisherDOI

• Strategy and Politics: An Introduction to Game Theory

  2015-05-28 · 4 citations

  bookOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  1. Politics as a Game. 2. Extensive Forms, Voting Trees and Planning Ahead 3. The Strategic Form and Nash Equilibria. 4. Zero Sum and Spatial Games. 5. The Prisoners' Dilemma and Collective Action. 6. Agendas and Voting Rules. 7. Games With Incomplete Information. 8. Cooperation and Coalitions.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• On Local Governance in China: From Feudalism, Centralized Bureaucracy, to Self-Governance

  WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks · 2014-09-26

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Nonseparable Preferences and Issue Packaging in Elections

  2013-01-01 · 16 citations

  book-chapterSenior author
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Peter C. Ordeshook

  36 shared

• John Fuh‐sheng Hsieh

  13 shared

• Gregory F. Rose

  10 shared

• Dean Lacy

  9 shared

• Brett V. Benson

  Vanderbilt University

  5 shared

• Philip O. Paolino

  University of North Texas

  4 shared

• Dennis Hickey

  National Chengchi University

  4 shared

• Ze-Gang Leng

  Institute of Religious Studies

  4 shared