About

Julia C. Morse is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research focuses on international organizations, with particular attention to issues of reputation, compliance, and market-driven enforcement. She has published her work in prominent journals such as International Organization, The Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and The Review of International Organizations. Her book, The Bankers' Blacklist: Unofficial Market Enforcement and the Global Fight against Illicit Financing, was published by Cornell University Press in 2022. Dr. Morse received her PhD from the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and holds a BA in Public Policy Studies and Political Science from Duke University. Prior to her academic career, she worked at the State Department as a Presidential Management Fellow and at the FBI as an Intelligence Analyst. She was also a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania's Browne Center for International Politics.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Sociology
• Law
• Law and economics
• Political economy
• Computer Science
• Economics
• Monetary economics
• Business
• International trade
• Public administration
• Psychology
• Public relations
• Finance

Selected publications

• Information Disorder and Global Politics

  International Organization · 2025-11-20 · 1 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Information is a key variable in International Relations, underpinning theories of foreign policy, inter-state cooperation, and civil and international conflict. Yet IR scholars have only begun to grapple with the consequences of recent shifts in the global information environment. We argue that information disorder —a media environment with low barriers to content creation, rapid spread of false or misleading material, and algorithmic amplification of sensational and fragmented narratives—will reshape the practice and study of International Relations. We identify three major implications of information disorder on international politics. First, information disorder distorts how citizens access and evaluate political information, creating effects that are particularly destabilizing for democracies. Second, it damages international cooperation by eroding shared focal points and increasing incentives for noncompliance. Finally, information disorder shifts patterns of conflict by intensifying societal cleavages, enabling foreign influence, and eroding democratic advantages in crisis bargaining. We conclude by outlining an agenda for future research.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance

  UNC Libraries · 2025-08-14

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  Public allegations of international law violations are common in international politics. When do these accusations generate international backlash for governments? We argue that political costs hinge on a rhetorical battle to shape perceptions of the government’s behavior. Governments use strategic messaging to contest information, challenge the appropriateness of international law, or cite extenuating circumstances. International organizations (IOs) counter government rhetoric to reinforce the law. These competing messages shape support for punishment among citizens and political elites. We test our argument with survey experiments measuring perceptions of alleged military aggression and human rights violations. Among the US public and a global sample of diplomatic elites, foreign government denials and claims about mitigating circumstances reduce punitive attitudes. IO rebuttals counter denials but can only partially neutralize other claims. We offer a new framework for analyzing the politics of noncompliance and present novel evidence illuminating the strengths and limitations of IOs in enforcing international law.

  PublisherDOI

• Information Fragmentation and Global Governance in Hard Times

  Ethics & International Affairs · 2025-01-01 · 1 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract With formal international organizations (IOs) facing gridlock and informal IOs proliferating, cooperation in the twenty-first century looks different than it did in previous eras. Global governance institutions today also face additional challenges, including a fragmented information environment where publics are increasingly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation. What do these trends portend for international politics? One way to answer this question is to return to a core ingredient of a well-functioning IO—information provision—and ask how such changes affect efficiency. Viewed through this lens, we see decline in some arenas and adaptation in others. Formal IOs are struggling to retain relevance as their weak policy responses and ambiguous rules create space for competing signals. The proliferation of informal institutions, on the other hand, may represent global governance evolution, as these technocratic bodies are often well-insulated from many political challenges. Yet even if global governance retains functionality, the legitimacy implications of such trends are troubling. IO legitimacy depends in part on process, and from this standpoint, the informational gains of informal governance must be weighed against losses of accountability and transparency. Ultimately, evaluating the normative implications of these trends requires making judgments about the preferred legitimizing principles for global governance.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• A Blueprint for Multinational Advanced AI Development

  Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2025-11-24

  reportOpen access

  The global race to develop advanced AI has entered a newphase marked by staggering investments, rapid technical breakthroughs, and intensifying geopolitical competition. The United States now controls approximately 75% of global AI compute capacity, China 15%, and the EU 5%. This concentration of compute, alongside concentrations of AI development talent, data, and AI model ownership suggests that mid-sized economies likely face insurmountable barriers to independent frontier AI development. At the same time, economic, cultural, and security infrastructures are coming to rely ever more on frontier models. States that are unable to develop their own frontier models or access the computing hardware required to train them will have to choose between dependency and weakness: Dependency: if states adopt U.S. or Chinese AI systems, these frontier AI states can then exploit their privileged position in ways that harm dependent states, for example through data theft, service restrictions, selectively withholding frontier capabilities, embedding values in foundation models, and unfavorable terms of trade. Weakness: if, on the other hand, states limit their adoption of frontier systems to avoid dependency, frontier AI states may achieve breakthrough capabilities—in economic productivity, in scientific discovery, in military operations—that create widening gaps in economic and military capabilities. Yet, mid-sized economies are also AI bridge powers, possessing substantial AI development capabilities and resources that, if combined, would allow them to challenge the status quo. By working together and strategically choosing their AI development approaches, AI bridge powers can develop competitive frontier models: First, pooled computing infrastructure can support frontier-scale development. Coordinated deployment of existing, planned, and within-reach European and other bridge power AI compute capacity is likely to provide sufficient computational resources to produce frontier AI models in the next few years, although significantly more investments are probably required to keep up with the moving frontier. Second, a significant portion of top AI talent has ties to AI bridge power countries. 87 of the 100 most-cited AI researchers originate from or currently work in countries outside the United States and China. Bridge powers could “call home” leading researchers if they had an inspiring vision backed by sufficient resources and an ethical development path. Third, while most of the data used to train frontier models is already public, bridge powers could pool domain-specific data and resources for data cleaning and expert labeling efforts. Fourth, bridge powers should make strategic, frontier development bets, leveraging shared digital infrastructures (e.g. pooled pre-training) and R&D efforts to focus on promising areas that do not rely on matching scale elsewhere, in order to reach and then track or even surpass the AI frontier. Fifth, building reliable AI represents an unmet market need where bridge powers have structural advantages. High-value industries require control over AI tools and confidence in their reliability before deploying them at scale. Bridge powers can act as trusted brokers by leveraging strong data protection regimes, robust rule of law, and responsive governance to speed up sustainable adoption. A multinational partnership could enable members to preserve sovereignty, have more weight in shaping global AI governance, and lead through ethical stewardship. Some precedents of similar multilateral projects exist through CERN or Airbus, and the capabilities exist through collective action. The question is then whether bridge powers will act decisively before dependencies deepen and the bipolar structure consolidates.

  PublisherDOI

• Smoke and Mirrors: Strategic Messaging and the Politics of Noncompliance

  American Political Science Review · 2025-08-07 · 1 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Public allegations of international law violations are common in international politics. When do these accusations generate international backlash for governments? We argue that political costs hinge on a rhetorical battle to shape perceptions of the government’s behavior. Governments use strategic messaging to contest information, challenge the appropriateness of international law, or cite extenuating circumstances. International organizations (IOs) counter government rhetoric to reinforce the law. These competing messages shape support for punishment among citizens and political elites. We test our argument with survey experiments measuring perceptions of alleged military aggression and human rights violations. Among the US public and a global sample of diplomatic elites, foreign government denials and claims about mitigating circumstances reduce punitive attitudes. IO rebuttals counter denials but can only partially neutralize other claims. We offer a new framework for analyzing the politics of noncompliance and present novel evidence illuminating the strengths and limitations of IOs in enforcing international law.

  PublisherDOI

• Your silence speaks volumes: Weak states and strategic absence in the UN General Assembly

  The Review of International Organizations · 2024 · 11 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Political Science
  • Sociology
  • Political Science

  Abstract Country participation in one-state, one-vote forums like the United Nations General Assembly often reflects underlying power asymmetries and endogenous political processes. Voting alignment is undoubtedly an important preference indicator. However, this paper contends that it is incomplete; silence is politically significant as well. Weak states use absence as a form of institutional power that shields them from geopolitical pressure and competing-principals problems. While abstention is a public signal of neutrality that undercuts voting unanimity, the ambiguous intent of absence makes it a distinct form of political expression. We examine the politics of absences at the General Assembly, highlighting how states may be strategically absent from select votes for political reasons. Building on the Bailey et al. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61 (2), 430–456, 2017 roll-call voting data, we distinguish strategic absences from other types of absence and provide evidence that such behavior is linked to US interests and competing-principals problems. Taking these non-random reasons for missingness into account provides a fuller picture of how weak states engage with international institutions and highlights how silence can be a consequence of larger political processes.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Rule and Resistance in the Anti-globalization Era

  Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2023-06-27

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Anti-globalist leaders form a distinct set of challengers to the global system because they share a common motivation: the desire to regain national sovereignty and reduce the power of international institutions. This chapter considers three different forms of anti-globalist resistance: (1) attempts to dismantle status quo regimes through unilateral action that challenges existing rules; (2) joining coalitions across states to transform existing multilateral institutions and reduce rules or obligations; (3) building new institutions or seeking alternative venues that favor state sovereignty over interconnectedness. Each strategy could transform the content of international rules, but with different implications for how we understand the nature of institutional authority. If international authority has moved beyond state consent and international institutions themselves now constitute a legitimate source of authority, anti-globalist leaders will find it difficult to escape the confines of institutional commitments through unilateral action. For strategic anti-globalists, then, the optimal way to undermine cooperation may be to work within the system itself, shaking the foundations of the post-1945 international order.

  PublisherDOI

• Unofficial Market Enforcement Against Listed Countries

  Cornell University Press eBooks · 2022-01-15

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  This chapter evaluates unofficial market enforcement, focusing on the relationship between listing and cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities. It begins with qualitative evidence, drawing from news articles and interviews with financial industry professionals to describe under what conditions the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list leads to unofficial market enforcement. The chapter discusses in greater detail why banks need information about a country's illicit financing risk and highlights why it is so challenging for banks to find this information on their own. It also explains why the FATF noncomplier list is useful in addressing such informational gaps and describes how market actors respond to listing. The chapter then describes the data and empirical strategy. The analysis employs a linear regression model with country-fixed effects to examine how listing relates to cross-border liabilities. The quantitative analysis finds that the noncomplier list leads to an estimated 13 percent decline in cross-border bank-to-bank liabilities, compared to when a country is not on the noncomplier list.

  PublisherDOI

• Fighting Illicit Financing in Southeast Asia

  Cornell University Press eBooks · 2022-01-15

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  This chapter assesses how the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) noncomplier list has transformed the ways that Thailand and the Philippines fight illicit financing. While the sources of opposition may vary, the case studies illustrate that the FATF noncomplier list is a powerful tool for shifting the politics of compliance. In Thailand, the noncomplier list forced the government to prioritize passing tougher laws on illicit financing. In the Philippines, the government passed almost every major piece of anti-money laundering legislation while on the FATF list or under direct threat of listing. If the case studies showcase the power of unofficial market enforcement, they also highlight some of the potential downsides to this approach. When Thailand was on the FATF noncomplier list, its government was confronting a multitude of political threats as well as natural disasters—serious issues that required substantive responses. Yet the FATF forced Thailand to prioritize passing legislation on combating illicit financing and possibly delayed other important policy programs. In the Philippines, market enforcement may have hurt some of the most vulnerable members of society.

  PublisherDOI

• 5. Unofficial Market Enforcement against Listed Countries

  Cornell University Press eBooks · 2022-01-15

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Robert O. Keohane

  University of Oxford

  5 shared

• Tyler Pratt

  2 shared

• T Aschenbrener

  1 shared

• Bridget Coggins

  University of California, Santa Barbara

  1 shared

• Christina L. Davis

  1 shared

• Marcela Levy

  1 shared

• Ryan Brutger

  1 shared

• Edwin L. Morse

  Madison Group (United States)

  1 shared

Education

• PhD

  Princeton University

  2017