About

David Glick is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at UC Davis, having joined the department in 2020. He holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Arizona (2014) and a B.A. in Philosophy from Brandeis University (2004). Prior to his appointment at UC Davis, he has held academic positions at the University of Sydney, Oxford University, University of Rochester, and Ithaca College. His research focuses on issues at the intersection of the philosophy of science, the philosophy of physics, and metaphysics. Key areas of interest include structural realism and structuralism, as well as the interpretation and metaphysics of quantum theory. Glick has contributed to the field through various publications, including edited volumes and articles in prominent philosophy journals, addressing topics such as the metaphysics of entanglement, the ontology of quantum field theory, and the nature of reality in physics.

Research topics

• Epistemology
• Philosophy
• Computer Science
• Political Science
• Theoretical physics
• Physics
• Law
• Quantum mechanics
• Economics
• Keynesian economics

Selected publications

• Perspectives on Quantum Theory

  Foundations of Physics · 2025-12-12

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• Metaphysical indeterminacy in Everettian quantum mechanics

  European Journal for Philosophy of Science · 2024 · 3 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Epistemology
  • Philosophy
  • Theoretical physics

  The question of whether Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) justifies the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy has recently come to the fore. Metaphysical indeterminacy has been argued to emerge from three sources: coherent superpositions, the indefinite number of branches in the quantum multiverse and the nature of these branches. This paper reviews the evidence and concludes that those arguments don't rely on EQM alone and rest on metaphysical auxiliary assumptions that transcend the physics of EQM. We show how EQM can be ontologically interpreted without positing metaphysical indeterminacy by adopting a deflationary attitude towards branches. Two ways of developing the deflationary view are then proposed: one where branches are eliminated, and another where they are reduced to the universal quantum state.

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• The principle of least action and teleological explanation in physics

  Synthese · 2023-07-12 · 22 citations

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  Abstract The principle of least action (PLA) has often been cited as a counterexample to the dominant mode of causal explanation in physics. In particular, PLA seems to involve an appeal to final causes or some other teleological ideology. However, Ben-Menahem (Causation in science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018) argues that such implications no longer apply given that PLA can be recovered as limiting case from quantum theory. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical implications of PLA-based explanations are not undermined by its status as derivative. However, I contend that PLA functions as a diachronic constraint that licenses explanations by constraint (Lange, Because without cause: non-casual explanations in science and mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). PLA-based explanations, on this account, are non-causal but also differ from familiar cases of teleological explanations in several respects.

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• Quantum Mechanics Without Indeterminacy

  Synthese Library/Synthese library · 2022-01-01 · 21 citations

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
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• QBism and the limits of scientific realism

  European Journal for Philosophy of Science · 2021 · 43 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Epistemology
  • Philosophy

  Abstract QBism is an agent-centered interpretation of quantum theory. It rejects the notion that quantum theory provides a God’s eye description of reality and claims instead that it imposes constraints on agents’ subjective degrees of belief. QBism’s emphasis on subjective belief has led critics to dismiss it as antirealism or instrumentalism, or even, idealism or solipsism. The aim of this paper is to consider the relation of QBism to scientific realism. I argue that while QBism is an unhappy fit with a standard way of thinking about scientific realism, an alternative conception I call “perspectival normative realism” may allow for a reconciliation.

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• Steven French & Juha Saatsi (Eds.): Scientific Realism and the Quantum. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2020, 336 pp., £60.00 (hardback), ISBN: 9780198814979

  Journal for General Philosophy of Science · 2021-02-05

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• The Foundation of Reality: Fundamentality, Space, and Time

  2020 · 28 citations

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  • Computer Science
  • Computer Science
  • Political Science
  Publisher

• Book Review: French, S., & Saatsi, J. (Eds.). (2020). Scientific Realism and the Quantum.Oxford University Press

  PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · 2020-01-01

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  Quantum mechanics (QM) has long been thought to challenge scientific realism.The Copenhagen school maintained that QM was unable to provide the realist's sought after description of microscopic reality.Today, many believe such a description can be found, but new challenges have arisen.This impressive collection of essays seeks to explore several such challenges.The contributions cover a range of different issues and viewpoints bearing on the broad topic of realism and QM.In this review, I'll touch on three main themes.

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• In Defense of the Metaphysics of Entanglement

  Oxford University Press eBooks · 2020-04-30 · 1 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Quantum entanglement has long been thought to have deep metaphysical consequences. For example, it has been claimed to show that Humeansupervenience is false or to involve a novel form of ontological holism. One way to avoid confronting the metaphysical consequences is to adopt some form of antirealism. This chapter discusses two prominent strands in recent literature—wavefunction realism and “Super-Humeanism”—which appear quite different but, as the authors see it, are instances of a more general strategy. In effect, what these attempt to do is to diffuse the puzzle of entanglement by eliminating it. These interpretative movements are advertised as equally realist, but, the chapter claims, fail to take an appropriately realist attitude towards entanglement. What the chapter advocates instead is a genuine metaphysics of entanglement: instead of eliminating entanglement, develop a metaphysics that accounts for and explains it.

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• Timelike entanglement for delayed-choice entanglement swapping

  Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics · 2019-06-22 · 6 citations

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Frequent coauthors

• Florian J. Boge

  TU Dortmund University

  5 shared

• George Darby

  Oxford Brookes University

  3 shared

• Hannah Tierney

  University of California, Davis

  1 shared

• Anna Marmodoro

  1 shared

• Baptiste Le Bihan

  1 shared