David Bulman

About

David J. Bulman is the Jill McGovern and Steven Muller Assistant Professor of China Studies and International Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His research focuses on economic and political development in China and the implications for US-China relations. He examines how central-local relations influence political incentives and local economic outcomes, analyzing China’s development through a broader comparative lens to provide insights into growth slowdowns and middle income transitions. Additionally, Bulman’s work explores the implications of China’s evolving development model for its foreign economic behavior and U.S. foreign policy. Bulman authored the book Incentivized Development in China: Leaders, Governance, and Growth in China’s Counties, published by Cambridge University Press in 2016, which investigates the political foundations of local economic growth in China, emphasizing the roles of county-level leaders and their career incentives. His background includes positions as an Economist at the World Bank and a China Public Policy Postdoctoral Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation. He has been a Woodrow Wilson Center China Fellow and a National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Public Intellectual Program fellow. Bulman holds an MA and PhD in China Studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS and a BA in Economics from Columbia University.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Sociology
• Economics
• Public administration
• Law
• Management
• Social Science
• Political economy
• Public relations

Selected publications

• Localism in Retreat? Central-Provincial Relations in the Xi Jinping Era

  Journal of Contemporary China · 2021 · 30 citations

  1st authorCorresponding

  Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive, personnel reshuffles, and institutional overhauls seem to mark a turning point in Beijing’s long-running fight against ‘localism’ (difangzhuyi). Yet, key questions remain about the scope and effectiveness of efforts to rein in China’s subnational officials. Has the Xi administration effectively combated localism by appointing more outsiders to provincial leadership teams? Or have strengthened oversight institutions made subnational officials more responsive to…

  PublisherDOI

• Leninism and Local Interests: How Cities in China Benefit from Concurrent Leadership Appointments

  Studies in Comparative International Development · 2019-05-01 · 20 citations

  articleOpen access1st author

  The practice in Leninist political systems of assigning local leaders concurrent seats on higher-level leadership bodies presents a puzzle. In China, for example, a subset of provincial leaders hold seats in the central Politburo, while some city-level leaders hold seats in provincial party standing committees (PPSCs). While some scholars view these concurrent appointments as a form of top-down control or co-optation, others see these arrangements as a reflection of local power and a channel for…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Loyalists, Localists, and Legibility: The Calibrated Control of Provincial Leadership Teams in China

  Politics & Society · 2020 · 18 citations

  1st authorCorresponding

  Selecting provincial leaders is a fraught task for authoritarian regimes. Although central authorities more readily trust provincial leaders with close ties to the center, such loyalists may lack the local knowledge and connections necessary to govern adeptly. Using an original data set on the tenures and backgrounds of China’s provincial party standing committee members, this article explores how Beijing fine-tunes provincial leadership teams to resolve this dilemma. The analysis challenges the…

  PublisherDOI

• Instinctive Commercial Peace Theorists? Interpreting American Views of the US–China Trade War

  Business and Politics · 2022-07-11 · 10 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Existing theories of individual trade preferences do not satisfactorily explain how security concerns should affect American support for the US–China trade war that began in 2018. Although existing theories of public attitudes toward international trade—economic self-interest, sociotropism, partisanship, reciprocity, and xenophobia—all help to explain initial support for the trade war, these hypotheses do not adequately explain citizen attitudes in the context of an increasingly adversa…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• The Economic Security Dilemma in US-China Relations

  Asian perspective · 2021-01-01 · 8 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  China and the United States are caught in an economic security dilemma. In response to perceived economic aggression, both countries now feel impelled to bolster domestic economic security through protectionist and retaliatory measures that the other side perceives as threatening. In game theoretic terms, a mutually beneficial "Stag Hunt" coordination game devolved into an uncooperative "Prisoner's Dilemma" after the global financial crisis. In the economic security dilemma that emerged under Tr…

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Walter Kolkma

  Asian Development Bank Institute

  7 shared

• Abla Safir

  5 shared

• Siddharth Sharma

  5 shared

• Sheheryar Banuri

  5 shared

• Kyle A. Jaros

  University of Notre Dame

  5 shared

• Luis F. López-Calva

  5 shared

• Aart Kraay

  5 shared

• Ezequiel Molina

  Piedmont Atlanta Hospital

  5 shared

Awards & honors

• 2021-2022 Woodrow Wilson Center China Fellow
• 2021-2023 National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Public…

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