Brian Gale
· Emmett S. Harrington Endowed ProfessorVerifiedUniversity of Washington · Accounting
Active 2017–2026
About
Brian Gale is an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the Foster School of Business, University of Washington. He holds a PhD from the University of Illinois (2019), a JD from the University of Chicago (2009), and a BS from Miami University (2006). His research focuses on various aspects of accounting, including corporate tax planning, investor judgment, information disclosure, and the effects of SEC review processes. His work has been published in reputable journals such as The Accounting Review and the Journal of Accounting Research. Dr. Gale's academic expertise encompasses accounting practices and their influence on market efficiency and investor decision-making.
Research topics
- Computer Science
- Business
- Accounting
- Psychology
- Political Science
- Economics
- Artificial Intelligence
- Microeconomics
- Finance
- Marketing
- Actuarial science
- Cognitive psychology
- Multimedia
- Law
Selected publications
A Survey of Financial Experimental Research through a Regulatory Lens
Accounting Horizons · 2026-04-01
article1st authorCorrespondingSYNOPSIS Academic research can inform policy, enforcement, and rulemaking at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). We argue that experimental accounting research is particularly well-suited to provide rigorous, causal evidence on issues central to these regulators’ missions. We review existing financial experimental studies relevant to securities regulation and classify them according to the SEC’s divisions and offices and FINRA’s oversight functions. This framework highlights where financial experimental evidence is relevant to regulatory activities and can help the SEC and FINRA identify research aligned with specific mandates. We also identify opportunities for future research and offer practical guidance to academics on communicating the relevance of their work, with the goal of strengthening the connection between research and securities regulation. JEL Classifications: D83; G11; G41; G53; M41.
How Index Fund Ownership and Earnings Guidance Frequency Influence Managerial Myopia
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01
articleOpen accessShareholder perceptions of external tax advisors in corporate tax planning
Contemporary Accounting Research · 2024-03-10 · 10 citations
articleOpen accessAbstract We examine shareholders' perceptions about how external tax advisors contribute to corporate tax planning. As residual claimants of corporate tax planning, shareholders benefit from lower corporate taxes, but also bear the financial and reputational costs of subsequent tax enforcement. Despite the influential advisory role of external tax advisors in corporate tax planning, existing research on how shareholders perceive this role is limited. Using event study methods and exploiting the heightened regulation of tax advice through the covered opinion rules as a setting, we observe average and cross‐sectional stock returns consistent with shareholders perceiving external tax advisors as contributing unfavorably to tax planning by promoting excessively risky strategies. We further find that risky and overall tax planning declined across firms after the enactment of the rules, consistent with shareholders' perceptions about tax advisors' contributions to firms' tax planning. Overall, our findings contribute to research on shareholder perceptions and valuation of tax planning, and have important implications for practice, where regulatory oversight of external tax advisors remains a significant concern.
How Index Fund Ownership and Earnings Guidance Frequency Influence Managerial Myopia
Behavioral Research in Accounting · 2024-12-12
article1st authorCorrespondingABSTRACT Managerial myopia imposes significant costs on firms, stakeholders, and the overall economy. Research suggests that both a firm’s shareholder base and the frequency of its earnings guidance influence myopia. Shareholder bases have undergone significant changes in recent years as index fund ownership supplants long-term shareholder ownership, yet it is unclear how the growth of index funds affects managerial myopia. We experimentally examine how index fund ownership influences managers’ myopia, and how these effects vary based on firms’ earnings guidance frequency. Consistent with prior research, results show that the likelihood of myopic decision-making increases as earnings guidance frequency increases. Results also show that the likelihood of myopic decision-making increases as index funds replace long-term shareholders, but only for managers who provide frequent earnings guidance. Our results suggest that eliminating frequent earnings guidance to help curtail myopia may become even more important as index fund ownership grows and supplants long-term shareholder ownership. JEL Classifications: M41; G11; G31; C91; D83.
Disclosure Presentation Attributes, Generative AI Output, and Investor Judgments
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 1 citations
preprintOpen accessJournal of Accounting Research · 2021 · 17 citations
- Computer Science
- Microeconomics
- Economics
ABSTRACT We use experimental markets to examine how pushing investment information and the value relevance of that information interact to influence investors’ value estimate accuracy and market price efficiency. Developments in technology allow information to be pushed to investors anytime and anywhere. However, in addition to value‐relevant information, pushed information often includes information that is irrelevant for assessing firm value. Drawing on psychology theory, we find that pushing information has divergent effects depending on the value relevance of the information. Pushing only value‐relevant information increases investors’ processing of the information and leads to more accurate value estimates and market prices than when not pushed. In contrast, pushing a mix of value‐relevant and value‐irrelevant information reduces investors’ processing of value‐relevant information, leading to less accurate value estimates and market prices due to poorer acquisition and integration of information than when not pushed or when only value‐relevant information is pushed. Collectively, our results reveal a dark side to push technologies, particularly with the growing presence of value‐irrelevant information.
The Accounting Review · 2021 · 9 citations
1st authorCorresponding- Computer Science
- Political Science
- Business
ABSTRACT Review correspondence between the SEC and firms is a potentially valuable resource for investors, revealing important information about firms' financial reporting quality. Research suggests that reducing access costs (i.e., the amount of effort required to access review correspondence) could increase investors' processing of this important information. Drawing on psychology theory, I predict and find that access costs interact with another key characteristic within the SEC's control—review ambiguity (i.e., transparency about outcomes from the SEC's review process)—to influence investors' judgments. Results show that when access costs are low, greater review ambiguity decreases investors' reliance on review correspondence information and influences investment judgments in a corresponding manner. In contrast, review ambiguity has no effect on investors' reliance or investment judgments when access costs are high. Overall, my results provide important new insights on the importance of SEC transparency during its review process, particularly as information becomes more easily accessible. JEL Classifications: C91; D81; D83; G11; M41.
How Do Disclosure Repetition and Interactivity Influence Investors’ Judgments?
Journal of Accounting Research · 2021 · 12 citations
- Computer Science
- Business
- Psychology
ABSTRACT Recent regulatory amendments aimed at modernizing disclosures and enhancing their usefulness focus on repetition and interactivity within firms’ disclosure filings. We use two experiments to provide evidence on the effects of disclosure repetition (repeating of information in the filing) and disclosure interactivity (user involvement in directing the form or content of the information displayed) on investors’ information processing and investment judgments. Results show that repetition increases investors’ processing of repeated information, consistent with the informational role of repetition documented in prior research. In contrast, repetition reduces investors’ processing of other, nonrepeated information when the filing is less interactive. This evidence corroborates concerns that repetition can obscure value‐relevant information from investors. However, we find that more interactive disclosures mitigate this harmful effect of repetition on investors’ processing of nonrepeated information. Further, more interactive disclosures lead to deeper overall processing of both repeated and nonrepeated information, rather than more interactive disclosures redirecting investors’ attention and processing away from repeated information. Thus, our evidence suggests that disclosure interactivity is an important disclosure attribute that counteracts the potentially harmful effects of repetition on investors' processing of nonrepeated information, while preserving repetition's informational role.
The Shareholder Response to Corporate Tax Planning Advice Regulation
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2020 · 1 citations
- Computer Science
- Business
- Accounting
Repetition, Interactivity, and Investors’ Reliance on Firm Disclosures
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2020-01-01 · 4 citations
articleOpen access
Frequent coauthors
- 6 shared
Stephanie M. Grant
University of Washington
- 4 shared
William Elliott
- 3 shared
Nerissa C. Brown
- 3 shared
Michael Mayberry
University of Florida
- 2 shared
Jessen L. Hobson
- 2 shared
Michael P. Donohoe
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
- 1 shared
Brad G. Kamrath
Montana State University
- 1 shared
Joe Croom
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