B. Douglas Bernheim

About

B. Douglas Bernheim is the Edward Ames Edmonds Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. His work spans a variety of fields including public economics, behavioral economics, game theory, contract theory, industrial organization, political economy, and financial economics. Notable contributions include introducing and exploring concepts such as rationalizability, coalition-proofness, and collective dynamic consistency in game theory; developing theories of common agency, menu auctions, and incomplete contracts in incentive theory; and advancing theories of multimarket contact and exclusive dealing within industrial organization. Additionally, Bernheim has contributed to understanding social motives in economics through concepts like strategic bequest motives, conformity, Veblen effects, and the equal division norm. His research also encompasses behavioral welfare economics, economic theories of addictive behaviors, financial education, and the conceptual foundations of Ricardian equivalence. Recognized for his impactful work, Bernheim has received honors such as an honorary doctorate from the University of Zurich and the 2022 Exeter Prize for a paper in experimental economics, behavioral economics, and decision theory.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Economics
• Mathematical economics
• Microeconomics
• Positive economics
• Artificial Intelligence
• Finance
• Public economics
• Statistics
• Mathematics

Selected publications

• What Motivates Paternalism? An Experimental Study

  American Economic Review · 2021 · 87 citations

  We study experimentally when, why, and how people intervene in others’ choices. Choice Architects (CAs) construct opportunity sets containing bundles of time-indexed payments for Choosers. CAs frequently prevent impatient choices despite opportunities to provide advice, believing Choosers benefit. They violate common behavioral welfare criteria by removing impatient options even when all payoffs are delayed. CAs intervene not by removing options they wish they could resist when choosing for them…

  DOI

• On the Empirical Validity of Cumulative Prospect Theory: Experimental Evidence of Rank‐Independent Probability Weighting

  Econometrica · 2020 · 84 citations

  1st authorCorresponding

  Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), the leading behavioral account of decisionmaking under uncertainty, avoids the dominance violations implicit in Prospect Theory (PT) by assuming that the probability weight applied to a given outcome depends on its ranking. We devise a simple and direct nonparametric method for measuring the change in relative probability weights resulting from a change in payoff ranks. We find no evidence that these weights are even modestly sensitive to ranks. Conventional cal…

  DOI

• A Theory of Chosen Preferences

  American Economic Review · 2021 · 77 citations

  1st authorCorresponding

  We propose and develop a dynamic theory of endogenous preference formation in which people adopt worldviews that shape their judgments about their experiences. The framework highlights the role of mindset flexibility, a trait that determines the relative weights the decision-maker places on her current and anticipated worldviews when evaluating future outcomes. The theory generates rich behavioral dynamics, thereby illuminating a wide range of applications and providing potential explanations fo…

  DOI

• Welfare and the Act of Choosing

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2024-03-01 · 10 citations

  reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  The standard revealed-preference approach to welfare economics encounters fundamental difficulties when the act of choosing directly affects welfare through emotions such as guilt, pride, and anxiety.We address this problem by developing an approach that redefines consumption bundles in terms of the sensations they produce, and measures welfare by blending choice-based methods with self-reported well-being techniques.In applications to classic social preferences paradigms, our approach shows tha…

  PublisherDOI

• Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature

  American Economic Review · 2023-10-30 · 5 citations

  articleOpen access

  We model legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated, and the agenda setter cannot commit to future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including sp…

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Sandro Ambuehl

  34 shared

• Laurence J. Kotlikoff

  34 shared

• Jagadeesh Gokhale

  University of Pennsylvania

  28 shared

• Jonathan Meer

  Texas A&M University

  25 shared

• Antonio Rangel

  24 shared

• Lorenzo Forni

  22 shared

• Debraj Ray

  New York University

  17 shared

• Annamaria Lusardi

  Economic Policy Institute

  16 shared

Education

• Ph.D., Economics

  Massachusetts Institute of Technology

  1986

• B.A., Economics

  Harvard University

  1981

Awards & honors

• Honorary Doctorate from University of Zurich
• 2022 Exeter Prize for the best paper in experimental economi…

Similar researchers at Stanford University

• Guido W Imbensh-109
• Nicholas Bloomh-106
• Matthew O. Jacksonh-103