About

Avner Kalay is the Francis A. Madsen Professor of Finance in the Department of Finance at the University of Utah's David Eccles School of Business. His research interests include corporate finance, with a particular focus on corporate dividend policy, taxation, and investment policy. He also specializes in capital market theory and efficiency, economics of information, agency theory, optimal contracting, real options, and the microstructure of markets.

Research topics

• Economics
• Business
• Monetary economics
• Financial economics
• Econometrics

Selected publications

• Market learning about the stand-alone value of the acquirer

  Finance research letters · 2026-02-19

  articleSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Trust and delegation: A case to consider on broker rebates and investor sophistication

  Journal of Financial Markets · 2019-12-09 · 5 citations

  articleSenior authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Information Asymmetry and the Bond Coupon Choice

  The Accounting Review · 2017-07-01 · 19 citations

  article

  ABSTRACT We examine the role of the coupon choice in bond contracts as a signaling mechanism in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the credit quality of the borrower. Prior literature focuses on the use of maturity as a signaling mechanism. We conjecture that the coupon is a more effective signaling mechanism. We exploit the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry, and employ both bond- and equity market-based variables of information asymmetry to test our conjecture. We find that following the enactment of RegFD, the coupon rates of bonds issued by unrated firms increase relatively more than those of rated firms, consistent with the coupon choice addressing information asymmetry. We fail to find similar increases in maturity. Our inferences remain the same when using the probability of informed trade to measure relative changes in information asymmetry around the enactment of RegFD. We also draw similar conclusions utilizing exogenous drops in analyst coverage that result from brokerage house closures as an alternative quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we provide evidence that the coupon is used more extensively when issuance costs are higher, precisely when maturity is predicted to be a less efficient contract term with which to address information asymmetry. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M21; M41.

  PublisherDOI

• The Almost Extinction of Stock Dividends

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2016-01-01 · 2 citations

  articleOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Information Asymmetry and the Bond Coupon Choice

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2015-01-01

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Market Learning About the Stand-Alone Value of the Acquirer

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2015-01-01

  articleOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Broker Rebates and Investor Sophistication

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2014-01-01 · 2 citations

  articleOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices

  The Journal of Finance · 2013-12-13 · 83 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  ABSTRACT This paper proposes a new method using option prices to estimate the market value of the shareholder voting rights associated with a stock. The method consists of synthesizing a nonvoting share using put‐call parity, and comparing its price to that of the underlying stock. Empirically, we find this measure of the value of voting rights to be positive and increasing in the time to expiration of synthetic stocks. The measure also increases around special shareholder meetings, periods of hedge fund activism, and M&A events. The method is likely useful in studies of corporate control and also has asset pricing implications.

  PublisherDOI

• Soft Dollar Arrangements and Investor Sophistication

  2013-01-01

  articleSenior author

  Following a ruling of the Israeli Securities Authority, portfolio managers had to obtain their clients‘ consent, in writing; so that they can continue to receive a fraction of the transaction costs their clients pay the broker executing the trades. One would expect an overwhelming opposition to the kickback as consenting investors are exposed to avoidable losses due to (moral hazard) access trading. Yet the opposite is found – about 89% of the investors in our sample allowed their manager to receive a kickback. This is quite remarkable considering that not responding is considered a prohibition. Indeed, the more sophisticated investors tend to disagree. We find that portfolios of consenting investors underperform in the year following their decision. Also, the empirical evidence indicates that consenting is not an award on past success. a Mor Haziza is a PhD student at Tel Aviv University, and b Avner Kalay is Francis A. Madsen Professor of Finance at the University of Utah and Maurice and Gertrude Deutch Chair professor at Tel Aviv University. We wish to thank Yakov Amihud, Dan Galai, Aharon Ofer, Orly Sade, and participants in the finance seminar at the Hebrew University, The University of Utah, and Tel Aviv University for many helpful comments. Mor Hazziza thanks the Rothschild Caesarea Center for Capital Markets and Risk Management for their financial support.

  Publisher

• The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2011-01-01 · 32 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Bezalel Gavish

  17 shared

• Christopher Barry

  UK Centre for Ecology & Hydrology

  17 shared

• Brien Rubinstein

  Pacific Lutheran University

  16 shared

• Robert Bowen

  16 shared

• Lane A. Daley

  16 shared

• Leland O'

  London School of Economics and Political Science

  16 shared

• D Stuart Bancroft

  16 shared

• Robert Jennings

  16 shared

Education

• Ph.D., Finance

  University of California, Berkeley

  1994

• M.S., Finance

  University of California, Berkeley

  1991

• B.S., Economics

  University of California, Los Angeles

  1988