About

Alexei Tchistyi is a professor of real estate and the Director of the MMH Program at the Cornell Nolan School of Hotel Administration. He received his PhD in business from the Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2005. Prior to joining Cornell University in 2020, he held academic positions at the New York University Stern School of Business, UC Berkeley Haas School of Business, where he also served as co-chair of the Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he was an associate professor of finance and director of the Office of Real Estate Research. His research focuses on topics related to real estate finance and corporate finance, including mortgage design, asset-backed securities, banking regulations, dynamic contracting, and executive compensation. His work has been published in leading financial journals, contributing to the understanding of financial mechanisms and regulations in real estate and corporate finance.

Research topics

• Economics
• Business
• Labour economics
• Microeconomics
• Actuarial science
• Financial system
• Finance
• Monetary economics

Selected publications

• The Winner's Curse in Housing Markets

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01 · 1 citations

  preprintOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Does Mortgage Rate Lock-in Dampen Commercial Real Estate Busts? <br>

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  preprintOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Smaller Banks, Smarter Lending? Evidence from the Commercial Real Estate Market

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  preprintOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Distortionary effects of PPP loans on business competition

  Journal of Financial Intermediation · 2024-06-21 · 1 citations

  articleSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Renegotiating Commercial Loans: Getting a Discounted Payoff is Possible But Complicated

  eCommons (Cornell University) · 2024-09-10

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  In times of crisis, some hotel owners find themselves overwhelmed by debt and face a difficult dilemma?either keep putting more of their money into their troubled assets or stop paying their mortgages and lose their hotels to foreclosure. This is an undesirable outcome for both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers lose their investments in the foreclosed property as well as their reputation. On the other hand, lenders recover substantially less than the property?s market value due to various costs and expenses associated with foreclosure.

  Publisher

• The Imitation Game: The Imitation Game: How Encouraging Renegotiation Makes Good Borrowers Bad

  Review of Financial Studies · 2024-09-24 · 1 citations

  articleSenior author

  Abstract We show that commercial mortgage borrowers behave opportunistically to attempt to obtain principal reductions. We develop a model in which lenders cannot perfectly observe borrowers’ use values and renegotiation is costly. We then exploit a tax rule change that reduced the cost of renegotiation. Consistent with the model predictions, borrowers with high private use values of the property are more likely to transfer into special servicing when lenders have a higher capacity to negotiate principal reductions after the rule change. Our results suggest adverse consequences of principal forgiveness for lenders.

  PublisherDOI

• Distortionary Effects of PPP Loans on Business Competition: Evidence From the Hotel Industry

  eCommons (Cornell University) · 2024-09-13

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  The Covid-19 pandemic that emerged in 2020 caused a deep, global economic crisis that was especially difficult for the hotel industry. The U.S. government responded to this crisis with an emergency set of economic relief measures on a near-unprecedented scale. The Small Business Administration?s $953-billion Payroll Protection Program (PPP) was a key part of that response. In an effort to reduce layoffs, the PPP offered temporary payroll subsidies in the form of forgivable loans for small businesses. Given the significant cost involved, it is important to evaluate the economic impact of the PPP initiative. While the program was clearly beneficial for businesses that received PPP funds, we found a potential unintended consequence of the PPP?namely, the distortion of business competition. Our study assesses how equilibrium market outcomes change when firms benefiting from government subsidies compete against non-subsidized firms.

  Publisher

• Distorting Effects of PPP Loans on Business Competition

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01

  preprintOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• The Imitation Game: How Encouraging Renegotiation Makes Good Borrowers Bad

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022-01-01 · 4 citations

  articleOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Did PPP Loans Distort Business Competition? Evidence from the Hotel Industry

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021 · 2 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Business
  • Labour economics
  • Economics
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Tomasz Piskorski

  Columbia University

  67 shared

• Christopher Mayer

  Austrian Institute of Technology

  49 shared

• Eva Steiner

  8 shared

• Dwight M. Jaffee

  7 shared

• George Pennacchi

  6 shared

• Barney Hartman‐Glaser

  Anderson University - South Carolina

  6 shared

• Andra C. Ghent

  University of Utah

  6 shared

• Sean Flynn

  5 shared

Awards & honors

• Young Researcher Award (2009)
• The Earl F. Cheit Outstanding Teaching Award (2010 - 2011)