
Erica Xuewei Jiang
· Assistant Professor of FinanceUniversity of California, Los Angeles · Finance
Active 2016–2025
About
Erica Xuewei Jiang studies how competition, technology, and policy shape financial intermediation, focusing on who finance serves, under what terms, and at what risk. She uses novel, granular microdata along with structural and reduced-form methods to quantify competition and interconnectedness between banks and nonbanks. Her research explores technology’s effects on market structure, incentives behind risk-taking, and their consequences for the real economy. Her recent projects examine bank-nonbank funding interdependence, the distributional consequences of digital banking, the transmission of interest-rate risk to bank balance sheets and fragility, and how collateral valuation and market structure influence credit supply. Jiang emphasizes measurement and welfare, identifying mechanisms that create winners, losers, and exclusion, as well as design choices that can create or reduce distortions. She joined UCLA Anderson in 2025, having previously been an assistant professor at USC Marshall School of Business and a visiting assistant professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. She earned her Ph.D. in finance from the University of Texas at Austin.
Selected publications
The Impact of Minority Representation at Mortgage Lenders
The Journal of Finance · 2025-02-11 · 11 citations
articleOpen accessABSTRACT We study links between the labor market for loan officers and access to mortgage credit. Using novel data matching mortgage applications to loan officers, we find that minorities are underrepresented among loan officers. Minority borrowers are less likely to complete mortgage applications, have completed applications approved, and to ultimately take up a loan. These disparities are reduced when minority borrowers work with minority loan officers. These pairings also lead to lower default rates, suggesting minority loan officers have an informational advantage with minority borrowers. Our results suggest minority underrepresentation among loan officers reduces minority borrowers’ access to credit.
Collateral value uncertainty and mortgage credit provision
Journal of Financial Economics · 2025-04-09 · 5 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingMonetary Tightening, Commercial Real Estate Distress, and US Bank Fragility
Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics · 2025-08-19 · 1 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingBook Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 14 citations
articleOpen accessBranching Out Inequality: The Impact of Credit Equality Policies
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024 · 2 citations
- Demographic economics
- Business
- Economics
Book Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, Htm Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 1 citations
articleOpen accessThe Pricing of Property Tax Revenues
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 1 citations
articleOpen access1st authorCorrespondingBook Value Risk Management of Banks: Limited Hedging, HTM Accounting, and Rising Interest Rates
National Bureau of Economic Research · 2024-03-01 · 8 citations
reportOpen accessIn the face of rising interest rates in 2022, banks mitigated interest rate exposure of the accounting value of their assets but left the vast majority of their long-duration assets exposed to interest rate risk. Data from call reports and SEC filings shows that only 6% of U.S. banking assets used derivatives to hedge their interest rate risk, and even heavy users of derivatives left most assets unhedged. The banks most vulnerable to asset declines and solvency runs decreased existing hedges, focusing on short-term gains but risking further losses if rates rose. Instead of hedging the market value risk of bank asset declines, banks used accounting reclassification to diminish the impact of interest rate increases on book capital. Banks reclassified $1 trillion in securities as held-to-maturity (HTM) which insulated these assets book values from interest rate fluctuations. More vulnerable banks were more likely to reclassify. Extending Jiang et al.’s (2023) solvency bank run model, we show that capital regulation could address run risk by encouraging capital raising, but its effectiveness depends on the regulatory capital definitions and can by eroded by the use of HTM accounting. Including deposit franchise value in regulatory capital calculations without considering run risk could weaken capital regulation’s ability to prevent runs. Our findings have implications for regulatory capital accounting and risk management practices in the banking sector.
Journal of Financial Economics · 2024-07-04 · 62 citations
article1st authorFinancing Competitors: Shadow Banks’ Funding and Mortgage Market Competition
Review of Financial Studies · 2023-04-21 · 91 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingAbstract Using novel shadow bank funding data, I find that shadow banks are funded by the very banks they compete with when originating mortgages. Evidence suggests that banks have market power in the upstream market for shadow banks’ funding, which in turn softens mortgage market competition through their strategic behaviors in both markets. I build and calibrate a quantitative model of vertical integration and competition to show that those consumers who would most benefit from shadow bank services are the ones to bear the costs. Secondary market innovation could increase downstream competition by reducing shadow banks’ reliance on their competitors. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Awards & honors
- WFA Cubist Systematic Strategies PhD Candidate Award for Out…
- Tommy Talk on my shadow bank research
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