About

José María Liberti is the Joseph Jr. and Carole Levy Chair in Entrepreneurship and a Clinical Professor of Finance at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. He is also a senior research fellow at The George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and a research fellow at the European Banking Center at Tilburg University. His academic affiliations include the Heizer Center for Private Equity and Venture Capital and the John L. Ward Center for Family Enterprises. Liberti has previously held positions such as the William M. Scholl Professor of Finance at DePaul University and has taught at London Business School, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Tilburg University, and other institutions. His professional experience includes work at Citibank N.A. in risk management and investment banking, with a focus on private enterprises, family firms, and corporate restructuring. His research interests encompass corporate finance, financial intermediation, and organizational economics, with particular attention to incentives, authority, and information in decision-making processes. Liberti's work has been published in leading finance journals, and he has received awards such as the Brattle Award for best paper in corporate finance. He holds a bachelor's and master's degree in economics from Universidad de San Andres and earned his Master's and PhD in Economics from The University of Chicago.

Research topics

• Finance
• Business
• Accounting
• Industrial organization
• Marketing
• Financial system
• Economics
• Actuarial science
• Management

Selected publications

• Product Complexity, Investor Experience, and Returns

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01

  preprintOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• How voluntary information sharing systems form: Evidence from a U.S. commercial credit bureau

  Journal of Financial Economics · 2021 · 38 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Business
  • Financial system
  • Finance
  PublisherDOI

• How Voluntary Information Sharing Systems Form: Evidence from a U.S. Commercial Credit Bureau

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2020 · 14 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Business
  • Accounting
  • Actuarial science
  PublisherDOI

• Brazil's Messi(as)? The Lava Jato Corruption Scandal, the Recession, and the Rise of Bolsonaro

  2019-03-11

  articleSenior author
  Publisher

• How Do Laws and Institutions Affect Recovery Rates for Collateral?

  The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 2019-12-02 · 30 citations

  articleOpen access

  Abstract Using unique internal bank data on ex ante appraised liquidation and market values of assets pledged as collateral in sixteen countries, we show that laws and institutions that strengthen creditor protection increase expected recovery rates for collateral. Stronger creditor protection increases expected recovery rates for movable collateral relative to immovable collateral and shifts the composition of collateral toward movable assets, thereby increasing debt capacity through both higher loan-to-values and attenuating the creditor’s liquidation bias. Our results suggest that the recovery rate for collateral is an important first-stage mechanism through which creditor protection can improve contracting efficiency and enhance access to credit. Received September 17, 2018; editorial decision July 9, 2019 by Editor Andrew Ellul.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• The Punishment of Business

  2019-01-02

  article
  Publisher

• How Do Laws and Institutions affect Recovery Rates on Collateral?

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2019-01-01 · 11 citations

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• Information: Hard and Soft

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2018-01-01 · 190 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Information: Hard and Soft

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2018-09-01 · 154 citations

  preprint1st authorCorresponding

  Information is a fundamental component of all financial transactions and markets, but it can arrive in multiple forms.We define what is meant by hard and soft information and describe the relative advantages of each.Hard information is quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, and its information content is independent of its collection.As technology changes the way we collect, process, and communicate information, it changes the structure of markets, design of financial intermediaries, and the incentives to use or misuse information.We survey the literature to understand how these concepts influence the continued evolution of financial markets and institutions.

  PublisherDOI

• The Anatomy of a Credit Supply Shock: Evidence from an Internal Credit Market

  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2018-04-01 · 59 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  We investigate how financial contracting interacts with lending-channel effects by tracing the anatomy of a credit supply shock using micro-level data from a multinational bank. Borrowers with stronger lending relationships, higher nonlending revenues, and those that pledge collateral, especially outside assets and real estate, experience less credit rationing. Consistent with a tightening of financing constraints post shock, borrower composition shifts toward larger and less risky firms, and loans exhibit higher collateralization rates. Our analysis highlights the value of relationships and suggests that relationship banking is a channel through which borrowers can mitigate lending-channel effects.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Jason Sturgess

  165 shared

• Byoung‐Hyoun Hwang

  Nanyang Technological University

  112 shared

• Mariassunta Giannetti

  13 shared

• Mitchell A. Petersen

  National Bureau of Economic Research

  12 shared

• Atif Mian

  Princeton University

  11 shared

• Charles W. Calomiris

  Utah State University

  10 shared

• Vasso Ioannidou

  9 shared

• Mauricio Larraín

  8 shared

Awards & honors

• Brattle Award (First Prize) for the best paper in corporate…
• Brattle Distinguished Paper Award twice