Michael J. Fishman
· Norman Strunk Professor of Financial Institutions; Professor of Finance; Faculty Director, PhD ProgramNorthwestern University · Management & Organizations
Active 1976–2024
About
Michael J. Fishman is the Norman Strunk Professor of Financial Institutions at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. He has served as the Senior Associate Dean for Curriculum & Teaching from 2011 to 2014 and as the Senior Associate Dean for Faculty & Research from 2018 to 2021. Professor Fishman has published widely in finance and economics, with research focusing on financial market regulation and contracting. His recent investigations include insider trading, disclosure regulations, the role of self-regulatory organizations, and long-term financial contracting. He has received multiple research awards, including the Smith Breeden Prize awarded by the American Finance Association, and has co-edited a book titled 'A Primer on Securitization'. He has held editorial positions on several finance journals and has been recognized by students with the Outstanding Professor Award multiple times. Professor Fishman earned his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago and holds a B.A. in Economics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Research topics
- Economics
- Computer Science
- Business
- Finance
- Microeconomics
- Monetary economics
- Mathematical economics
Selected publications
Correction to: A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
Review of Financial Studies · 2024
1st authorCorresponding- Computer Science
- Computer Science
- Mathematical economics
We only focus on slow thawing in the region between x s and 1.Note that a similar region with slow thawing can also appear in the region between x and x s and slow down the convergence to the screening steady state from the left."
A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
Review of Financial Studies · 2024 · 7 citations
1st authorCorresponding- Economics
- Monetary economics
- Business
Abstract We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.
A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2020 · 1 citations
1st authorCorresponding- Business
- Economics
Frequent coauthors
- 18 shared
Kathleen M. Hagerty
Northwestern University
- 13 shared
Peter M. DeMarzo
- 9 shared
Neng Wang
National Bureau of Economic Research
- 8 shared
Jonathan A. Parker
New School
- 3 shared
Ludwig Straub
- 2 shared
Francis A. Longstaff
- 2 shared
Zhiguo He
- 1 shared
Ronald M. Harstad
University of Missouri
Awards & honors
- Smith Breeden Prize, American Finance Association
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