About

Peter D. Feaver (Ph.D., Harvard, 1990) is a Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University. He is the Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy and Co-PI of the America in the World Consortium. Feaver has authored several books, including 'Thanks For Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the US Military' (Oxford University Press, 2023), 'Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations' (Harvard Press, 2003), and 'Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States' (Cornell University Press, 1992). He has also co-authored and co-edited multiple works on civil-military relations, American foreign policy, and national security issues. His research interests include grand strategy, civil-military relations, nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, and public opinion. Feaver has served in key government roles, including as Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform on the National Security Council Staff at the White House from June 2005 to July 2007, and as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council in 1993-94. He is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group and contributes to policy discussions through various platforms.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Law
• Sociology
• Social psychology
• Psychology
• Medicine
• Public relations
• History
• Demography

Selected publications

• Afterword

  2026-01-30

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has proven to be more durable than many expected it to be. It is more effective, more ethical, more politically sustainable, and more legitimate than the realistic alternatives. It only falls short in comparison to conscription in the area of promoting civic virtues widely through the citizenry. It faces challenges but is worth preserving. The AVF can continue to work, but only if it adapts to meet the new geopolitical, demographic, and political realities—and only if we remember that the AVF exists chiefly to protect the homeland and US global interests and not to solve a host of other worthy goals policymakers are tempted to assign to it.

  PublisherDOI

• Right or Wrong? The Civil–Military Problematique and <i>Armed Forces &amp; Society</i> ’s 50th

  Armed Forces & Society · 2024-05-30 · 5 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  The central concern of civil–military relations theory is how to have a military institution simultaneously strong enough to protect society and the state from enemies while also properly sized and obedient enough not to pose a threat itself to that society and state. When scholars wrestle with this question, they must engage the seminal contributions from Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, as I did in “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control.” In hindsight, it is clear that I was right enough in theory but perhaps not in practice. Thirty years of American civil–military relations shows the importance of norms and the strain on military professionalism imposed by the principal norm for democracies: that civilians have the right to be wrong. Future scholars must emphasize the shoring up of norms that build the trust that lubricates day-to-day civil–military interactions.

  PublisherDOI

• Conclusion

  2023-06-07

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Many of the major pillars undergirding public confidence in the military are eroding, suggesting that high public confidence may be increasingly hollow. Military leaders are wise to be concerned about keeping public support high. But more important than the overall level of confidence is the deservedness. Public confidence that is driven by realistic assessments in the competence and nonpartisan professionalism of the military is good; confidence that is driven by political loyalties, social desirability, or partisan blame games is not as good. When the military does not live up to its reputation, it is essential for the public to have a clear-eyed, but respectful, view of these shortcomings so that it can exercise the oversight and accountability necessary for a democratic military to get back on track. A draft is not needed to shore up public support. Instead, civilian and military leaders could help better situate the military in the public constellation by launching a new “Thanks for Your Service” movement, one that lauds all of the nonmilitary ways people can serve in contemporary society. Civilians should also revive civics education—and military leaders renew the push for military professionalism—to shore up a normative understanding of proper civil-military relations. Future research can refine these recommendations and track changes over time.

  PublisherDOI

• Figures

  2023-06-07

  other1st authorCorresponding

  Subject US Politics Collection: Oxford Scholarship Online

  PublisherDOI

• Introduction

  2023-06-07

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Existing research has established that public confidence in the military is high, but that research raises more questions than it answers. What drives public confidence, does high confidence matter for other things we care about, and where is public confidence in the military headed? The military is a salient institution in American society, but the public knows very little about the military except that other members of the public seem to hold the military in high regard. The public is not highly inclined to join the military nor to learn more about the military. Taken together, the picture is one of high regard at high remove. The topic is ripe for a deeper examination.

  PublisherDOI

• Copyright Page

  2023-06-07

  other1st authorCorresponding

  Extract Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Peter Feaver 2023 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form

  PublisherDOI

• Replication Data for Thanks For Your Service and Technical Appendix

  Harvard Dataverse · 2023-07-11

  datasetOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Replication Data for Thanks For Your Service (Oxford University Press, 2023). Technical Appendix for Thanks For Your Service (Oxford University Press, 2023)

  PublisherDOI

• Chapter 7 The Fulcrum of Fragility: Command and Control in Regional Nuclear Powers

  Cornell University Press eBooks · 2023-01-20 · 1 citations

  book-chapterOpen accessSenior author

  Command and control systems are the operational means by which a state conducts the management, deployment, and potential release of nuclear weapons. 1 These operational features of a state's nuclear arsenal directly impact impor tant dimensions of nuclear strategy and strategic stability, such as a state's ability to survive an initial attack and retaliate with nuclear force.Command and control systems that are robust enough to accomplish this demanding mission reinforce nuclear deterrence.Command and control vulnerabilities, however, can pre sent leaders with a "use them or lose them" dilemma that could escalate a crisis into conflict. 2 Command and control systems also constitute the primary defense against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.The structure of a state's command and control arrangements underpin core concepts of nuclear strategy such as strategic stability and arsenal safety and security.Despite the importance of command and control systems for maintaining nuclear safety and stability, the causes and consequences of command and control in regional nuclear powers remain poorly understood.Whereas scholars have made significant pro gress in explaining other aspects of nuclear strategy and proliferation, operational level outcomes such as nuclear 1.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Confidence in the Military over Time and Today

  2023-06-07

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Public confidence in the military is high in the aggregate today, but that fact masks important changes over time as well as important differences of opinion among subgroups. A closer look at existing surveys, coupled with an in-depth analysis of two proprietary surveys conducted in 2019 and 2020 with the express purpose of exploring the dynamics of public confidence in the military, sheds new light on the topic. In the aggregate, public confidence in the military is highly correlated with whether or not the military is deployed to overseas wars. Once disaggregated, on average, high confidence in the military is more a Republican than a Democrat thing, more an old than a young thing, more a male than a female thing, and more a white than a minority thing. Moreover, when pressed, the public clearly ranks the military as a whole higher than certain prominent military individuals.

  PublisherDOI

• Whether and How Confidence Shapes Concrete Support for Raising and Maintaining the Military

  2023-06-07

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Military leaders are wise to monitor overall public confidence in the military because public attitudes about confidence in the military track closely with other attitudes military leaders rightly must prize: the public’s support for raising and maintaining strong armed forces and public attitudes about the sort of missions the military should be assigned to conduct. Exposure to portrayals of the military in popular culture appears to be linked with higher confidence among younger Americans of recruiting age. Moreover, other Americans—the parents, friends, or aunts and uncles of potential recruits—with high levels of confidence in the military are more likely to advise friends and family members to consider military service than are those with low confidence. More confident Americans—and this is especially true of Republicans in the post-9/11 era—are more likely to support higher military budgets, but other fiscal and domestic factors likely shape the context of budget debates in even more critical ways.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Christopher Gelpi

  The Ohio State University

  29 shared

• Jason Reifler

  University of Exeter

  14 shared

• Hal Brands

  9 shared

• Peter R. Lavoy

  9 shared

• Richard H. Kohn

  5 shared

• Stephen Biddle

  4 shared

• John H. Aldrich

  3 shared

• Kristin Thompson Sharp

  Duke University

  3 shared

Awards & honors

• Civil Discourse Project - Institutional Support (2026-2027)
• Executive in Residence Fellowship (2026-2027)
• Civil Discourse Project - Fellowship Support (2026-2027)