About

Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. He chairs the Hoover Institution Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and is the principal investigator of the Global Digital Policy Incubator, part of Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center. Diamond has directed FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, where he now leads its Program on Arab Reform and Democracy. His research focuses on democratic trends and conditions around the world, as well as policies and reforms to defend and advance democracy. He is the founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy and serves as a senior consultant at the International Forum for Democratic Studies of the National Endowment for Democracy. Diamond has authored several books, including "Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency," which analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy globally and offers an agenda for strengthening and defending democracy. His work also includes critical analyses of U.S. foreign policy and postwar Iraq, and he has edited numerous books on democratic development worldwide. Diamond teaches courses on democracy and American foreign policy at Stanford, including a MOOC on Comparative Democratic Development. He holds all his degrees from Stanford University, including a Ph.D. in Sociology, and has taught at Vanderbilt University. His extensive consulting and advising work spans government agencies, international organizations, and think tanks, emphasizing governance, development, and democratic reform.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Sociology
• Law
• Chemistry
• Economics
• Political economy
• Medicine
• Positive economics
• Development economics
• Geography
• Psychology

Selected publications

• 8 Conclusion

  Lynne Rienner Publishers eBooks · 2025-01-16

  book-chapterOpen access

  Addressing the toxic tribalism and political extremism that has arisen in recent decades requires action along many fronts.One of these is the institutional framework within which democratic politics and elections take place.This volume has brought together a highly distinguished group of academics from several disciplines who have spent much of their careers studying how the design of democratic processes shapes politics and the political culture more generally.Our task force also includes lawyers and others with substantial experience with the political process.We do not believe there is a single institutional-design reform, or even a series of reforms, that could magically transform our political culture.But institutional reforms can matter at the margins in combatting political extremism, and those margins can make a significant difference in the kind of politics we experience and the larger political culture we inhabit.The institutional framework within which politics and elections take place creates incentive structures that shape which candidates decide to run, which are likely to win, and the relationship between political parties, candidates, officeholders, interest groups, and the general public.Moreover, because many citizens take political cues from those who hold public office, particularly the most visible public officials, the types of candidates who succeed also shape the larger political culture.In this book, we have brought to bear the best current empirical knowledge on a variety of institutional reforms that have been offered to combat extremism.We believe it is critical to test reform proposals against the best data available, and, indeed, one aim of this book is to 8 Conclusion

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• 1 The Electoral Reform Imperative

  Lynne Rienner Publishers eBooks · 2025-01-16 · 1 citations

  book-chapterOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Scholars, journalists, and the American people broadly agree that American democracy is in difficulty, if not grave danger.Recent surveys consistently find that 50 to 60 percent of Americans are not satisfied with the way democracy is working in the United States.And they think the problem is systemic. 1In a 2021 Pew survey, a stunning 85 percent of Americans said the US political system either needs "major changes" or must be "completely reformed"; 58 percent of adults who reported wanting substantial reforms said "they are not confident the system can change." 2These figures were among the highest of all advanced industrial democracies surveyed in 2021. 3In 2022, Americans' confidence in their national government was the lowest among citizens of G7 democracies (31 percent), 4 about the level of Nigeria and Venezuela. 5And early that same year, a Quinnipiac poll found that substantial majorities of both Democrats and Republicans believed "the nation's democracy is in danger of collapse." 6ne result-or at least correlate-of declining public satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the United States is that Americans' support for the specific institutions and norms of democracy also is declining.Some studies find a generational erosion in support for democracy as a form of government, with "more supportive older generations being replaced by less supportive younger ones." 7This pattern of erosion may have started decades ago, but it seems to have accelerated more recently.According to a recent survey of the Democracy Fund's Voter Study Group, comprised of scholars and analysts focused on public sentiment, few Americans show a consistent commitment to democracy.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• The status and prospects for democracy in Asia

  2025-06-27

  report1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Power, Performance, and Legitimacy

  Journal of democracy · 2024-03-22 · 11 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract: Democracies today remain in a potent and protracted recession, and they have retreated from the ideological struggle against autocracy. We can renew the world's democratic momentum through power, performance, and legitimacy. Democracies must generate economic prosperity and opportunity while containing corruption, crime, and abuses of power, to reinvigorate support for democracy across regions and generations. Liberal democracies cannot be weak or retreat; they must exert their power to safeguard free and fair elections, independent media, and the rule of law. Nowhere in the world where dictatorships repress rights, censor information, and propagate disinformation can democracy be secure. Every defense of democracy is a source of inspiration and instruction. We must get serious again about promoting the values, experiences, requirements, and institutions of democracy. And we must do so on the scale, with the scope and ease of access in many languages, required to save it.

  PublisherDOI

• Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over? An Empirical Assessment

  2024-01-01 · 33 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Since the Portuguese military overthrew the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship in April of 1974, the number of democracies in the world has multiplied dramatically. Before the start of this global trend toward democracy, there were roughly 40 countries in the world that could be rated as more or less democratic. The number increased moderately through the late 1970s and early 1980s as a number of states experienced transitions from authoritarian (predominantly military) to democratic rule. But then, in the mid-1980s, the pace of global democratic expansion accelerated markedly, to the point where as of 1996 there were somewhere between 76 and 117 democracies, depending on how one counts. How one counts is crucial, however, to the task of this essay: thinking about whether democracy will continue to expand in the world, or even hold steady at its current level. In fact, it raises the most fundamental philosophical and political questions of what we mean by democracy. Resumen Desde que los militares portugueses derrocaron la dictadura de Salazar/Caetano en Abril de 1974 el número de democracias en el mundo se ha multiplicado drásticamente. Antes del comienzo de este movimiento global hacia la democracia, había aproximadamente cuarenta países en el mundo que pudieran ser clasificados como más o menos democráticos. El número aumentó moderadamente entre fines de los setenta y principios de los ochenta, cuando una serie de estados experimentaron transiciones desde gobiernos autoritarios (predominantemente militares) hacia gobiernos democráticos. Pero entonces, a mediados de los ochenta, el ritmo de expansión democrática global se aceleró marcadamente, a punto tal hacia 1996 habían, dependiendo de cómo uno cuente, entre setenta y seis y ciento diecisiete democracias. Sin embargo, el modo en que uno cuenta es crucial para el propósito de este ensayo: pensar de si la democracia continuará expandiéndose en el mundo, o aún si se mantendrá en sus niveles actuales. En efecto, cómo uno cuenta plantea la pregunta filosófica y política más fundamental de qué queremos decir con 'democracia.'

  PublisherDOI

• Electoral Reform in the United States

  Lynne Rienner Publishers eBooks · 2024-12-30 · 1 citations

  bookOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  In the midst of the political ugliness that has become part of our everyday reality, are there steps that can be taken to counter polarization and extremism—practical steps that are acceptable across the political spectrum? To answer that question, starting from the premise that the way our political processes are designed inevitably creates incentives for certain styles of politics and candidates, the Task Force on American Electoral Reform spent two years exploring alternative ideas for reforming key aspects of the US electoral process. The results of their work are presented in this essential book.

  PublisherDOI

• Deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan

  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists · 2023-03-04 · 5 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  ABSTRACTThere is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People's Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms "reunification." Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a "porcupine strategy" of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security.KEYWORDS: TaiwanChinaJapanTaiwan straitCross-strait relationsporcupine strategy AcknowledgmentsThe authors co-led a delegation on regional security and semiconductor technology to Taiwan in August 2022 that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. In addition, this paper draws on insights generated by conferences and presentations organized by the Hoover Institution's Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region, which receives annual support from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco—the representative office of Taiwan in the area—as well as from private donors. We thank them and the Hoover Institution for their support. We also thank Michael Brown for his comments on a draft of this article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).FundingThe authors co-led an August 2022 delegation to Taiwan to discuss security and semiconductor technology that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. This paper draws on meetings and conferences that benefited in part from this financial support. However, no official of the government of Taiwan or the US government reviewed any portion of this paper prior to publication, and no permission or feedback was sought from any government official or agency. The paper represents the authors' own independent thinking and not the views of any government, government agency, or other organization.FundingThe authors co-led an August 2022 delegation to Taiwan to discuss security and semiconductor technology that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. This paper draws on meetings and conferences that benefited in part from this financial support. However, no official of the government of Taiwan or the US government reviewed any portion of this paper prior to publication, and no permission or feedback was sought from any government official or agency. The paper represents the authors' own independent thinking and not the views of any government, government agency, or other organization.Additional informationFundingThe authors co-led an August 2022 delegation to Taiwan to discuss security and semiconductor technology that received partial support from the government of Taiwan. This paper draws on meetings and conferences that benefited in part from this financial support. However, no official of the government of Taiwan or the US government reviewed any portion of this paper prior to publication, and no permission or feedback was sought from any government official or agency. The paper represents the authors' own independent thinking and not the views of any government, government agency, or other organization.Notes on contributorsLarry DiamondLarry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He co-chairs the Hoover Institution's Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its Project on China's Global Sharp Power. He has visited Taiwan annually since 1995 and was a visiting fellow at the Academia Sinica in Taipei during 1997-98.James O. EllisJames O. Ellis, Jr., USN (Ret.) is the Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He co-chairs the Hoover Institution's Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and chairs Hoover's Global Policy and Strategy Initiative. A 39-year Navy veteran, he held six operational commands and several senior staff positions. In 1996, Adm. Ellis served as commander of the aircraft carrier battle group that led US contingency response operations in the Taiwan Strait.

  PublisherDOI

• Mr. Modi comes to Washington – The Indian prime minister’s visit could strengthen ties with the US, but also raises some delicate issues

  2023-06-19

  preprintSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Afterword: Nigeria’s Long Search for a Viable Political Order

  Boydell and Brewer eBooks · 2023-12-31

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Afterword: Nigeria's Long Search for a Viable Political Order

  2023-09-19

  other1st authorCorresponding

  The chapters in this volume tell a sobering tale of a major emerging-market country (by far Africa's most populous) still searching for a viable political order six decades after its independence. Among the largest states that emerged from colonial rule after the Second World War (countries like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines), none faces such persistent and deep questions as does Nigeria about its future existence as one nation. And in recent years, secessionist calls and pressures have multiplied. Even within Africa, only a few large countries (such as Ethiopia and the Congo) confront anything like these existential challenges to their corporate existence. The tenacity of this most basic question of political order – who and what constitutes the nation – may seem odd for a country that has enjoyed decades of bountiful oil revenue to fund the central state and distribute resources to diverse parts of the country. But, as in many other low-income countries that have become largely dependent on this stream of income, oil has been very much part of the problem.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Marc F. Plattner

  60 shared

• Steven Smith

  18 shared

• Juan J. Linz

  Yale University

  16 shared

• Yun‐han Chu

  Academia Sinica

  16 shared

• Seymour Martin Lipset

  15 shared

• Victoria A. Farrar‐Myers

  13 shared

• Cynthia Enloe

  13 shared

• Ann O'

  Texas A&M University

  13 shared

Education

• Ph.D., Political Science

  Stanford University

  1985

• M.A., Political Science

  University of California, Berkeley

  1980

• B.A., Political Science

  Yale University

  1977