About

Fabio Ghironi is a Paul F. Glaser Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Washington. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Berkeley, obtained in 1999, and has earned a Master’s degree in Economics from Bocconi University in Milan in 1994, as well as a Laurea cum Laude in Economic and Social Sciences from Bocconi University in 1993. His fields of interest include International Macroeconomics, Macroeconomics, and Monetary Economics. Ghironi's research focuses on macroeconomic interdependence, international trade, and monetary policy, with notable contributions to understanding the valuation channel of external adjustment, the role of net foreign assets in small open economy models, and the dynamics of trade and macroeconomic heterogeneity. He has advised students and taught courses on monetary economics and advanced macroeconomics, contributing significantly to academic discourse in these areas.

Research topics

• International economics
• Economics
• Political Science
• Monetary economics
• Macroeconomics
• Econometrics

Selected publications

• Interest rate uncertainty as a policy tool?

  Journal of International Economics · 2025-10-10 · 1 citations

  article1st author
  PublisherDOI

• International trade and macroeconomic dynamics with sanctions

  Journal of Monetary Economics · 2025-07-25 · 4 citations

  articleOpen access1st author

  We develop a framework combining dynamic, intertemporal choices of general-equilibrium macro models with microfoundations of modern trade theory to study sanctions. In a two-country, two-sector setup, Home holds a comparative advantage in producing differentiated consumption goods via heterogeneous firms with endogenous entry, while Foreign in homogeneous intermediate goods from a fixed number of firms. Sanctions include trade bans and financial restrictions excluding particular Foreign agents from markets. In our model, sanctions reallocate resources across and within countries, affecting production, exchange rates, and welfare, with larger welfare losses when targeting sectors of comparative disadvantage. Focusing only on long-run outcomes, overlooking initial dynamics, inaccurately assesses welfare impacts. Sanctions weaken international comovement and fragment markets but leave business cycles intact. • A framework to study the effects of sanctions which are designed as forced exits at extensive margin. • Sanctions generate producer recomposition, impacting the exchange rate, welfare, and business cycle comovements. • Sanctions cause profound welfare losses if they target sectors with comparative disadvantage. • Overlooking adjustment periods mismeasures the true welfare impacts of sanctions. • Sanctions fragment global comovements but minimally affect within-country business cycles.

  PublisherDOI

• International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with Sanctions

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2024-03-01 · 3 citations

  reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  We study international trade and macroeconomic dynamics triggered by the imposition of sanctions.We begin with a tractable two-country model where Home and Foreign countries have comparative advantages in production of differentiated consumption goods and a commodity (e.g., gas), respectively.Home imposes sanctions on Foreign.Financial sanctions exclude a fraction of Foreign agents from the international bond market.Gas sanctions take the form of a ban on gas trade, equivalent to an appropriate price cap in our model.Differentiated goods trade sanctions exclude a fraction of Foreign and Home exporters from international trade.All sanctions lead to resource reallocation in both economies.Exchange rate movements reflect the direction of reallocation and the type of sanctions imposed rather than the success of the sanctions.Welfare analysis shows that gas sanctions are more costly for Home, while differentiated consumption goods trade sanctions are more costly for Foreign.A third country that refrains from joining the sanctions mitigates welfare losses in Foreign, but refraining from joining the sanctions is beneficial for the third country.These findings highlight the importance and the difficulty of international coordination when imposing sanctions.

  PublisherDOI

• International Economic Sanctions and Third-Country Effects

  IMF Economic Review · 2024 · 32 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Political Science
  • Economics
  • International economics
  PublisherDOI

• International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with Sanctions

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 4 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Interest Rate Uncertainty as a Policy Tool?

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022-01-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Trade, unemployment, and monetary policy

  Journal of International Economics · 2021 · 25 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Economics
  • Monetary economics
  • International economics
  PublisherDOI

• Market Reforms at the Zero Lower Bound

  Journal of money credit and banking · 2021-03-15 · 9 citations

  articleSenior author

  Abstract This paper studies the impact of product and labor market reforms when the economy faces major slack and a binding constraint on monetary policy easing—such as the zero lower bound (ZLB). To this end, we build a model with endogenous producer entry, labor market frictions, and nominal rigidities. We find that while the effect of market reforms depends on the cyclical conditions under which they are implemented, the ZLB itself does not appear to matter. In fact, when carried out in a recession, the impact of reforms is typically stronger when the ZLB is binding. The reason is that reforms are inflationary in our structural model (or they have no noticeable deflationary effects). Thus, contrary to the implications of reduced‐form modeling of product and labor market reforms as exogenous reductions in price and wage markups, our analysis shows that there is no simple across‐the‐board relationship between market reforms and the behavior of real marginal costs. This significantly alters the consequences of the zero (or any effective) lower bound on policy rates.

  PublisherDOI

• Protectionism and the business cycle

  Journal of International Economics · 2021 · 92 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Economics
  • Monetary economics
  • International economics
  PublisherDOI

• Trade, Unemployment, and Monetary Policy

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2020-07-01 · 12 citations

  preprintOpen accessSenior author

  We study how trade linkages affect the conduct of monetary policy in a two-country model with heterogeneous firms, endogenous producer entry, and labor market frictions. We show that the ability of the model to replicate key empirical regularities following trade integration--synchronization of business cycles across trading partners and reallocation of market shares toward more productive firms---is central to understanding how trade costs affect monetary policy trade-offs. First, productivity gains through firm selection reduce the need of positive inflation to correct long-run distortions. As a result, lower trade costs reduce the optimal average inflation rate. Second, as stronger trade linkages increase business cycle synchronization, country-specific shocks have more global consequences. Thus, the optimal stabilization policy remains inward looking. By contrast, sub-optimal, inward-looking stabilization---for instance too narrow a focus on price stability---results in larger welfare costs when trade linkages are strong due to inefficient fluctuations in cross-country aggregate demand.

  PublisherDOI

Recent grants

• International Trade and Macroeconomic Dynamics with Sanctions

  NSF · $459k · 2023–2026

Frequent coauthors

• Matteo Cacciatore

  HEC Montréal

  382 shared

• Marc J. Melitz

  Centre for Economic Policy Research

  289 shared

• Florin Bilbiie

  University of Cambridge

  208 shared

• Giuseppe Fiori

  Federal Reserve Board of Governors

  164 shared

• Romain Duval

  International Monetary Fund

  122 shared

• Giulia Sestieri

  Banque de France

  69 shared

• Matthieu Bussière

  69 shared

• Giovanni Callegari

  Ente Regionale per i Servizi all'Agricoltura e alle Foreste

  69 shared

Education

• Ph.D., Economics

  University of California Berkeley

  1999

Awards & honors

• 2017-2018 Buechel Scholarship and Conley Fellowship
• Ensley Graduate Fellowship Award (2017-2018)
• NBER Pre-doctoral Fellowship (2017)
• Washington Center for Equitable Growth Grant (2017)