About

Professor Anil Arya is a faculty member in the Department of Economics at The Ohio State University, holding a courtesy appointment as a Professor. He earned his Ph.D. in Business from The University of Iowa in 1991 and his B.Tech. in Mechanical Engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India, in 1987. His research has developed insights about accounting practices and highlighted the unique role played by accounting numbers in decentralized organizations where information is critical. His scholarly work has studied issues such as earnings management, real options and control problems, information system design, team effectiveness, and historical cost reporting. Professor Arya's articles have been published in numerous academic journals, including the Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, The Accounting Review, Review of Accounting Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, The Rand Journal of Economics, Management Science, and Issues in Accounting Education. In addition to his research, he teaches in the MBA, MAcc, undergraduate Honors, and Ph.D. Accounting programs, emphasizing an interdisciplinary approach that highlights economic forces influencing accounting practices.

Research topics

• Microeconomics
• Business
• Economics
• Accounting
• Finance
• Public economics
• Marketing
• Industrial organization
• Macroeconomics
• Actuarial science

Selected publications

• Disclosure Incentives for Firms in Light of Cross-Ownership

  The Accounting Review · 2026-03-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  ABSTRACT We model two competing firms, each operating through their controlled subsidiaries while also holding a minority financial stake in their rival’s subsidiary. Under such cross-ownership, we derive the firms’ optimal disclosure policies, showing how they are affected by technological spillovers, competitive intensity, and the nature of product markets. The results demonstrate that cross-ownership induces more disclosures, benefiting the firm because disclosures promote the profit of its subsidiary (at low spillover values) or the rival’s subsidiary (at high spillover values). The increased transparency under cross-ownership can generate Pareto gains, improving consumer surplus and firm profits relative to separate ownership. This unifying finding holds under quantity and price competition, challenging the view that cross-ownership leads firms to collude, harming consumers. Additionally, with cross-ownership, high-spillover disclosures occur more under price than quantity competition. Thus, price competition can generate Pareto gains, contradicting the view that it favors consumers at the expense of firms. JEL Classifications: D43; D60; D82.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• MoO3/MoS2 based nanocomposite electrodes with ultrahigh performance and excellent cyclic stability for supercapacitor application

  Materials Science and Engineering B · 2025-02-08 · 17 citations

  article
  PublisherDOI

• Disclosure to competitors in light of endogenous firm investments

  Contemporary Accounting Research · 2025-06-17 · 1 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract This paper extends a familiar model of competition and disclosure to incorporate the practical feature that firms may not only hold private information about consumer demand, but they can also influence demand by the investments they make in improving product quality. Such investments can reflect installing new product features, improving durability, adding design enhancements, and the like. This paper demonstrates that investments stand to significantly influence the firm's preference for disclosures and, in fact, become a determining feature of disclosure choice. In particular, under Cournot competition, a firm prefers disclosure when the industry‐wide effects of information and investments are concordant. That is, if both product quality and demand information have large positive industry spillovers, disclosure is desirable because it promotes implicit cooperation in investments; if both have low spillover, disclosure permits a firm to convey strength to a rival and then use quantity and quality in concert to dominate the market precisely when the firm's demand is at its peak.

  PublisherDOI

• The Evolving Make-or-Buy Decision: Strategic Concurrent Sourcing and Capacity Disclosures

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Disclosure Incentives for Firms in Light of Cross-Ownership

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01 · 1 citations

  preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Synergetic effect driven WO3/MoS2 nanocomposite based electrode for high-efficiency supercapacitors

  Electrochimica Acta · 2025-03-02 · 18 citations

  article
  PublisherDOI

• Overcoming the Challenges in Aqueous Zinc Metal Batteries: Underlying Issues and Mitigation Strategies

  Chemistry - An Asian Journal · 2025-05-16

  review1st author

  The increasing demand for green and clean energy harvesting and their judicious storage call for pursuing new energy storage technologies. Building better batteries has drawn significant attention to fulfilling the energy demand by delivering the stored electrical energy at the anticipated time and minimal cost. Li-ion batteries play a crucial role in transitioning to a sustainable energy landscape. However, their safety and environmental issues are of concern. Zn-based batteries provide more sustainable solutions due to their low cost, enhanced safety, and environmental benignity. Still, poor thermodynamic reversibility and stability of Zn anode in the aqueous electrolytes prevent its practical application. Significant efforts such as Zn anode surface engineering and electrolyte and/or interface modification alleviate these issues. However, in-depth studies of the root causes associated with the reversibility and stability issues of Zn electrodes are still deficient. Hence, this review focuses on the underlying causes of the major issues (dendrite, hydrogen evolution, corrosion, and passivation) associated with Zn anodes. Furthermore, we have summarized the technological advances that have been made to address these issues. Finally, some promising future directions and perspectives are provided for a further in-depth understanding of thermodynamic irreversibility and to improve the overall performance of the Zn anode.

  PublisherDOI

• Coordinating Pro-Social Practices in Decentralized Relationships: The Case of the Buy-One-Give-One Model

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Team Design and its Implications for Competition and Disclosure

  Production and Operations Management · 2025-03-13 · 1 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  This article examines how the composition of managerial teams influences the information and competitive landscapes in which firms operate. Specifically, the impact of teams depends on the task environment under which they operate and the extent of competition the firm faces in the product markets. Under a substitute task environment, team heterogeneity better facilitates firm learning, whereas, under a complementary task environment, team homogeneity enhances learning. However, more learning is not always optimal, as this accentuates adverse selection concerns, which leads the firm's rival to counter by becoming more aggressive in competition. This, in turn, forces the firm to cede some of its information advantage through disclosures. In effect, when designing teams to manage information, the firm must balance its learning needs with its rival's competitive threats. Consequently, in a substitute task environment, team heterogeneity is only optimal for the firm when competition is not fierce, and homogeneity is desirable otherwise. In a complementary task environment, the preference for teams as a function of competition is reversed. Additionally, any inherent heterogeneity in the level of competition in the product markets in which the firm operates diminishes the demand for team heterogeneity. The article also derives the firm's optimal team composition when the markets are characterized by Bertrand or Cournot competition, when the available managerial pool for the firm is constrained or unconstrained, when tasks are market-specific or firm-specific, and when the task environment is generalized.

  PublisherDOI

• Seemingly Self-Sabotaging Disclosures

  The Accounting Review · 2024-12-12

  article1st authorCorresponding

  ABSTRACT Firm disclosures are observed by multiple audiences with diverse interests. Recognizing this practical feature, studies have examined how conflicting incentives provided by the multiple recipients of the information affect disclosure outcomes. Understandably, studies have not examined scenarios wherein disclosure incentives from recipients align in the same direction. With aligned incentives, disclosure incentives are presumably “additive.” This paper challenges such thinking. We model a firm that faces a potential entrant and a scrutinizing regulator so each individually incentivizes the firm to withhold favorable market news. However, we show that their joint presence can drastically change the disclosure equilibrium: the firm may voluntarily disclose good news seemingly in self-sabotage. Such disclosures attract entry, compelling the firm to yield its monopoly position. However, by ceding market power, the firm boosts consumer surplus and soothes regulatory concerns. The ensuing reduction in regulatory costs borne by the firm can then increase the firm’s overall value.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Brian Mittendorf

  99 shared

• Jonathan Glover

  King's College London

  53 shared

• Ram Ramanan

  Indian School of Business

  32 shared

• John C. Fellingham

  Fisher College

  24 shared

• Richard Young

  Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research

  10 shared

• Thomas Pfeiffer

  10 shared

• Hans Frimor

  University of Southern Denmark

  9 shared

• Dae‐Hee Yoon

  Yonsei University

  7 shared